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THE CONSTITUTIONAL TENSION BETWEEN
APPRENDI AND McKEJVER: SENTENCE
ENHANCEMENTS BASED ON DELINQUENCY
CONVICTIONS AND THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN
JUVENILE COURTS
Barry C. Feld*
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court ruled that any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime "other than the fact of
a prior conviction" must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi exempted the fact of a
prior conviction from its holding because criminal defendants
enjoyed a constitutional right to a jury trial at the time the state
obtained that conviction which assured the accuracy and
reliability of the prior record. By contrast, a plurality of the
Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania denied juvenile
delinquents a constitutional right to a jury trial and the vast
majority of states do not provide juveniles with either a state
constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial. The absence of
a jury right detracts from the factual accuracy of delinquency
convictions, adversely affects the quality of justice and delivery
of legal services in juvenile courts, and raises significant
questions about the propriety of using delinquency
adjudications to enhance adult criminal sentences under the
Apprendi exception for prior convictions. Since Apprendi,
federal circuit and state appellate courts are divided on the use
of delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences.
While it is important to use delinquency convictions to enhance
criminal sentences, justice and fairness require that courts only
use convictions that satisfy Apprendi's procedural
requirements. McKeiver long has been ripe for overruling on
its own merits, and Apprendi provides additional impetus for
the Supreme Court and states to grant juveniles a
constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial so that criminal
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courts properly may use delinquency adjudications as a
legitimate "fact of a prior conviction."
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In Apprendi v. New Jersey,' the Supreme Court ruled that
"foither than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."2 The
Court reasoned that Due Process required a jury to find the facts
upon which a court based an enhanced sentence as an "element" of
the offense at trial, rather than to allow a judge to find those facts
by a preponderance of the evidence as a "sentencing factor" at a
sentencing hearing. The Court exempted the "fact of a prior
conviction" from its holding because defendants enjoyed criminal
procedural safeguards, including the right to a jury trial and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, which assured the accuracy and
reliability of the prior record.'
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
3. Id; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)
(stating that Congress treated recidivism as a sentencing factor rather than an
[Vol. 381112
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Although Apprendi provoked a flood of criminal sentence
appeals and a mixed scholarly reaction,' it has important
element of the aggravated offense).
4. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 620 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("As of May 31, 2002, less than two years after Apprendi was
announced, the United States Courts of Appeals had decided approximately
1,802 criminal appeals in which defendants challenged their sentences, and in
some cases even their convictions, under Apprendi. These federal appeals are
likely only the tip of the iceberg, as federal criminal prosecutions represent a
tiny fraction of the total number of criminal prosecutions nationwide."); see also
Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87
IOWA L. REV. 465, 468 (2001) (analyzing impact of Apprendi on allocation of
institutional powers between legislatures, prosecutors, judges, and juries,
noting ease with which legislatures can circumvent Apprendi because
"legislatures can raise statutory maxima and then allow judges to lower these
maxima by finding mitigating facts. In other words, Apprendi applies only to
aggravating but not mitigating facts."); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding
and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L. J. 1097,
1100 (2001) [hereinafter Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding) (criticizing Apprendi for
obsessive emphasis on jury trials when most criminal convictions are based on
guilty pleas and thereby depriving defendants of the only factual determination
they practically enjoy at sentencing hearings); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v.
New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 255 (2001) ("In the
year since the Court's opinion, more than four hundred federal and state court
decisions have dealt with Apprendi issues, and a recent article in the Federal
Sentencing Reporter listed forty-eight federal statutes that either have been or
may soon be challenged under Apprendi."); Kyron Huigens, Solving the
Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L. J. 387, 431 (2001) ("The solution to the Apprendi
puzzle turns on the distinction between fault and eligibility, a related
distinction between the functions of the jury and the functions of the sentencing
court, and rule-of-law considerations that are unique to determinations of
fault."); Benjamin J. Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281 (2001); Steven A. Saltzburg,
Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243,
264-65 (2001) (discussing procedural safeguards to regulate judicial sentencing
discretion); Jeffrey Standen, The End of an Era of Sentencing Guidelines:
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOwA L. REV. 775, 780 (2001) (stating that Apprendi
will lead to better legislative drafting by linking statutory language with
corresponding sentences); John Kenneth Zwerling, Comprendez Apprendi?, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309 (2001); B. Patrick Costello, Comment, Apprendi v. New
Jersey: "Who Decides What Constitutes a Crime?" An Analysis of Whether a
Legislature is Constitutionally Free to "Allocate" an Element of an Offense to an
Affirmative Defense or a Sentencing Factor Without Judicial Review, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1205, 1270 (2002) (criticizing Apprendi for creating judicial
backlog and confusing judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys); Andrew J.
Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and Elements
of a Crime, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2000) (arguing that broad
interpretation of Apprendi calls into question the validity of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines); Stephanie B. Stewart, Note, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Protecting the
Constitutional Rights of Criminals at Sentencing, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1193, 1216
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implications for the use of juvenile delinquency adjudications to
enhance sentences as well. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,5 a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that juvenile delinquents,
unlike adult criminal defendants, do not enjoy a constitutional right
to a jury trial, and the vast majority of states do not provide
delinquents with a state constitutional or statutory right to a jury
trial.6 The lack of a right to a jury affects the quality of juvenile
justice administration in other ways, such as the delivery of legal
services, and raises questions about the legitimacy of using
delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences. Because of
these cumulative procedural differences, non-jury delinquency
adjudications simply are not as reliable or factually accurate as
criminal convictions. Thus, Apprendi's reasons to except "the fact of
a prior conviction" from its holding do not apply to delinquency
convictions.
Following Apprendi, appellate courts have divided over the use
of delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences. In United
. 7
States v. Tighe, the Ninth Circuit held that "Apprendi's narrow
'prior conviction' exception is limited to prior convictions resulting
from proceedings that afforded the procedural necessities of a jury
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the 'prior
conviction' exception does not include non-jury juvenile
adjudications."8 By contrast, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v.
Smalley,9 upheld an enhanced sentence which included a prior
juvenile adjudication:
[W]hile we recognize that a jury does not have a role in trials
for juvenile offenses, we do not think that this fact undermines
the reliability of such adjudications in any significant way
because we think that the use of a jury in the juvenile context
would 'not strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding
function' and is not constitutionally required. We therefore
conclude that juvenile adjudications can rightly be
characterized as "prior convictions" for Apprendi purposes...10
Federal and state courts have considered the implications of
(2001) (stating that Apprendi adds "much-needed clarity" to criminal
sentencing).
5. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
6. See infra notes 97-149 and accompanying text.
7. 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001)
8. Id. at 1194-95.
9. 294 F.3d 1030 (2002).
10. Id. at 1033 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d
688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that the absence of right to a jury trial does not
disqualify juvenile adjudication for purposes of Apprendi exception).
1114 [Vol. 38
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Apprendi for the use of delinquency convictions in other sentencing
contexts." In addition, juveniles have raised Apprendi challenges to
jurisdictional transfers and argued that the judicial waiver decision
to try a youth as an adult increases the maximum penalty to which
the youth is exposed and therefore should be submitted to a jury.
12
The Supreme Court has declined to resolve the split among the
circuits or to decide the post-Apprendi constitutionality of increased
sentences based on delinquency convictions obtained without the
right to a jury trial.
This article analyzes the implications of Apprendi for the use of
delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences. It uses the
Supreme Court's recent sentencing jurisprudence as a vehicle to
urge reconsideration of McKeiver's decision to deny juveniles a
constitutional right to a jury trial. Part I focuses on the Court's
analysis in Apprendi and the crucial role of the jury and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in the finding of facts that lead to
criminal convictions and longer sentences. Part II reviews the
history of the juvenile court and McKeiver's decision to deny
delinquents a jury trial. It analyzes the original justifications to
deny juries and the validity of those reasons in light of the increased
punitiveness of contemporary juvenile courts. Based on the Court's
reasoning in Apprendi, it argues that the jury is crucial to uphold
the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" and to assure the
factual accuracy of delinquency convictions. The absence of jury
trials adversely affects other aspects of juvenile justice
administration, such as the delivery of legal services, and further
detracts from the quality of delinquency pleas and convictions. This
section also considers the policy reasons to use delinquency
convictions for criminal sentence enhancements. Prior adjudications
as a juvenile provide important evidence of a "criminal career" and
rational criminal justice policy should include this information when
judges make criminal sentencing decisions. Part III analyzes
appellate decisions in which defendants have raised Apprendi
11. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 313 F.3d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 2002)
("We do not therefore decide whether a juvenile adjudication can be
characterized as a 'prior conviction' under Apprendi and, thus, can be used to
increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum without being
submitted to or found by a jury."); State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732 (Kan. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003); see also infra notes 306-345 and accompanying
text.
12. See, e.g., People v. Bertran, 765 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); State
v. Jones, 47 P.3d 783 (Kan. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 980 (2002);
Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d 781 (Mass. 2001); State v. Gonzales,
24 P.3d 776, 778 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). See infra notes 269-304 and
accompanying text.
20031 1115
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
challenges to the use of delinquency convictions. It critically
examines the cases involving delinquency convictions used for
sentence enhancements in light of Apprendi's concerns about the
validity and reliability of judicial fact-finding. While it is important
to use delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences, justice
and fairness require that courts only use convictions that satisfy the
procedural requirements of Apprendi. The article concludes that
McKeiver is ripe for over-ruling and urges states to grant juveniles a
state constitutional or statutory right to a jury so as to enable
criminal courts properly to use delinquency adjudications as a
legitimate "fact of prior conviction."
I. APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY AND "THE FACT OF A PRIOR
CONVICTION"
Throughout most of the twentieth century, criminal court
judges imposed indeterminate sentences. 8 For most offenses, the
legislature prescribed a relatively high maximum penalty and,
within the statutory range, the judge at a sentencing hearing
considered circumstances of the offense, characteristics of the
offender, and virtually any other factor deemed relevant to select a
sentence or to avoid imprisonment and put the defendant on
probation.14  Because indeterminate sentences allowed
13. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) ("For
almost a century, the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system
of indeterminate sentencing."). Michael Tonry, in Sentencing Matters,
summarizes the indeterminate nature of criminal sentencing in the United
States until the sentencing reforms of the 1970s.
Every American state and the federal system in 1970 had an
indeterminate sentencing system in which a legislature enacted and
amended the criminal code and set maximum penalties. Minimum
penalties existed in a few jurisdictions, but they were widely
disapproved .... Subject only to statutory maximums and occasional
minimums, judges had authority to decide whether a convicted
defendant was sentenced to probation (and with what conditions) or to
jail or prison (and for what maximum term). A parole board would
decide when prisoners were released; usually prisoners became
eligible for release after serving a third of the maximum sentence, but
they could be held until their maximum terms expired.
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6 (1996). See also Alan M. Dershowitz,
Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 297, 298-99 (1975) (stating that prison and probation officials exercised
broad discretion in defining rehabilitative goals for imprisoned offenders and
based release decisions on when they met those goals).
14. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986)
("Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without
any prescribed burden of proof at all. Pennsylvania has deemed a particular
fact relevant and prescribed a particular burden of proof. We see nothing in
1116 [Vol. 38
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individualized judicial discretion, similarly-situated offenders-
defendants convicted of the same crime and even co-defendants-
could receive vastly dissimilar sentences. No formal criteria
governed sentencing discretion, trial courts made decisions about
life and death or for terms of years on an idiosyncratic and even
arbitrary basis, and appellate courts granted convicted defendants
very limited sentence review.' 5
Beginning in the 1970s, states began to adopt determinate
sentencing laws, sentencing guidelines, and mandatory minimum
sentences to limit judicial discretion, to reduce invidious disparity,
and to create greater uniformity, predictability, and certainty in the
imposition of criminal sentences. 16  As "just deserts" displaced
Pennsylvania's scheme that would warrant constitutionalizing burdens of proof
at sentencing.") (citations omitted); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251-52
(1949) (finding that the trial judge has wide discretion in sentencing and "no
federal constitutional objection would have been possible if the judge here had
sentenced appellant to death because appellant's trial manner impressed the
judge that [the] appellant was a bad risk for society, or if the judge had
sentenced him to death giving no reason at all").
15. One prominent critic of indeterminate, discretionary sentencing, U.S.
District Judge Marvin Frankel, described the sentencing process:
The common form of criminal penalty provision confers upon the
sentencing judge an enormous range of choice[s]. The scope of what
we call "discretion" permits imprisonment for anything from a day to
one, five, 10, 20 or [even] more years ....
The statutes granting such powers characteristically say nothing
about the factors to be weighed in moving to either end of the
spectrum or to some place between . . . . Even the most basic
sentencing principles are not prescribed or stated with persuasive
authority ....
Moving upward from what should be the philosophical axioms of a
rational scheme of sentencing law, we have no structure of rules, or
even guidelines, affecting other elements arguably pertinent to the
nature or severity of the sentence .... What factors should be
assessed-and where, if anywhere, are comparisons to be sought-in
gauging the relative seriousness of the specific offense and offender as
against the spectrum of offenses by others in the same legal
category?...
With the delegation of power so unchanneled, it is surely no
overstatement to say that "the new penology has resulted in vesting in
judges and parole and probation agencies the greatest degree of
uncontrolled power over the liberty of human beings that one can find
in the legal system." The process would be totally unruly even if
judges were superbly and uniformly trained for the solemn work of
sentencing. As everyone knows, however, they are not trained at all.
Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 1, 4-6, 29-31
(1972).
16. See TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS, supra note 13, at 13-24 (describing
"just deserts" sentencing and sentencing guidelines grids); Richard S. Frase,
20031 1117
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rehabilitation as the primary purpose of sentencing, determinate
sentences based on the offense superseded individualized
indeterminate sentences. 7 Empirical evaluations questioned the
effectiveness of correctional treatment programs, the assumptions
underlying indeterminate sentencing-human malleability, the
availability of appropriate interventions, the ability of clinicians to
classify inmates for treatment-and the scientific underpinnings of
those who administered the rehabilitative enterprise. 8
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 363-65
(1997) (analyzing different sentencing theories embedded in sentencing
guidelines); Deborah L. Mills, Note, United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging
the Shift In The Juvenile Court System From Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 921-22 (1996) (reviewing origins of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Commission which Congress created "to eliminate the discretionary
sentencing system which was previously in place. This system was considered
to be permeated by judicial bias and abuse of judicial power. Congress wanted
to ensure that similarly situated criminal defendants received equal sentencing
treatment in the courts").
17. See JOAN PETERSILIA & SuSAN TURNER, GUIDELINE-BASED JUSTICE: THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL MINORITIES (1985). The report notes:
By 1985, at least 25 states had enacted determinate sentencing
statutes, 10 states had abolished their parole boards, and 35 states
had mandatory minimum sentence laws .... [M]any states and
jurisdictions had established formal guidelines for sentencing
decisions (e.g., prison vs. probation, length of sentence), for
determining supervision levels for parolees and probationers, and for
parole release.
Id. at 1. For arguments critical of the rehabilitative ideal as a goal of penal
reform and supportive of model prison programs based on punishment, see
generally AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 45-53
(1970); DAVID FOGEL, ".... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF... ": THE JUSTICE MODEL
FOR CORRECTIONS 260-66 (1st ed. 1975); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT 45-50 (1974); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING
BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE:
THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 49-55 (1976) (rejecting the rehabilitative ideal as
unworkable and unjust, concluding that the length of an offender's sentence
should reflect the seriousness of the offender's crime).
18. There have been numerous studies of the efficacy of both juvenile and
adult correctional programs in rehabilitating offenders. Few have encouraged
proponents of rehabilitation. See, e.g., David F. Greenberg, The Correctional
Effects of Corrections: A Survey of Evaluations, in CORRECTIONS AND
PUNISHMENT 111 (David F. Greenberg ed., 1977); Robert Martinson, What
Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 THE PUBLIC INTEREST
22, 25 (1974); THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS (Sechrest et al. eds., 1979). But see Mark W. Lipsey & David B.
Wilson, Effective Intervention for Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Synthesis of
Research, in SERIOUS & VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND
SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 313, 330 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds.,
1998) (describing characteristics of successful treatment programs for serious
juvenile offenders).
1118 [Vol. 38
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Indeterminate sentencing vested too much discretion in judges,
parole boards, and clinicians who lacked the ability validly to
differentiate among similarly situated offenders. As a result,
individualizing sentences often result in inequalities, disparities,
and injustices." Determinate sentences punish offenders for their
past behavior rather than on predictions about future behavior and
rely on more objective, offense-related factors such as the
seriousness of the present offense, culpability and degree of the
actor's participation, or criminal history. Because determinate
sentencing hearings focus on offense factors rather than offender
characteristics, they increasingly consider many of the same types of
facts as at the criminal trial itself.2 °
19. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 17, at 124-
44. An analysis of the impact of the American Friends Service Committee's
Struggle for Justice summarizes its premises:
[C]riminal justice practitioners had never developed the technical
capabilities required to implement the [treatment] model.
Evaluations of rehabilitation programs had consistently failed to find
persuasive evidence for the success of treatment; after fifty years of
research on the prediction of criminality, postrelease recidivism still
could not be predicted accurately. The prospects of major
improvement in these areas were questioned on theoretical grounds: If
crime is not the product of an individual pathology, then it cannot be
"cured."... Going beyond this technical criticism, the [AFSC]
Working Party rejected coerced therapy as undignified and potentially
repressive, and attacked individualization in sentencing as a violation
of fundamental norms of distributive justice and proportionality ....
Where decisions are unstructured by law, regulation, or even
meaningful guidelines and are for the most part unreviewed and
unchecked, decisions supposedly to be made on the basis of criteria
related to rehabilitation can be and sometimes are made on the basis
of other criteria that are legally irrelevant and discriminatory in their
impact, such as race, class, sex, life style, and political affiliations ....
Seen in this light, rehabilitation was not merely a laudable goal that
scientific research had unfortunately failed thus far to achieve, but
something far more insidious-an ideology that explained crime in
highly individualistic terms and legitimated the expansion of
administrative powers used in practice to discriminate against
disadvantaged groups and to achieve covert organizational goals.
David F. Greenberg & Drew Humphries, The Cooptation of Fixed Sentencing
Reform, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 206, 207-08 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding, supra note 4, at 1153 ("A federal
defendant in essence has a right to two trials: First, there is a jury trial, at
which a jury must find the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, there is a sentencing hearing, at which a judge must find sentencing
facts by a preponderance of the evidence."); Hoffman, supra note 4, at 267
(stating that the determinate sentencing movement "helped to ensure that
sentencing hearings would more closely resemble the same kind of inquiry into
the facts and circumstances of the crime that occurs at a typical guilt/innocence
trial .... Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, instead of
asking (as was common in pre-Guideline days) whether the defendant's
20031 1119
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Sentencing guidelines base presumptive sentences on the
present offense and criminal history, identify aggravating and
mitigating factors that warrant a departure from the presumed
sentence, require judges to give reasons for their departure
decisions, and authorize appellate review of the reasons for
departures. After the seriousness of the present offense, the most
important factor affecting the length of a defendant's sentence is her
prior criminal record.2' While sentencing guidelines provide more
objective criteria to control judicial discretion, state legislatures and
the United States Congress simultaneously adopted mandatory
minimum sentencing statutes which enabled prosecutors, in their
charging decisions, to exercise greater control over sentences and
further to limit judges' discretion. The adoption of sentencing
guidelines, mandatory minima, and the judicial fact-finding on
which courts base their sentencing decisions provide the contextual
backdrop against which the Supreme Court decided Apprendi.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,22 the defendant fired several bullets
into the home of an African-American family that had recently
moved into an all-white neighborhood. Apprendi pled guilty to three
counts involving the shooting, the most serious of which was second-
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and for
which he could receive a sentence of five to ten years. 3 At the
sentencing hearing, the trial judge found by "a preponderance of the
evidence" that Apprendi acted with a "purpose to intimidate"
motivated by racial bias, imposed a "hate crime" enhancement, and
sentenced him to twelve years-two years more than the statutory
personal characteristics are conducive to rehabilitation or will require lengthy
incapacitation, sentencing judges are now required to look mostly at the harm
caused by the defendant's crime (whether or not the full parameters of that
harm were proven at the guilt-innocence trial) and the defendant's prior
criminal record.").
21. Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing
Process, 22 CRIME & JUST.: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 303, 304 (1996) ("After the
seriousness of the crime, the criminal history of the offender is the most
important determinant of sentence severity in common-law jurisdictions.
Evidence of the importance of criminal record is to be found in statutory
sentencing enhancements for recidivists, case law decisions affirming
sentencing differentials between defendants with different criminal histories,
and in sentencing practices in trial courts.").
22. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
23. The second-degree offense to which Apprendi pled guilty carried a
sentence range of five to ten years. None of the counts to which Apprendi pled
guilty referred to the "hate crime" statute or alleged that he had acted with
racial motives. As part of the plea agreement, the State reserved the right to
request a "hate crime" sentence enhancement and Apprendi reserved the right
to challenge the constitutionality of that sentence enhancement. Id. at 470.
1120 [Vol. 38
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maximum for the firearms offense itself.24 Apprendi appealed on the
grounds that Due Process required the finding of racial bias upon
which the court sentenced him for a "hate crime" to be proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt rather than to be determined by the
judge as a "sentencing factor. 2 5 The divided New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the sentence because the finding of racial bias
involved his "motive" which it regarded as a traditional "sentencing
factor" rather than an essential "element" of the offense. 6 In
Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, reversed
and held that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial entitled a criminal defendant to a
jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of
the crime with which he is charged.
24. Id. at 471. The trial court imposed the twelve-year enhanced sentence
on one of the firearm counts and shorter concurrent sentences on the other
counts to which Apprendi pled guilty. The "hate crime" statute provided for an
"extended term" of imprisonment which increased the penalty for a second-
degree offense like Apprendi's to between ten and twenty years, based on the
trial judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the "defendant in
committing the crime acted, at least in part, with ill will, hatred or bias toward,
and with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals -because
of race, color, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-
3(e) (West 1995) (repealed 2001).
25. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
26. Id. at 471-72. The majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that the "hate crime" enhancement "simply took one factor that has always
been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment and dictated the
weight to be given that factor." Id. at 473 (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d
485, 494 (N.J. 1999)). The dissent objected that the fact of the defendant's
racial motivation must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because it
involves a finding so integral to the offense and sentence as to constitute a
material element. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 473.
27. Id. at 475-76 ("The question whether Apprendi had a constitutional
right to have a jury find such bias on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is starkly presented.").
Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding, supra note 4, at 1102, places Apprendi in the
broader context of the Court's evolving understanding of what facts constitute
"elements" to be found by a jury and which constitute "sentencing factors" to be
found by a judge:
Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has struggled to
explain which facts are elements of crimes and which are sentencing
factors. Elements must be charged in an indictment and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Sentencing factors, in contrast,
are entrusted to the sentencing judge under a lower standard of proof.
The Court's case law in this field, however, has hardly been a model of clarity.
On the one hand, the Court has repeatedly recognized that legislatures have
historically had broad latitude to define crimes and punishments. It has
further stressed that judges have historically had broad latitude to find facts
and exercise discretion at sentencing. On the other hand, it has said there must
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Apprendi expressly held and applied to the states the Court's
ruling the previous year in Jones v. United States8 that implied, in a
federal prosecution, that any fact, other than the fact of a prior
conviction, that "increases the maximum penalty for a crime must
be... submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.,
29
be some constitutional limits on the legislative prerogative to define elements.
Until Apprendi, the Court had never clearly enunciated what those limits were.
28. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
29. Id. at 243 n.6. The federal car-jacking statute at issue in Jones, 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (1994), contained three provisions with separate penalties for
armed car-jacking (fifteen years), armed car-jacking with "serious bodily injury"
to the victim (twenty-five years), and armed car-jacking in which "death" to the
victim results (up to life imprisonment or death sentence). Although the
government indicted and the judge instructed the jury only on the theory that
Jones had engaged in armed car-jacking which carried a fifteen-year sentence,
at the sentencing hearing the judge found by a preponderance of evidence that
Jones' victim had suffered "serious bodily injury" and imposed the twenty-five-
year sentence. Id. at 230-3 1. The court of appeals upheld Jones' sentence on the
grounds that the "serious bodily injury" constituted an aggravating sentencing
factor for enhancement rather than an element of the offense to be proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority of the Court in Jones
compared the statute with other statutes involving aggravated sentences based
on injury to the victim and concluded that "serious bodily injury" constituted an
element of the offense to be proved to a jury rather than simply a "sentencing
factor" to be found by a judge. Id. at 235-36 ("Congress probably intended
serious bodily injury to be an element defining an aggravated form of the
crime.").
In addition to its statutory interpretation, the Court construed the statute
as it did in order to avoid the grave constitutional questions that would arise
under a contrary reading. Id. at 240 ("As the Government would have us
construe it, the statute would be open to constitutional doubt in light of a series
of cases over the past quarter century, dealing with due process and the
guarantee of trial by jury."). As the Court later explained, the failure to charge
in the indictment, submit to a jury, and prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
facts which aggravated the length of the sentence could violate the Due Process
right to notice and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 243 n.6.
The Court reviewed the colonial history of the right to a jury trial and concluded
that a diminution of the right would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns.
"[D]iminishment of the jury's significance by removing control over facts
determining a statutory sentencing range would resonate with the claims of
earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet
settled." Id. at 248. The Court explained that
[i]f a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to life on a nonjury
determination, the jury's role would correspondingly shrink from the
significance usually carried by determinations of guilt to the relative
importance of low-level gate keeping: in some cases, a jury finding of
fact necessary for a maximum 15-year sentence would merely open
the door to a judicial finding sufficient for life imprisonment. It is
therefore no trivial question to ask whether recognizing an unlimited
legislative power to authorize determinations setting ultimate
sentencing limits without a jury would invite erosion of the jury's
function to a point against which a line must necessarily be drawn.
FACT OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
Jones exempted the fact of a prior conviction based on the Court's
earlier decision in Almendarez-Torres, which emphasized the
procedural safeguards afforded to defendants when the state
obtained those prior convictions.30 As in Jones, the Court's Apprendi
Id. at 243-44. Accordingly, the Court found that the statute created three
separate offenses with distinct elements, each of which must be charged and
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Jones dissent read the statute as creating armed car-jacking as the
complete offense with the factors of "serious bodily harm" or "death" as
"punishment provisions directed to the sentencing judge alone." Id. at 256. The
dissent objected even more strongly to the majority's invocation of the
"constitutional doubt rule" because it found "no real doubt regarding the power
of Congress to establish serious bodily injury and death as sentencing factors
rather than offense elements. . . ." Id. at 254.
The rationale of the Court's constitutional doubt holding makes it
difficult to predict the full consequences of today's holding, but it is
likely that it will cause disruption and uncertainty in the sentencing
systems of the States .... These States should not be confronted with
an unexpected rule mandating that what were once factors bearing
upon the sentence now must be treated as offense elements for
determination by the jury.
Id. at 271.
30. The Jones Court exempted recidivism--"the fact of a prior conviction"-
from the elements that increased the length of sentence and thus must be
submitted to a jury, because "a prior conviction must itself have been
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and
jury trial guarantees." Id. at 249.
The previous year, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224
(1998), the Court had exempted recidivism-"the fact of a prior conviction"-
from the "elements" that the government must allege and prove to a jury.
Almendarez-Torres involved a federal statute that criminalized the return of a
deported alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994). The statute imposed a two-year term of
imprisonment, unless the alien was deported after "conviction for commission of
an aggravated felony," in which case he could receive a maximum term of
twenty years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994). Almendarez-Torres raised the
constitutional issue whether the offense which carried a twenty year maximum
term involved a separate crime which required the government to allege the
existence of and to prove to a jury the fact of the prior conviction of the
aggravated felony or whether it simply involved an enhanced penalty.
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226. The Court concluded that the provision
did not define a separate offense but simply authorized the trial court to
increase the sentence for a recidivist. The Court reasons that the sentencing
factor at issue-recidivism-is the most traditional basis for a sentencing court's
increasing an offender's sentence. "[Pirior commission of a serious crime-is as
typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Id. at 230. The Court
emphasized that "the sentencing factor at issue here-recidivism-is a
traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing
an offender's sentence." Id. at 243. The Court noted that, as a sentencing
factor, a state need not allege a defendant's prior conviction in the indictment or
information even though the conviction was necessary to bring the defendant
within the statute. Indeed, to do so would risk serious prejudice to the
defendant by exposing the jury to evidence of his prior crimes. Id. at 235.
The Court in Jones distinguished its holding in Almendarez-Torres and
explained that
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analysis hinged on the distinction between an "element of an
offense" and a "sentencing factor." For Apprendi, proof of the
elements of an offense determined the severity of the sentence and
provided the necessary connection between culpability and
punishment.3
The historic link between verdict and judgment and the
consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within
the limits of the legal penalties provided highlight the novelty
of a legislative scheme that removes the jury from the
determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal
defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury
verdict alone.32
not every fact expanding a penalty range must be stated in a felony
indictment, the precise holding being that recidivism increasing the
maximum penalty need not be so charged. But the case is not
dispositive of the question here, not merely because we are concerned
with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and not alone the rights
to indictment and notice as claimed by Almendarez-Torres, but
because the holding last Term rested in substantial part on the
tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor, not as an
element to be set out in the indictment. The Court's repeated
emphasis on the distinctive significance of recidivism leaves no
question that the Court regarded that fact as potentially
distinguishable for constitutional purposes from other facts that might
extend the range of possible sentencing . . . . One basis for that
possible constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to see: unlike
virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty
for an offense, and certainly unlike the factor before us in this case, a
prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures
satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.
Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49 (emphasis added).
31. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478. The Court noted that traditionally criminal
trial judges exercised very little sentencing discretion. "The substantive
criminal law tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed a particular sentence
for each offense. The judge was meant simply to impose that sentence (unless
he thought in the circumstances that the sentence was so inappropriate that he
should invoke the pardon process to commute it)." Id. at 479 (quoting John H.
Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution,
in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, at 36-37 (A.
Schioppa ed., 1987)).
32. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83. The Court emphasized that its narrow
ruling only affected the procedures by which a state sentenced a defendant to a
term in excess of the maximum penalty authorized for that offense based on
findings of "aggravating" factors. Id. at 474 ("The constitutional question
however, is whether the twelve-year sentence imposed on count eighteen was
permissible, given that it was above the ten-year maximum for the offense
charged in that count."). The Court emphasized that nothing in its analysis
precluded trial judges from exercising discretion "taking into consideration
various factors relating both to the offense and offender-in imposing a
FACT OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
Apprendi held that a judge may not impose a longer sentence than
the statutory maximum for which the state charged and the jury or
plea convicted the defendant. The Court's extension of
constitutional procedures reflects the increased adversariness of
determinate sentencing laws."
Apprendi emphasized that the requirement that a jury find all
the facts necessary to constitute the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt constituted an essential element of Due Process.34 Burdens of
proof reflect the allocation of risks of error between litigants, the
respective stakes at issue to the parties, and the extent to which
society desires to minimize the risks of an incorrect verdict.35
judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that
judges in this country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing
sentence within statutory limits in the individual case." Id. at 481.
33. E.g., Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 267-68, who argues that
as an unintended consequence of the recent move from discretionary
to determinate sentencing, sentencing hearings have begun to look
more and more like adversarial proceedings, which in turn has helped
to ensure that they will be treated, for constitutional purposes, more
and more like adversarial proceedings. Apprendi, in other words, is a
natural and perhaps even predictable consequence of the recent trend
toward an adversarial-ness in sentencing.
34. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-84. Standards of proof-preponderance,
clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable doubt-reflect society's interests in
the correct outcome of cases.
[S]ociety's interest in the outcomes of criminal cases is regarded as
quite high, and the trier of fact is asked to be satisfied "beyond a
reasonable doubt," the highest standard of proof. The disutility of
convicting an innocent person is viewed as being much greater than
the disutility of freeing a guilty one; hence, the probability of error is
intentionally weighted in the defendant's favor.
Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of
Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 159, 161 (1985) (citations omitted).
See also, Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Defining the Standards of Proof in Jury
Instructions, 1 PSYCHOL. SC. 194, 195 (1990) ("The higher the standard of proof,
the greater the risk of error that has been placed on the initiating parties. This,
in turn, reflects a determination that the protection of defendants' rights or
interests at stake in the litigation is much more important to society than
plaintiffs' interests.").
35. The Court in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), emphasized that
burdens of proof reflect the societal importance attached to achieving a correct
decision in a case. The Court noted that "the law has produced across a
continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases." Id. at
423. In private civil litigation, the "preponderance" standard allocates the risks
of error equally between plaintiffs and defendants. "At one end of the spectrum
is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties...
[SIociety has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits .... "
Id. In Addington, which involved involuntary civil commitment, the Court held
that the Constitution provides greater protections because the state initiates
actions which affect an individual's liberty or other important interests. "The
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Earlier, in In re Winship, 6 the Court found that states must prove a
criminal defendant's and a juvenile delinquent's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt because criminal prosecution subjected an offender
to "the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction
and.., the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction."37  Winship posited a functional equivalence between
delinquency and criminal proceedings and emphasized that the
highest standard of proof gave vitality to the "presumption of
innocence" and guarded against the risk of erroneous convictions.
interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere
loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the
plaintiffs burden of proof." Id. at 424. Society bears almost all of the risk of
error when it adopts a "reasonable doubt" standard. Id. at 428. As the Court
noted in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the allocation of the risk to
society is appropriate because
[t]here is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in
factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one
party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the
process of placing on the other party the burden of... persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 525-26. See generally, C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof- Degrees of
Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1293 (1982) (analyzing efforts to quantify meanings of different burdens of
proof).
36. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
37. Id. at 363, 365. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
38. The Court in Winship placed the risk of error on the prosecution in
order to reassure the community about outcomes in criminal cases:
[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the
criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not
be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty.
Id. at 364.
In the aftermath of Winship, the Supreme Court dealt with a series of
cases that considered to what extent a legislature constitutionally could shift
the burden of proof in a criminal case from the state to the defendant by
redefining an "element of the offense" as an "affirmative defense" which the
defendant must establish. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208
(1977) ("The social cost of placing the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is thus an increased risk that the guilty will go free.
While it is clear that our society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial
burden in order to protect the innocent, it is equally clear that the risk it must
bear is not without limits."); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-704 (1975)
(holding a state may not relieve itself of burden of proof by placing an essential
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For the Apprendi majority, the New Jersey sentencing
procedure implicated the same constitutional considerations of
culpability, stigma, and loss of liberty involved in Winship. 9 After
Apprendi pled guilty to the second-degree offense that he unlawfully
possessed a firearm, the judge at the sentencing hearing found
"racial bias" and imposed a term identical to that which a judge
could impose if the jury had convicted him of the more serious crime
of unlawful possession in the first-degree.40 New Jersey argued that
the "hate crime" finding was a judicially proper "sentencing factor."'"
element of the offense on the defendant as an affirmative defense); Ronald J.
Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1977);
Huigens, supra note 4, at 395-96; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan
III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE
L.J. 1325 (1979); Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice:
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977).
39. The Apprendi majority noted that
[i]f a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute
when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not
others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma
attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the
defendant should not-at the moment the State is put to proof of those
circumstances-be deprived of protections that have, until that point,
unquestionably attached.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000). The requirements of due process and the
right to a jury trial implicate not only questions of a defendant's guilt or
innocence but also the length of his sentence. Id.
40. Id. at 491. Justice Scalia's Apprendi concurrence emphasized the vital
role of the jury in determining the degree of guilt and the penal consequences.
[T]he criminal will never get more punishment than he bargained for
when he did the crime, and his guilt of the crime (and hence the
length of the sentence to which he is exposed) will be determined
beyond a reasonable doubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of his fellow
citizens.
Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
41. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Court used the term "sentencing
factor" to describe a fact that could affect whether or not a judge imposed a
mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant even though a jury did not find
the fact at the time of conviction. 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). In McMillan, the
statute required the judge to impose a mandatory minimum sentence if the
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant "visibly
possessed a firearm" while committing a specified offense. The Court
emphasized that the sentencing scheme did not affect the maximum penalty for
which the judge could sentence the defendant but only limited the "sentencing
court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it
without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." Id. at 87-88.
Although New Jersey argued that the "hate crime" statute's "purpose to
intimidate" simply focused on Apprendi's motive, the Court found that it went
to the defendant's state of mind or mens rea and thus constituted an essential
element of the offense itself. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492-93. "The defendant's
intent in committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a
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However, the Apprendi majority emphasized that Due Process and
the right to a jury implicated not only the factual questions of guilt
or innocence, but also the degree of culpability and the penal
consequences of a conviction.42 "Despite what appears to us the clear
'elemental' nature of the factor here, the relevant inquiry is one not
of form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant
to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty
verdict?
,3
core criminal offense 'element."' Id. at 493.
42. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484-85. Justice Scalia's concurrence emphasized
that Apprendi involved the scope of the right to a jury trial and other trial
rights. "What ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they are
unable to say what the right to trial by jury does guarantee if, as they assert, it
does not guarantee ... the right to have a jury determine those facts that
determine the maximum sentence the law allows." Id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975) (stating
the criminal law "is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract
but also with the degree of criminal culpability" assessed).
Apprendi emphasized that "[tihe degree of criminal culpability the
legislature chooses to associate with particular, factually distinct conduct has
significant implications both for a defendant's very liberty, and for the
heightened stigma associated with an offense the legislature has selected as
worthy of greater punishment." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495. In a separate
section of the opinion, Justice Stevens distinguished McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986), where the Court upheld a statute that created a
mandatory minimum sentence for anyone whom the trial judge found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to "visibly possess a firearm" during the
commission of certain designated felonies. The Court characterized the judge's
factual finding of the "visible possess[ion] of a firearm" as a "sentencing factor"
because it only affected the minimum sentence but did not cause the sentence to
exceed the statutory maximum penalty. "We limit [McMillan's] holding to cases
that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory
maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict." Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 487 n.13. Similarly, the Court distinguished Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which approved the judicial finding of recidivism to
enhance a sentence on the grounds "procedural safeguards attached to any 'fact'
of prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge
the accuracy of that 'fact' in his case." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488.
43. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. The Court distinguished the practice
approved in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), from that in New
Jersey by noting that "[w]hen a judge's finding based on a mere preponderance
of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maximum punishment, it is
appropriately characterized as 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense."' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495. See also, Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding,
supra note 4, at 1122 ("The [Apprendi] majority once again exalted jury fact-
finding, relied heavily on historical arguments about juries' traditional role, and
refused to trust judges or legislators. The Court feared the erosion of jury trials
and also hinted at the need to give fair notice to defendants of enhancements.").
According to Bibas, Apprendi's "elements" rule was designed to protect juries
from judicial encroachment on defendant's rights.
Without such a rule, the Court asserted, "the jury right could be
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In an extended concurrence and historical analysis, Justice
Thomas argued that "a 'crime' includes every fact that is by law a
basis for imposing or increasing punishment" and the state must
prove each element to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Any fact
which has the effect of aggravating the seriousness of the offense or
increasing the severity of the punishment is an "element" which the
state must prove as part of its burden.45 Justice Thomas' analysis
was broader than that of the Apprendi majority because he also
would include "the fact of a prior conviction" as an element to be
proved because it, too, had the effect of aggravating the penalty
imposed.46 "What matters is the way by which a fact enters into the
sentence. If a fact is by law the basis for imposing or increasing
punishment-for establishing or increasing the prosecution's
entitlement-it is an element.4 7
Justice O'Connor wrote for the four justices who dissented in
Apprendi and argued for a more flexible definition of which facts
constituted an "element" of an offense to be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt and which appropriately could be characterized as
a "sentencing factors" and found by a judge by a preponderance of
the evidence.48
lost.., by erosion." Allowing judges to find these facts could lead to
judicial arbitrariness and oppression. Jury trials and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt protect not only the innocent from stigma and losing
liberty. They also protect the guilty from added losses of liberty and
stigma ....
Id. at 1133.
44. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501. At common law, legislatures understood
that "a fact that is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment is an
element." Id. at 502.
45. Id. at 501 ("One need only look to the kind, degree, or range of
punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a given set of facts.
Each fact necessary for that entitlement is an element.").
46. Id. at 514-16. Justice Thomas expressed the view that the Court
wrongly had decided Almendarez-Torres, approving the treatment of recidivism
as a "sentencing factor," even though he had voted with the majority in that
case. Id. at 520 ("[Olne of the chief errors of Almendarez-Torres-an error to
which I succumbed-was to attempt to discern whether a particular fact is
traditionally (or typically) a basis for a sentencing court to increase an
offender's sentence.").
47. Id. at 521.
48. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524-27. As the Court noted,
[W]e have proceeded with caution before deciding that a certain fact
must be treated as an offense element despite the legislature's choice
not to characterize it as such. We have therefore declined to establish
any bright-line rule for making such judgments and have instead
approached each case individually, sifting through the considerations
most relevant to determining whether the legislature has acted
properly within its broad power to define crimes and their
punishments or instead has sought to evade the constitutional
requirements associated with the characterization of a fact as an
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[A] State may leave the determination of a defendant's
sentence to a judge's discretionary decision within a prescribed
range of penalties. When a judge, pursuant to that sentencing
scheme, decides to increase a defendant's sentence on the basis
of certain contested facts, those facts need not be proved to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge's findings, whether
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or less, suffice for purposes
of the Constitution. Under the Court's decision today,
however, it appears that once a legislature constrains judges'
sentencing discretion by prescribing certain sentences that
may only be imposed (or must be imposed) in connection with
the same determination of the same contested facts, the
Constitution requires that the facts instead be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.49
The dissent questioned the historical foundation and
constitutional bases of the majority's ruling." It also feared that
requiring a jury to find every fact relevant to the length of sentence
could invalidate many types of determinate-sentencing systems.5
Under the more flexible approach it endorsed, the New Jersey
sentence enhancement passed muster.5
In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer objected to the majority's
requirement that the State submit to a jury questions relevant to
offense element.
Id. at 524.
49. Id. at 546.
50. Id. at 529-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The Court appears to hold today, however, that a defendant is entitled
to have a jury decide, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact
relevant to the determination of sentence under a determinate-
sentencing scheme. If this is an accurate description of the
constitutional principle underlying the Court's opinion, its decision
will have the effect of invalidating significant sentencing reform
accomplished at the federal and state levels over the past three
decades.
Id.
52. Id. at 552-53. According to the dissent, the New Jersey statute increase
in the maximum penalty was proper because it
does not shift the burden of proof on an essential ingredient of the
offense by presuming that ingredient upon proof of other elements of
the offense. Second, the magnitude of the New Jersey sentence
enhancement, as applied in petitioner's case, is constitutionally
permissible .... Third, the New Jersey statute gives no impression of
having been enacted to evade the constitutional requirements that
attach when a State makes a fact an element of the charged offense
.... In sum, New Jersey "simply took one factor that has always been
considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment"-a
defendant's motive for committing the criminal offense--"and dictated
the precise weight to be given that factor" when the motive is to
intimidate a person because of race.
Id. at 552-53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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sentencing and argued that the decision could erode many of the
benefits of determinate sentencing reforms. According to Breyer,
many factors bear on the harmfulness of criminal conduct, but once
a jury finds the defendant guilty, most of those considerations are
appropriately left to the sentencing process. 3 To the extent that
judicial discretion produced inconsistent sentencing of similarly-
situated offenders, sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum
sentences provide greater uniformity and consistency in
sentencing." Once the legislature specifies the factors that should
increase a defendant's sentence, Justice Breyer questioned why a
jury, rather than a judge, must find those facts.55 While the majority
insisted that a jury should find facts affecting punishment as an
element of the offense, Justice Breyer argued that such a rule would
not effectively limit judicial discretion nearly as well as more
procedural protections at sentencing.5
53. Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer argues that
it is important for present purposes to understand why judges, rather
than juries, traditionally have determined the presence or absence of
such sentence-affecting facts in any given case. And it is important to
realize that the reason is not a theoretical one, but a practical one...
an administrative need for procedural compromise. There are, to put
it simply, far too many potentially relevant sentencing factors to
permit submission of all (or even many) of them to a jury.
Id. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 560 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 560-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[L] egislatures sometimes have directly limited the use (by judges or by
a commission) of particular factors in sentencing, either by specifying
statutorily how a particular factor will affect the sentence imposed or
by specifying how a commission should use a particular factor when
writing a guideline. Such a statute might state explicitly, for
example, that a particular factor, say, use of a weapon, recidivism,
injury to a victim, or bad motive, "shall" increase, or "may" increase a
particular sentence in a particular way .... The Court holds that a
legislature cannot enact such legislation (where an increase in the
maximum is involved) unless the factor at issue has been charged,
tried to a jury, and found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. My
question in respect to this holding is, simply "why would the
Constitution contain such a requirement"?
Id. at 560-61 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 562-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The source of the problem lies not in a legislature's power to enact
sentencing factors, but in the traditional legislative power to select
elements defining a crime, the traditional legislative power to set
broad sentencing ranges, and the traditional judicial power to choose
a sentence within that range on the basis of relevant offender conduct.
Conversely, the solution to the problem lies, not in prohibiting
legislatures from enacting sentencing factors, but in sentencing rules
that determine punishments on the basis of properly defined relevant
conduct, with sensitivity to the need for procedural protections where
sentencing factors are determined by a judge (for example, use of a
20031 1131
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Apprendi hinges on the crucial role of the jury in the criminal
process. As a matter of "fundamental fairness," Due Process
requires a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. 57  The Supreme
Court in Duncan v. Louisiana58 held that Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process "selectively incorporated" the Sixth Amendment and
required a jury trial in adult criminal proceedings. Duncan
emphasized the jury's role to protect a defendant against arbitrary
or eccentric judges and overzealous or vindictive prosecutors, to
assure both factual accuracy, and to protect against governmental
oppression:
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and
experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against
judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority ....
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less
"reasonable doubt" standard), and invocation of the Due Process
Clause where the history of the crime at issue, together with the
nature of the facts to be proved, reveals unusual and serious
procedural unfairness.
Id. at 562-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer also questioned the majority's logic and consistency that a
jury must find factors that increased the maximum sentence, but a judge could
find those facts which subjected a defendant to a longer, mandatory minimum
sentence:
I do not understand why, when a legislature authorizes a judge to
impose a higher penalty for bank robbery (based, say, on the court's
finding that a victim was injured or the defendant's motive was bad),
a new crime is born; but where a legislature requires a judge to impose
a higher penalty than he otherwise would (within a pre-existing
statutory range) based on similar criteria, it is not.
Id. at 563-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting). By focusing only on sentences that exceed
the statutory maxima, rather than those which create mandatory minima, he
argued that most defendants would receive less procedural fairness rather than
more. Id. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965). The Supreme Court
in In re Murchison, explained the importance of an impartial tribunal:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness .... But to perform its high function in
the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
(1954)); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (noting that
"conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and
argument in open court, and not by any outside influence").
58. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.
Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State
Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise
of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over
the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and
Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in
the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence."
Thus, Apprendi reflects the central role of the jury to find the facts
constituting the elements of the offense, to uphold the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to limit the power of the State, and
to provide justice in sentences by linking convictions with
•• 60
culpability.
Two years later, the Supreme Court applied the Apprendi
principle to capital sentencing in Ring v. Arizona.6 ' After the jury
convicted the defendant of a capital crime, the issue in Ring was
whether a judge, rather than a jury, could then find the presence of
additional "aggravating circumstances" that warranted imposition of
the death penalty.62 Although Apprendi earlier had purported to
distinguish the capital sentencing procedure employed in Arizona in
• 63
order to avoid overruling Walton v. Arizona, the Arizona Supreme
59. Id. at 156.
60. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, where the Court noted that
[tihe potential or inevitable severity of sentences was indirectly
checked by juries assertions of a mitigating power when the
circumstances of a prosecution pointed to political abuse of the
criminal process or endowed a criminal conviction with particularly
sanguinary consequences. This power to thwart Parliament and
Crown took the form not only of flat-out acquittals in the face of guilt
but of what today we would call verdicts of guilty to lesser included
offenses, manifestations of what Blackstone described as "pious
perjury" on the jurors' part.
526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999); see also, Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding, supra note 4, at
1101 ("The Jury Clauses were meant to ensure a democratic, populist check on
the administration of justice.").
61. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
62. Id. at 597. The jury found Ring guilty of first-degree felony murder, for
which the maximum punishment was life imprisonment, unless the judge found
additional "aggravating circumstances" that outweighed any "mitigating
circumstances." Id. at 596.
63. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
In distinguishing Walton, the Apprendi majority asserted that a conviction of
first-degree murder authorized the death penalty, but the judge could either
affirm that sanction or impose a lesser one. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97. The
Apprendi dissenters characterized that assertion as "demonstrably untrue,"
described the purported distinction as "baffling," and argued that even following
conviction by a jury, a defendant only could receive the death penalty if a judge
made the factual determination that statutory aggravating factors existed. Id.
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Court's decision in Ring asserted that the Apprendi dissenters
properly understood the fundamental inconsistency between Walton
and Apprendi.64 Based on Jones and Apprendi, the Court overruled
Walton and reversed Ring's capital sentence.65 With regard to the
finding of "aggravating circumstances" that might justify imposition
of the death penalty, the Court reasoned that "[i]f a State makes an
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the
finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."6  Justice Scalia
concurred on the grounds that the jury, rather than a judge, must
find any facts that increase the level of punishment to which the
State subjects the defendant.67 Justice Breyer's concurrence argued
that the Eighth Amendment, rather than the Sixth Amendment,
requires jury sentencing in capital cases.6  Because the ultimate
justification for the death penalty is retribution, Breyer argued that
the jury, which embodies "the community's moral sensibility," rather
than a single governmental official, should make the ultimate
decision.69 Justice O'Connor dissented for the reasons that she did
in Apprendi and argued if any case should be overruled, the
appropriate candidate should be Apprendi rather than Walton.0
at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. The Supreme Court discussed the findings of the Arizona Supreme
Court in Ring:
The Arizona high court concluded that the present case [Ring] is
precisely as described in Justice O'Connor's dissent [in Apprendi]-
Defendant's death sentence required the judge's factual findings."
Although it agreed with the Apprendi dissent's reading of Arizona
law, the Arizona court understood that it was bound by the
Supremacy Clause to apply Walton, which this Court had not
overruled. It therefore rejected Ring's constitutional attack on the
State's capital murder judicial sentencing system.
Id. at 596 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 609.
66. Id. at 602. The Court found Walton inconsistent with Apprendi because
it allowed a sentencing judge, rather than a jury, to find the necessary
aggravating circumstances to justify imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 609.
"Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires
that they be found by a jury." Id. (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 610 ("[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls them
elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found by the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.").
68. Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I believe that jury sentencing in
capital cases is mandated by the Eighth Amendment.").
69. Id. at 615 (Breyer, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Apprendi was a serious
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II. THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE JURY
Many analysts have examined the origins and social history of
the juvenile court.' Changes in cultural ideas about childhood and
social control that accompanied modernization more than a century
ago gave rise to the juvenile court. 2 Economic modernization
brought with it changes in family structure, modified the function of
the family in society, and promoted a new cultural perception of
childhood. 8  The new ideology of childhood depicted children as
mistake... [and its rule] that any fact that increases the maximum penalty
must be treated as an element of the crime is not required by the Constitution,
by history, or by our prior cases."). She objected that "[b]y expanding on
Apprendi, the Court today exacerbates the harm done in that case. Consistent
with my dissent, I would overrule Apprendi rather than Walton." Id. at 621.
71. See generally, ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 101-36 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the origins of the Cook County
Juvenile Court); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE
ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980) (discussing the
social structural context of the Progressives' building of social welfare and social
control institutions); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920
(1967) (discussing the impact of industrialization on social institutions). On the
role of developing social theories on criminal justice and juveniles, see FRANCIS
A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY 25-41 (1964); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S
JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978) (analyzing the impact of social sciences on
juvenile courts "rehabilitative" ideology).
72. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1097 (1991) (discussing the creation of juvenile court as
reflection of social construction of childhood and adolescence).
73. Economic modernization and industrialization transformed the United
States from a rural agrarian society into an urban industrial one. See generally
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955);
GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-1916 (1963); WIEBE, supra note 71.
Family structure and function changed as economic modernization
separated work from the home and fostered a new social construction of
childhood. See generally, CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 178-209 (1980); JOSEPH F.
KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 To THE PRESENT (1977);
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 6-10
(1977) (analyzing the effects on family life of the nineteenth-century
emancipation of women and the growth of industrialization). Demographic
changes in the number of children and a shift of economic functions from the
family to other work environments altered the roles of women and children.
The idea of "childhood" is socially constructed and underwent substantial
modification during this period. Ainsworth, supra note 72, at 1091-93 ("[Tjhe
life-stage we call 'childhood' is likewise a culturally and historically situated
social construction .... The definition of childhood-who is classified as a
child, and what emotional, intellectual, and moral properties children are
assumed to possess-has changed over time in response to changes in other
facets of society."). Especially within the upper and middle classes, a more
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vulnerable, fragile, and dependent innocents who required
supervision and preparation for life. Industrialization,
urbanization, and social change also fostered the Progressive
movement, many of whose programs shared a unifying child-
centered theme.74
A. The Juvenile Court
Progressive criminal justice reforms reflected changes in
ideological assumptions about criminality. Positive criminology
attempted to identify the factors that caused crime and contested
the classic formulations of crime as the product of free-will choices.75
modern conception of childhood emerged in which children were perceived as
corruptible innocents whose upbringing required greater physical, social, and
moral structure than had previously been regarded as prerequisite to
adulthood. The family, particularly women, assumed a greater role in
supervising a child's moral and social development. For analysis of the
modernization of the family and the changing conception of childhood, see
generally, AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL HANDBOOK
(Joseph Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985); PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF
CHILDHOOD (1962).
74. Progressives' policies, embodied in juvenile court legislation, child labor
laws, child welfare laws, and compulsory school attendance laws, reflected and
advanced the changing cultural conception of childhood. "The child was the
carrier of tomorrow's hope whose innocence and freedom made him singularly
receptive to education in rational, humane behavior. Protect him, nurture him,
and in his manhood he would create that bright new world of the progressives'
vision." WIEBE, supra note 71, at 169. See also LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876-
1957 127-28 (1961) (creating compulsory school attendance laws); KETT, supra
note 73, at 215-44 (regulating children's spare time activities); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN
WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 187-210 (1982)
(discussing child welfare legislation); WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE
CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD
LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 120-21 (1970) (introducing child labor laws).
75. Criminal justice policies reflect underlying ideological assumptions and
values, often unstated, about what causes crime and how to deal with it. See
FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 27 (1982)
(crime ideology, whether based on science, religion, or common sense, provides
framework for interpreting and responding to offenders); DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
(2001). Classical criminal law assumed that rational actors made voluntary
choices to commit crimes and that they deserved the consequences for their
acts. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Progressives
reformulated their ideology of crime, modified criminal justice administration,
and based social control practices on new theories about behavior and deviance.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 71, at 52-61. Positive criminology asserted that
biological, psychological, social, or environmental "determined" or caused
criminal behavior. See id. at 50-B2. Determinism reduced actors' moral
responsibility for their crimes and criminal justice personnel attempted to
reform them rather than to punish them for their offenses. See FRANCES ALLEN,
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Positivist criminology regarded deviance as determined rather than
chosen, and sought to identify the causes of crime and delinquency.
Progressives attributed criminal behavior to deterministic forces
that reduced offenders' moral responsibility for their crimes, and
attempted to reform rather than to punish them. The conjunction of
positivistic criminology, the use of medical models to treat criminals,
and the emergence of social science professionals gave rise to the
"Rehabilitative Ideal. '76  Progressive criminal justice reforms-
probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and the juvenile court-
all emphasized open-ended, informal, and flexible policies to change
offenders.
THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 3-7 (1981). Because each offender's
background, traits, and circumstances differed, Progressives attempted to
individualize justice. RYERSON, supra note 71, at 22. In its quest for scientific
legitimacy, criminology borrowed its methodology and vocabulary from the
medical profession. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE JUVENILE COURT 57-60 (1999) ("Just as germs caused diseases,
deterministic assumptions redirected criminological research scientifically to
study offenders in order to identify the causes of crime."). The ability to identify
the causes of crime implied the ability to "cure" it as well. Id. at 60. Medical
metaphors-pathology, infection, diagnosis, and treatment-provided analogues
popular with criminal justice professionals. See ROTHMAN, supra note 71, at
293-323. The medical model of criminality emphasized diagnosis, prescription,
and intervention to cure the problems of each offender. See id; see also
RYERSON, supra note 71, at 105-24 (discussing the declining importance of
punishment and deterrence).
76. The "Rehabilitative Ideal" assumes
that human behavior is the product of antecedent causes. These
causes can be identified .... Knowledge of the antecedents of human
behavior makes possible an approach to the scientific control of
human behavior. Finally... it is assumed that measures employed to
treat the convicted offender should serve a therapeutic function; that
such measures should be designed to effect changes in the behavior of
the convicted person in the interests of his own happiness, health, and
satisfactions and in the interest of social defense.
ALLEN, supra note 71, at 26. Progressive reformers assumed both that human
behavior is malleable and that they knew the appropriate direction in which to
change people. See id. at 26-27. Progressives believed that the behavioral and
social sciences provided them with the tools with which systematically to
change people. See RYERSON, supra note 71, at 99-136. They also believed in
the virtues of their way of life and the desirability of imposing their middle-
class values on immigrants and the poor. ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 48-49
("Progressives were equally convinced of the viability of cultural uplift and of
the supreme desirability of middle-class life in cultural as well as material
terms .... The model was clear: All Americans were to become middle class
Americans.").
77. See ALLEN, supra note 71, at 25-28; ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 45-50
(arguing that Progressives used the state to inculcate their values in others).
Progressives believed that professionals and experts could develop rational and
scientific solutions to social problems. JOHN SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN 124
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The juvenile court movement combined the new ideas about
children with the new ideology of social control to remove children
from the criminal justice system and to provide them with
78individualized treatment in a separate system. Progressives
expected juvenile court professionals to use informal procedures and
to substitute a scientific and preventative approach for the
traditional punitive purposes of the criminal law. 9 Under the guise
of parens patriae, juvenile courts emphasized treatment,
supervision, and control rather than punishment, and exercised
broad discretion to intervene in the lives of young offenders. °
Juvenile courts exercised jurisdiction over non-criminal status
offenses, such as truancy, sexual activity, or immorality, which the
criminal law typically ignored.8' Characterizing intervention as a
civil or welfare proceeding completed the separation of juvenile from
criminal courts and allowed greater authority to control and
supervise children.
In separating children from adult offenders, juvenile courts
rejected the jurisprudence and procedure of adult criminal
prosecutions. Reformers modified courtroom procedures to
eliminate any implication of a criminal proceeding, adopted a
euphemistic vocabulary, and endorsed a physically separate court
(1988) (identifying social control as an administrative problem rather than as a
moral or political one). The Progressives' reliance on the State to implement
social reforms reflected their views of State benevolence, government's ability to
correct social problems, confidence in their own middle-class values, and in the
propriety of imposing those values in others. See David Rothman, The State as
Parent: Social Policy in the Progressive Era, in DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF
BENEVOLENCE 67, 74.76 (1978).
78. See generally MARGARET ROSENHEIM, ET AL., A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE (2002).
79. See PLATT, supra note 71, at 43-47; RYERSON, supra note 71, at 35-42;
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109-11 (1909).
80. See, e.g., Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839) (justifying the
establishment of the House of Refuge, which offered aid to homeless and
destitute youth, on the basis of parens patriae); Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile
Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae", 22 S.C. L. REV. 147, 181
(1970); Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 207-10 (1971).
81. Activities inappropriate for children, such as smoking or truancy, and
conduct inconsistent with the new social construction of childhood and
adolescence, such as immorality, stubbornness, vagrancy, or living a wayward,
idle, and dissolute life, subjected youths to pre-delinquent intervention by the
courts to supervise their upbringing. See PLATT, supra note 71, at 137-38;
Steven Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality:
Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARV. EDUC. REV. 65,
70, 81 (1978).
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building to avoid the stigma of adult prosecutions.82  Judges
conducted confidential hearings, limited public access to court
records, and found children to be delinquent rather than guilty of a
crime.83 Proceedings focused on the child's background and welfare
rather than the specifics of the crime. Reformers envisioned a social
welfare system rather than a judicial one, and they excluded
lawyers, juries, rules of evidence, and formal procedures from
delinquency proceedings. "[T]rial by jury was eliminated in most
juvenile courts as irrelevant to the proper determination before the
court, because the court was less concerned with factually
determining whether the child had broken the law than with
sensitively diagnosing and treating the child's social pathology.8 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved the absence of a jury
and asserted that "[w]hether the child deserves to be saved by the
state is no more a question for a jury than whether the father, if
able to save it, ought to save it."85
Social workers and probation officers assisted judges and
investigated the child's background, identified the sources of her
misconduct, and developed a treatment plan to meet her needs.
Juvenile court personnel enjoyed enormous discretion to make
82. See ROTHMAN, supra note 71, at 217-18; RYERSON, supra note 71, at 38-
39; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 92-93
(1967).
83. According to David S. Tanenhaus,
The inventors of the juvenile court designed this "new piece of social
machinery" not only to remove children from the harsh criminal
justice system, but also to shield them from stigmatizing publicity. In
the juvenile court, its inventors envisioned, hearings would be closed
to spectators and the press, a juvenile's record would remain
confidential, and no private lawyers or juries would be part of the
legal process.
David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 43 (2002).
Id. at 62-63. Although closed and confidential procedures became a fixture of
juvenile courts, the Cook County Juvenile Court conducted public hearings for
the first decade of its existence. Id. Juvenile court supporters used the public
proceedings to educate the public about the juvenile court, to explain its
rehabilitative mission, and to establish its legitimacy.
Although the progressives wanted to protect the privacy of the
individual child in court, they also sought to publicize the plight of
poor children in general. Case histories, which included a great deal
of information about a child but not his or her actual name, served as
one way of meeting the twin goals of educating the public about
children through accounts of specific children who remained nameless.
Id. at 63.
84. Ainsworth, supra note 72, at 1101.
85. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905).
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dispositions in the "best interests of the child." Principles of
psychology and social work, rather than formal legal rules, guided
decision-makers. The court collected information about the child's
life history, character, and social environment, and assumed that a
scientific analysis of the child's past would lead to a proper diagnosis
and intervention to assure her future welfare. Reformers
maximized judicial discretion to allow for flexibility in diagnosis and
treatment. The offense a child committed did not necessarily
indicate her "real needs" and did not affect either the intensity or
the length of dispositions. Judges focused first and foremost on the
child's character and lifestyle and imposed indeterminate, non-
proportional dispositions that could continue for the duration of
minority.
B. Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court and the
Denial of the Jury
The Supreme Court in Gault mandated some procedural
safeguards in delinquency adjudications and shifted judicial
attention from assessing a child's "real needs" to determining legal
guilt or innocence as a prerequisite to sentencing. Gault reviewed
the history of juvenile courts and the traditional reasons for denying
procedural safeguards to juveniles: Delinquency hearings were civil
proceedings rather than criminal trials and when the State acted as
parens patriae, no adversarial relationship existed between the
interests of the child and the State.86 The Court rejected these
justifications, observed that "unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure," and concluded that denial of procedural rights
frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than "careful,
compassionate, individualized treatment."87 Gault insisted that the
"claimed benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly
appraised. Neither sentiment nor folklore should cause us to shut
our eyes" to the realities of recidivism, the failures of rehabilitation,
the stigma of a "delinquency" label, the breaches of confidentiality,
or the arbitrariness of the process.88 Juvenile courts' failure to live
up to the Progressive ideal prompted the Court to mandate some
elementary procedural safeguards as a matter of "fundamental
86. 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967).
87. Id. at 18.
88. Id. at 21-25. Several factors motivated the Court to impose procedural
safeguards on the juvenile justice process: states adjudicated juveniles as
delinquent for behavior that would be a crime if committed by adults; the
attendant stigma of delinquency/criminal convictions; and the harsh realities of
juvenile institutional confinement. Id. at 27-29.
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fairness." The Court based the right to advanced notice of charges, a
fair and impartial hearing, and the right to the assistance of
counsel, including the opportunities to confront and cross-examine
witnesses on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and
relied on the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights only to grant
delinquents the privilege against self-incrimination.8 9
Despite its critical dicta, the Court confined its decision
narrowly to delinquency hearings at which the State charged the
juvenile with criminal conduct and she faced the possibility of
institutional confinement. Gault did not consider other aspects of
juvenile court procedures, jurisdiction, or dispositional practices. 90
89. Id. at 31-34 (notice of charges); id. at 34-42 (right to counsel); id. at 42-
55 (privilege against self-incrimination); id. at 56-57 (confrontation and cross-
examination). The Supreme Court decided Gault and the other criminal
procedure cases in the context of its broader agenda to protect civil rights, civil
liberties, and racial minorities against imposition by state law enforcement
officials. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The
Warren Court and the Conservative "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1451
(2003) (summarizing reasons for extending civil rights guarantees).
The Supreme Court could have decided Gault as it did other defendants'
challenges to states' criminal procedures, and simply incorporated and applied
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states via the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black advocated this procedural
equation between delinquency and criminal prosecutions.
Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged,
and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by
the State to be confined for six years, I think the Constitution requires
that he be tried in accordance with the guarantees of all the
provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 61 (1967) (Black, J., concurring). The Gault majority
chose not to make that functional equation.
The majority of the Gault Court, however, was unwilling to agree that
juvenile delinquency trials should precisely mirror their adult
criminal counterparts. Instead, the majority wished to find a
jurisprudential basis for affording the essential protections of the
adult criminal process while preserving the rehabilitative goals,
confidentiality, and other benevolent features of the juvenile court
process. To effect these results, the Gault majority decreed that
juveniles would enjoy only those constitutional rights necessary to
implement the Due Process Clause's guarantee of "fundamental
fairness."
Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice:
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
553, 558 (1998).
90. 387 U.S. at 13. Several analysts examine the narrow holding in Gault
and its functional limitation of juveniles' procedural rights. See, e.g., Frances
Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (1981) (analyzing
limitations on juveniles' procedural rights); Irene Merker Rosenberg, The
Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to
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The Court noted that the Due Process rights it granted would not
impair juvenile courts' ability to treat delinquents separately from
adults.91 It insisted, however, that adversarial procedures were
essential to determine the validity of delinquency charges, to
preserve individual freedom, and to protect against the power of the
State.92
In subsequent juvenile court decisions, the Supreme Court
elaborated on the procedural and functional equivalence between
criminal and delinquency proceedings. As noted earlier, In re
Winship93 decided that states must prove delinquency beyond a
reasonable doubt rather than by the lower, civil preponderance of
the evidence standard of proof.94 Because the Constitution contains
no explicit provision regarding the criminal standard of proof,
Winship first held that Due Process required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in adult criminal proceedings and then extended
that same requirement to delinquency proceedings both to ensure
accurate fact-finding and to constrain governmental overreaching.95
the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 661-64 (1980).
91. 387 U.S. at 22.
92. Id. at 20-21. The dual functions of procedural safeguards-factual
accuracy and preventing governmental oppression-were clearly implicated in
the Court's holding to grant the privilege against self-incrimination in
delinquency adjudications. Id. at 49-50; see also Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing
Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV.
141, 155-56 nn.46-47 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing]. By recognizing
the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination, states no longer
could characterize juvenile adjudications either as "non-criminal" or "non-
adversarial" because the Fifth Amendment privilege functions as the guarantor
of an adversarial process and the primary mechanism to maintain a balance
between the state and the individual. Compare, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 50, with
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) ("The Court in Gault was obviously
persuaded that the State intended to punish its juvenile offenders.").
93. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
94. Id. at 368.
95. Id. at 361-67. It is illuminating to compare Winship's treatment of the
standard of proof in criminal and delinquency cases with the standard of proof
required by the Court for involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (holding that despite the loss of
liberty, the State need only establish the commitment criteria by "clear and
convincing" evidence). In Addington, the Court equated criminal and
delinquency proceedings, and distinguishing both from involuntary
commitment proceedings:
The Court [in Winship] saw no controlling difference in loss of liberty
and stigma between a conviction for an adult and a delinquency
adjudication for a juvenile. Winship recognized that the basic issue-
whether the individual in fact committed a criminal act-was the
same in both proceedings. There being no meaningful distinctions
between the two proceedings, we required the state to prove the
juvenile's act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt .... Unlike the
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The Court weighed the value of providing the highest standard of
proof against its potential negative impact on the beneficial aspects
of the juvenile process and concluded that "the constitutional
safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required
during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are
those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault.
'96
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,97 however, a plurality of the Court
declined to extend to delinquents full procedural parity with
criminal defendants and denied juveniles a constitutional right to a
jury trial in state delinquency proceedings.9 In companion cases
from Pennsylvania and North Carolina, the juveniles argued that
Gault and Winship functionally had converted delinquency hearings
into criminal trials and therefore entitled them to a jury.99 The
McKeiver plurality rejected their arguments and held that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process standard of "fundamental
fairness" in delinquency proceedings emphasized only "accurate
factfinding"-which a judge could satisfy as well as a jury.'00 Unlike
delinquency proceeding in Winship, a civil commitment proceeding
can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 427-28.
96. 397 U.S. at 368.
97. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Justice Blackmun wrote the plurality opinion in
McKeiver which Justices Burger, Stewart, and White joined. Justice White
wrote a separate concurrence elaborating on the differences between
punishment and treatment in juvenile court. Id. at 551-53 (White, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan concurred on the grounds that he did not believe
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial in state criminal proceedings. Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan concurred in the Pennsylvania appeal and dissented in the
North Carolina appeal on the grounds that the purpose of constitutional
procedures is to prevent against governmental oppression and asserted that a
public trial performed that function as well as a jury trial. Id. at 553-57
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and
Marshall, dissented, and argued that juveniles have a right to a jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment because the state charged delinquents with a crime, for
which they could be confined, thus making delinquency proceedings
indistinguishable from criminal trials. Id. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 545.
99. Id. at 542-43 ("The North Carolina juveniles particularly urge that the
requirement of a jury trial would not operate to deny the supposed benefits of
the juvenile court system... [and] that no reason exists why protection
traditionally accorded in criminal proceedings should be denied young people
subject to involuntary incarceration for lengthy periods.").
100. Id. at 543. Although the Court recognized some deficiencies of juvenile
courts, id. at 547-48, it affirmed its confidence in the ability of juvenile court
judges to find facts and decide cases as fairly as juries:
[Olne cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary
component of accurate factfinding. There is much to be said for it, to
be sure, but we have been content to pursue other ways for
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Gault and Winship, which recognized the dual roles of procedural
safeguards-to assure accurate fact-finding and to protect against
government oppression-McKeiver insisted that "fundamental
fairness" required only accurate fact-finding.'0' For example, Gault
required the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to protect against government oppression even though it might
compromise accurate fact-finding."2 By contrast, McKeiver invoked
the mythology of the sympathetic, paternalistic juvenile court judge,
denied that delinquents required protection against government
oppression , and rejected concerns that the informal juvenile
determining facts . ... In Duncan [v. Louisiana] the Court stated,
"We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial--or any
particular trial-held before a judge alone is unfair or that a
defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by
a jury."
Id. at 543 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968)).
101. See infra notes 118, 127 and accompanying text. McKeiver
acknowledged that
Some of the constitutional requirements attendant upon the state
criminal trial have equal application to that part of the state juvenile
proceeding that is adjudicative in nature .... The Court, however,
has not yet said that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult
accused of crime also are to be enforced or made available to the
juvenile in his delinquency proceeding.
403 U.S. at 533. Justice Brennan's opinion in McKeiver recognized that
procedural justice included protecting individuals against governmental
oppression, but he concluded that alternatives to a jury trial, such as a public
trial, could make trials visible and accountable to the community and
accomplish that purpose. Id. at 553-55 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that "the States are not bound to provide
jury trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately
protects the interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve."
Id. at 554. The right to a trial by jury protects the individual against
governmental oppression by enabling the defendant to appeal to the conscience
of the community. Id. at 555. Pennsylvania granted juveniles a public trial,
which Justice Brennan regarded as a functional equivalent safeguard for the
core values protected by the right to a jury trial. Id. at 554-55. By contrast,
North Carolina procedures excluded the public from delinquency proceedings
and thus precluded any protection against "misuse of the judicial process." Id.
at 556; see also Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 92, at 158-60, 262-66 (analyzing
Justice Brennan's opinion in McKeiver).
102. See Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 92, at 154-59 nn.46-47.
103. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550. Contra Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991) ("The dominant strategy to
keep agents of the central government under control was to use the populist
and local institution of the jury."). Amar argues that the jury was intended to
be populist and majoritarian to offset judicial elitism, drawn from the local
community to counter the power of a centralized government, and political
participants designed to serve as a mini-legislature. Id. at 1187-89.
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system could compromise the accuracy of fact-finding.104 By denying
a need existed to protect delinquents from state over-reaching,
McKeiver ignored the unique "checking function" that juries provide
to assure equality in justice administration and to avoid invidious
racial disparities. °5 The need for protection against governmental
imposition is especially acute in juvenile courts because the more
severe sentences of juvenile courts fall disproportionately heavily on
racial minority offenders.0 6
The dissent in McKeiver insisted that once the State charged a
youth with a crime, for which it could incarcerate her for a term of
years, then the delinquent enjoyed the right to a jury trial. 107
104. According to McKeiver, concerns about procedural safeguards, such as
jury trials, to assure accurate fact-finding and protection against governmental
oppression ignores the benevolent premises of the juvenile court system.
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of
evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the
juvenile's prior record and of the contents of the social file; about
repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of
juvenile and probation officers and social workers-all to the effect
that this will create the likelihood of pre-judgment-chooses to ignore,
it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of
paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.
403 U.S. at 550. See also infra notes 161-184 and accompanying text
(discussing the differences between judge and jury reasonable doubt).
105. See, e.g., DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 107 (2003)
("The instrumental theory encompasses not only due respect for individual
dignity, but also due respect for the 'checking value' of preventing tyranny.").
Efforts to control racial disparity are essential to assuring the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system. Id. at 108. From Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589
(1935), to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-85, 89 (1986), the Court has
emphasized that a commitment to equality in criminal justice administration
bars exclusion of racial minorities from the jury venire or the exercise of racially
motivated peremptory challenges. See also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME,
AND THE LAw 193-230 (1997) (analyzing efforts to regulate and control racially
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to black jury members).
106. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE
231 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001) (noting that the compound effect of small
racial disparities in justice administration produces large cumulative
differences in handling of minority offenders); EILEEN POE YAMAGATA &
MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 15-16 (2000) (asserting that black
youths are disproportionately over-represented at each successive step of
juvenile justice decision-making process); Feld, supra note 89, at 1565-72
(summarizing research on racial disparities in waiver of youths to criminal
court and sentencing of delinquents in juvenile court).
107. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("But where a State
uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile for a criminal act and
to order 'confinement' until the child reaches 21 years of age or where the child
at the threshold of the proceedings faces that prospect, then he is entitled to the
same procedural protections as an adult.").
20031 1145
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Moreover, the explicit provisions of the Bill of Rights, rather than an
amorphous notion of "fundamental fairness," provided the applicable
constitutional standard and juveniles deserved the same procedural
protections as adults."8 The dissent repeated the "incorporation"
argument it made in Gault that the punitive consequences of
delinquency adjudications-criminal charges carrying the possibility
of confinement-required criminal procedural safeguards. 10 9  The
dissent feared that juvenile courts' informal procedures could
contaminate the accuracy of judicial fact-finding"0 and it rejected
the plurality's concerns that a jury right might entail excessive
administrative burdens."'
108. Id. at 560 ("No adult could be denied a jury trial in those circumstances.
The Fourteenth Amendment, which makes trial by jury provided in the Sixth
Amendment applicable to the States, speaks of denial of rights to 'any person,'
not denial of rights to 'any adult person'; and we have held indeed that where a
juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult, he is entitled to be tried under a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." (citation omitted)).
109. Id. at 559-60. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Gault advocated
the "total incorporation" approach to constitutional adjudication in determining
the procedural rights of juveniles:
Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged,
and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by
the State to be confined for six years, I think the Constitution requires
that he be tried in accordance with the guarantees of all the
provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Undoubtedly this would be true of an adult
defendant, and it would be a plain denial of equal protection of the
laws-an invidious discrimination-to hold that others subject to
heavier punishment could, because they are children be denied these
same constitutional safeguards.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 61.
110. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 563. ("'[Tjrial by jury will provide the child with
a safeguard against being prejudged' by a judge who may well be prejudiced by
reports already submitted to him by the police or caseworkers in the case.").
111. Justice Douglas appended to his dissenting opinion the opinion of Judge
De Ciantis of the Family Court of Providence, Rhode Island, who granted a
delinquent a right to a jury trial. Id. at 563-572. In that opinion, Judge De
Ciantis reviewed the traditional reasons given for denying juveniles the right to
a jury trial. In response to concerns about the administrative burdens a jury
might impose, he observed that
there is no meaningful evidence that granting the right to jury trials
will impair the function of the court. Some states permit jury trials in
all juvenile court cases; few juries have been demanded, and there is
no suggestion from these courts that jury trials have impeded the
system of juvenile justice .... In fact the very argument of
expediency, suggesting "supermarket" or "assembly-line" justice is one
of the most forceful arguments in favor of granting jury trials. By
granting the juvenile the right to a jury trial, we would, in fact, be
protecting the accused from the judge who is under pressure to move
the cases, the judge with too many cases and not enough time. It will
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The McKeiver plurality offered reasons, rather than reasoning
and analysis, to justify its rejection of a jury right."' It feared that
jury trials would disrupt the traditional juvenile court and adversely
affect its informality, flexibility, and confidentiality." 3 Moreover,
the Court recognized that to require jury trials would make juvenile
courts procedurally indistinguishable from criminal courts and raise
questions whether any reasons exist to maintain a separate juvenile
court just to try younger offenders. Although McKeiver found
provide a safeguard against the judge who may be prejudiced against a
minority group or who may be prejudiced against the juvenile brought
before him because of some past occurrence which was heard by the
same judge.
Id. at 564-65 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 545. The Court stated, "Despite all these disappointments, all
these failures, and all these shortcomings, we conclude that trial by jury in the
juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement. We so
conclude for a number of reasons..." The Court then listed thirteen numbered
"reasons" why juries were unnecessary in delinquency trials. Id. at 545-50.
113. Id. at 550. However, the Court did not consider the possibility that
informality may harm the administration of juvenile justice and the
delinquents it sentences. See, e.g., Susan E. Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Ban
On Jury Trials For Juveniles in The District of Columbia, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 875, 887-90 (1995) (arguing that "informality, if it exists, only does so as
a nicety for courts to latch onto while constituting a meaningless label to those
whom it is supposed to benefit"); Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public
Jury Trial: A Need for Today's Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 236-37
(1993) ("It is widely believed that informality neither furthers the cause of
rehabilitation nor forces the child to appreciate the wrongfulness of criminal
behavior."); Allan H. Horowitz & Nancy L. Nickerson, Note, McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 BROOK. L. REV. 650, 689 (1972)
("The fact that a jury, rather than a judge, is the finder of fact would expose the
accused juvenile to no additional trauma. It may even prove to be beneficial...
."); Sara E. Kropf, Note, Overturning McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The
Unconstitutionality of Using Prior Convictions to Enhance Adult Sentences
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 87 GEO. L.J. 2149, 2170 (1990) ("[Ilt is
unlikely that the juveniles involved in the juvenile court system-brought
before judges, held in prison cells prior to a judicial hearing, counseled by
attorneys-view it as anything but formal and adversarial. Juveniles may be
harmed when they expect to see a jury-an expectation based perhaps on
images from television and films or from contact with adults in the criminal
system-and are faced only with a judge .... ").
114. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551 ("If the formalities of the criminal
adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system,
there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate
disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to
give impetus to it."). See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified
Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 942
(1995) (criticizing "the single most serious procedural infirmity of the juvenile
court-its lack of jury trials . . ."); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court:
Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
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faults with the juvenile process, the Court did not believe that
granting the right to a jury trial would correct those deficiencies and
it feared that a jury only would make the process more formal and
adversarial. 5 Yet, the Court did not consider or discuss whether
any possible advantages might accrue from increased formality,"6
whether Gault effectively had foreclosed its renewed concerns about
flexibility and informality, or why procedural formality at trial was
incompatible with treatment dispositions at sentencing."7 Most
importantly, McKeiver did not analyze the purported distinctions
CRIMINOLOGY 68, 97 (1997) (arguing for criminal procedural parity between
juveniles and adults).
115. McKeiver noted that providing for trial by jury in juvenile court "would
bring with it... the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the
adversary system and, possibly, the public trial." 403 U.S. at 550. McKeiver
reflects the general hostility evinced by the Burger Court toward the extension
and expansion of the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 412-14 (1972) (allowing non-unanimous verdicts in jury trials); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (allowing six person jury to decide criminal
cases).
116. One of Gault's reasons for requiring procedural formality in
delinquency proceedings was that "[diepartures from established principles of
due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in
arbitrariness." Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19. See also Ainsworth, supra note 72, at
1119-21 (holding that formality as reflected in consistency, control of the
process by litigant, respectful treatment, and confidence in fact-finders are key
elements to sense of legitimacy and procedural justice).
117. The Appendix to Justice Douglas' dissent emphasized that a jury trial
was compatible with a therapeutic disposition. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 568-69
("The role of the jury will be only to ascertain whether the facts, which give the
court jurisdiction, have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury
will not be concerned with social and psychological factors .... Taking into
consideration the social background and other facts, the judge, during the
dispositional phase, will determine what disposition is in the best interests of
the child and society. It is at this stage that a judge's expertise is more
important, and the granting of a jury trial will not prevent the judge from
carrying out the basic philosophy of the juvenile court.").
The dissent in People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 917 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (Johnson, J., dissenting), noted the illogic of McKeiver's concerns:
If a juvenile court system allows jury trials, it is assumed, the system
cannot and will not retain whatever rehabilitative and parental
characteristics is may possess in the absence of such a right. And yet
these are completely unrelated phenomena-how a juvenile court
decides whether the accused committed the crime of which he or she is
charged need have no bearing whatsoever on how it deals with that
same juvenile once the judge, or a jury, returns a "true finding."... It
simply has not been demonstrated the declaration of a constitutional
right to jury trial in delinquency proceedings must or will eliminate
the remaining rehabilitative parental features of the juvenile court
system."
Id. at 917.
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between treatment in juvenile courts and punishment in criminal
courts that justified different procedures for each forum.1 8 The
Court did not review any factual record of dispositional practices or
conditions of confinement when it concluded that juvenile courts
treated, rather than punished, delinquents."9 It simply noted that
the juvenile court ideal envisions "an intimate, informal protective
proceeding,"2° even while it acknowledged that States seldom, if
ever, realize that "ideal." 2' Despite Gault's formalization of juvenile
court procedures, McKeiver remained ideologically committed to the
traditional "treatment" model of the juvenile court."2 While denying
118. The Court has held that fundamental fairness in adult criminal
proceedings requires both factual accuracy and protection against governmental
oppression. For example, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968), the
Court recognized that "[piroviding an accused with the right to be tried by a
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."
See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988)
(analyzing Court's analysis of punishment and treatment in other doctrinal
contexts and the implications of those analyses for delinquency proceedings)
[hereinafter Feld, Punishment, Treatment].
119. Compare McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), with Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.
364 (1986). In Allen, the Court denied petitioner the protections of the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination in a "sexually dangerous
person" commitment proceeding. Because the privilege is only available when
the State "punishes" a person, the Court based its ruling, in part, on petitioner's
failure to disprove the State's assertion that it treated, rather than punished
him:
Petitioner has not demonstrated, and the record does not suggest, that
"sexually dangerous persons" in Illinois are confined under conditions
incompatible with the State's asserted interest in treatment. Had
petitioner shown, for example, that the confinement of such persons
imposes on them a regimen which is essentially identical to that
imposed upon felons with no need for psychiatric care, this might well
be a different case. But the record here tells us little or nothing about
the regimen at the psychiatric center, and it certainly does not show
that there are no relevant differences between confinement there and
confinement in the other parts of the maximum-security prison
complex .... We therefore cannot say that the conditions of
petitioner's confinement themselves amount to "punishment" and thus
render "criminal" the proceedings which led to confinement.
Id. at 373-74.
120. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
121. Id. at 543-45.
122. Justice White concurred in McKeiver and identified some differences
between juvenile and criminal proceedings. The criminal law punishes
responsible actors for making blameworthy choices, but the deterministic
assumptions of the juvenile justice system regard juveniles as less competent or
culpable. Id. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring). The indeterminate length of
juvenile dispositions and the "eschewing [of] blameworthiness and punishment
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juveniles criminal procedural parity with adults, McKeiver never
examined either how juvenile "treatment" differed from criminal
"punishment" or whether delinquents also required procedural
protections against government oppression.123 In short, the Court
decided McKeiver based on juvenile courts' "rhetoric" rather than
their "reality."
Of course, the "reality" of juvenile justice, like that of criminal
justice, is that the vast majority of defendants plead guilty rather
than have their cases decided by juries. 1 4 But the possibility of
invoking a jury trial provides an important check on prosecutorial
over-charging, on judges' evidentiary rulings, and the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in marginal factual cases .' The
possibility of a jury trial also increases the visibility and
accountability of justice administration and the performance of
for evil choice" satisfied Justice White that "there remain differences of
substance between criminal and juvenile courts." Id. at 552, 553. The McKeiver
plurality apparently assumed, without any evidence, that juveniles only
received positive rehabilitative treatment which requires no further special
safeguards against governmental intervention as contrasted with retributive
punishment which necessitates greater procedural protections to prevent
governmental oppression. See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 118, at
832; Martin Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual
Framework for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND.
L. REV 791, 830-31 (1982).
123. See, e.g., Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 118, at 831;
Gardner, supra note 122, at 830-32.
124. See, e.g., Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding, supra note 4, at 1150 (stating
that academic and judicial emphasis on jury trial is anachronistic because
"[M ewer than four percent of adjudicated felony defendants have jury trials, and
another five percent have bench trials. Ninety-one percent plead guilty. Our
world is no longer one of trials, but of guilty pleas."). See also Barry C. Feld,
Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform,
79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1107-08 (1995) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth]:
The Task Force surveyed states in which juveniles have a right to a
jury and found that youths, like adults seldom exercised the option.
Some commentators argue that because adult defendants seldom
exercise their right to a jury, its denial to juveniles is of little
consequence. Even if the right to a jury is little more than a chip in
the plea-bargaining game, it is not self-evident why young offenders
should be dealt fewer cards than somewhat older players.
See also Patricia L. Shaugnessy, Comment, The Right to a Jury Under the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 14 GONZAGA L. REV. 401, 421 (1979) (rates of jury
trials ranged from 0.36% to 3.2% in states that grant juveniles the right to a
jury).
125. See Ainsworth, supra note 114, at 943 ("The criminal justice system
operates in the shadow of the jury trial, so that the potential invocation of that
right affects the charging decision and plea negotiation even in cases that
eventually culminate in guilty pleas.").
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lawyers and judges."' The jury's checking function may be even
more important in the highly discretionary, low-visibility juvenile
justice system dealing with dependent youths who are unable
effectively to protect themselves.
There are several additional reasons to question the
contemporary validity of McKeiver's 1971 plurality decision. As a
matter of constitutional analysis, McKeiver marked a departure
from the Court's then-prevailing mode of adjudication. During the
previous decade of criminal procedure decisions, the Warren Court
"incorporated" various provision of the Bill of Rights and
emphatically rejected the "fundamental fairness" standard which
McKeiver revived to justify the denial of juries to juveniles.27  For
126. See, e.g., R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Ala. 1971) (granting juveniles
a state constitutional right to jury and public trials, in part, because "[w]e
cannot help but notice that the children's cases appealed to this court have
often shown much more extensive and fundamental error than is generally
found in adult criminal cases, and wonder whether secrecy is not fostering a
judicial attitude of casualness toward the law in children's proceedings"). On
the performance of lawyers in juvenile courts, see infra notes 185, 187-88 and
accompanying text.
127. See generally, DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE
ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
99-115 (2003) (noting the rejection of "fundamental fairness" and ascendance of
"selective incorporation" of provisions of the Bill of Rights as constitutional
basis for Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions during the 1960s).
Professor Dripps describes the "fundamental fairness" test as a version of
illegitimate substantive due process to regulate state criminal procedure which
the Warren Court rightly rejected. Id. at xiv. In an extended critique of
"fundamental fairness," Dripps notes that
[tiested by the criteria of legitimacy, instrumental reliability, and
clarity and consistency, the fundamental fairness regime fares poorly
indeed .... First, even rudimentary procedural requirements
exceeded the appropriate scope of substantive due process review ....
[Flundamental fairness analysis can be legitimate only within the
limits that cabin legitimate substantive due process analysis, and
those limits are quite properly exceedingly narrow. Fundamental
fairness, therefore, could not legitimately secure the instrumental
theory of criminal procedure ....
The second key to understanding the illegitimacy of fundamental
fairness analysis is that substantive due process doctrine displaced
procedural due process completely .... Procedural due process means
a fair hearing before conviction, and hearings can be unfair without
evoking the intense moral disapproval required to invalidate a law as
a matter of substantive due process [because it "shocks the
conscience"] ....
Finally, ... the justices never specified the values that determine
fundamental fairness, let alone assign them consistent priorities.
Instead, the standard of fundamental fairness was "to be tested by an
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case." The combination of
so nebulous and normative a standard as "fundamental fairness" with
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example, "selective incorporation" of the Sixth Amendment provided
the constitutional rationale for the Supreme Court's decision to
grant adult criminal defendants the right to a jury trial in Duncan
v. Louisiana.2 McKeiver declined to follow Duncan, but failed to
explain its reasons for not doing so other than to assert its
conclusion that "the juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held
to be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and reach of the
Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet been regarded as devoid of
criminal aspects merely because it usually has been given the civil
label.' 29
On the other hand, if the Court were called upon to decide
McKeiver today as a "civil" rather than "criminal" case, then the
appropriate mode of analysis would be the three-factor test
employed in Mathews v. Eldridge" rather than the "fundamental
fairness" standard it used. In deciding what procedural safeguards
the state must provide when governmental action would deprive an
individual of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest,
the Court balances three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.1
3 1
In terms of the private interests involved, the Court in Gault,
Winship, and Breed v. Jones".. recognized that a delinquency
proceeding was comparable in seriousness and consequences to afelon .. 133
felony prosecution. Second, despite McKeiver's confidence in
case-by-case adjudication amounted to a constitutional chancellors
foot.
Id. at 110-12. See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 65 (2000)
("During the 1960s, the prevailing due process position shifted from the
fundamental fairness doctrine to the selective incorporation doctrine.").
128. 391 U.S. at 162; see also supra note 56.
129. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
130. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
131. Id. at 335. See also DRIPPS, supra note 127, at 60 ("The test requires
the reviewing court to consider the weight of the individual's interest, the risk
of error, and the costs to the government of additional procedural safeguards.").
132. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
133. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 ("A proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."). Gault
based its decision, in part, on the likelihood of incarceration and the conditions
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judicial fact-finding, juvenile court judges are more likely
erroneously to adjudicate youths delinquent than are juries, thereby
posing a significant risk of error adversely affecting a substantial
private interest. 3 4 Thirdly, and despite McKeiver's concern about
the fiscal and administrative burdens that a right to a jury trial
would entail, the available evidence suggests that providing this
additional procedural safeguard would have, at most, only a modest
impact on juvenile justice administration. Thus, a proper
of confinement associated with a delinquency prosecution:
The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of
liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence.., that the
institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School.
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a
"receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an
institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a
greater or lesser time.
Id. at 27. Winship required "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in delinquency
adjudications because the Court found that "he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction .... The same considerations that demand extreme caution in
factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child." Id.
at 363, 365.
In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975), the Court used the Fourteenth
Amendment to require the states to apply the Double Jeopardy provisions of the
Fifth Amendment to the adjudication of juvenile offenses and to decide whether
to prosecute a youth as a juvenile or as an adult before proceeding to a trial on
the merits of the charge. Breed established a functional equivalence between
an adult criminal trial and a delinquency proceeding. Id. at 531. The Court
described the identical interests implicated in a delinquency hearing and a
traditional criminal prosecution: "anxiety and insecurity," a "heavy personal
strain," and the increased burdens of delinquency prosecutions as the juvenile
system became more procedurally formalized. Id. at 530-3 1.
134. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 124, at 1107 (describing the
Minnesota Juvenile Justice Task Force's efforts to ascertain the administrative
impact of providing jury trials in delinquency proceedings):
The available empirical evidence, however, contradicts concerns that
jury trials substantially disrupt delinquency proceedings. Instead, the
right to a jury appears to have, at most, a marginal practical impact
on juvenile justice administration. The Task Force surveyed states in
which juveniles have a right to a jury and found that youths, like
adults seldom exercised the option.
Id.
Earlier research reported that juveniles seldom exercised the right to a
jury. See also id. at 1108 n.643; Sanborn, supra note 113, at 237 (1993) (noting
that juveniles rarely exercise right to jury trial, hence such trials are a minimal
administrative burden); Patricia L. Shaughnessy, Comment, The Right to a
Jury Under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 14 GONZAGA L. REV. 401, 420-21(1978) (discussing survey of states that reports rates of delinquents who
received jury trials ranged between 0.36% and 3.2% of formal petitions filed).
The Minnesota Task Force also found that in those states in which juveniles
enjoyed the right to a jury trial, delinquents exercised the right in about 1% to
3% of cases.
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Eldridge analysis would lead to a different outcome.
Finally, McKeiver's factual predicate that the sanctions that
juvenile courts impose are not "punishment" has been superseded by
the new reality of juvenile justice. Notwithstanding McKeiver's
reluctance to hasten the demise of the juvenile court, Gault and
Winship already drastically had altered the form and function of
juvenile courts. By emphasizing procedural regularity in the
adjudication of guilt as a prerequisite to delinquency sanctions, the
Court shifted the focus of juvenile courts from "real needs" to proof
that the youth committed a crime. 36 In reaction to the greater
procedural formality, changes in States' juvenile codes have fostered
a substantive, punitive convergence with criminal courts as well.
The increased emphasis on punishment in juvenile courts is
reflected in legislative amendments of juvenile codes' purposes
clauses,' court opinions endorsing "punishment," '38 States'
enactment of determinate and mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes,3 ' evaluations of juvenile court judges' sentencing
136. See, e.g., In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(denying petitioner a jury trial in a juvenile proceeding, but urging the Supreme
Court to reconsider McKeiver in light of evidence that juvenile court proceedings
have many attributes of criminal trial proceedings). In Javier A., the Court
noted that "Uluvenile proceedings now feature the same contests over admission
of evidence as adult proceedings since only proof admissible in a criminal trial
can be used to support a finding the juvenile committed the criminal offense."
Id. at 419.
137. See, e.g., Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 118 at 838-47; Linda
F. Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in
America, 5 J. L. & POLICY 223, 232-37 (1996); Kropf, supra note 113 at 2174-75
(noting that language employed by legislatures emphasizes punishment over
treatment).
138. See, e.g., In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. at 417 ("[E]mphasis is on
protecting the citizens of the state of California from the child"); In re Seven
Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (Nev. 1983) ("By formally recognizing the legitimacy
of punitive and deterrent sanctions for criminal offenses juvenile courts will be
properly and somewhat belatedly expressing society's firm disapproval of
juvenile crime and will be clearly issuing a threat of punishment for criminal
acts to the juvenile population."); State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (Wash.
1979) (concluding that sometimes punishment is treatment); State ex rel.
D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 415-16 (W. Va. 1980) ("[Olur treatment looks
a lot like punishment ... treatment is often disguised punishment"; "'treatment'
is often a caricature-something worthy of a story of Kafka or a Soviet mental
hospital.").
139. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND
VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 11, 15-16 (1996). Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra
note 118, at 850-79 (analyzing determinate and mandatory minimum juvenile
sentencing statutes); Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice, supra note
122, at 833-35; Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile
Offender Statutes: Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation within the
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practices, 4 ° and the harshness of conditions of confinement.14 ' All of
these changes clearly indicate that juvenile courts punish youths for
their past offenses rather than treat them for their future welfare.4
Although a few states allow juveniles jury trials as a matter of
state law, 4 the vast majority of states do not. In the three decades
of criminalizing juvenile justice since McKeiver, advocates of jury
trials have advanced several constitutional arguments to circumvent
that plurality decision. 44 Some have argued that juveniles should
Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479, 500 (1995) (equating mandatory
minimum sentences with retribution).
140. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems'
Responses to Youth Violence, in 24 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
189, 223-29; Ainsworth, supra note 72, at 1105-06 (describing role of "just
deserts" in juvenile sentencing). Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 124, at 1087-
94.
141. See In re D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 37 (La. 2002) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
("The four Louisiana Training Institutes to which convicted juvenile offenders
are sent are reportedly the scenes of the most violent and abusive practices of
any children's prisons in the nation.") (quoting Fox Butterfield, Few Options or
Safeguards In a City's Juvenile Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at Al); DALE
G. PARENT ET AL., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS FACILITIES 7-9 (1994) (describing institutional crowding and
violence as pervasive problems); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 118,
at 891-96 (analyzing empirical evaluations of institutions and juvenile "right to
treatment" cases challenging conditions of confinement).
142. See generally Ainsworth, supra note 72; Feld, Punishment, Treatment,
supra note 118; Sheffer, supra note 139.
143. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19- 2-107 (2002); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 55A (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A. 17(2) (2001); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-5-1502(1) (2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16.A (Michie 2003); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(C) (Vernon 2002); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6 (2001); WYO.
STAT. § 14-6-223(c) (2003).
144. Virtually all of the academic commentary on McKeiver has been critical
of its analysis and constitutional ruling. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 72;
Susan E. Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Ban on Jury Trials for Juveniles in the
District of Columbia, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 875 (1995); Feld, Violent
Youth, supra note 124; Barbara F. Katz, Juveniles Committed to Penal
Institutions-Do They Have The Right to a Jury Trial?, 13 J. FAM. L. 675 (1974);
Edward J. McLaughlin & Lucia Beadel Whisenand, Jury Trial, Public Trial
and Free Press in Juvenile Proceedings: An Analysis and Comparison of the
IJA/ABA, Task Force, and NAC Standards, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1979);
Sanborn, supra note 113; Carol R. Berry, Comment, A California Juvenile's
Right to Trial by Jury: An Issue Now Overripe for Consideration, 24 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1223 (1987); W.J. Keegan, Comment, Jury Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric
and Reality, 8 PAC. L.J. 811 (1977); Carlan J. Kraft, Note, A Right to a Jury
Trial for Juveniles?-The Implications of McKeiver, 49 N.D. L. REV. 6725 (1973);
Korine L. Larson, Comment, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice For All:
Extending the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 835 (1994); David C. Owens, Comment, Striking Out Juveniles: A
Reexamination of the Right to a Jury Trial in Light of California's 'Three
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enjoy a constitutional right to a jury as a matter of Equal
Protection.'45 Others have urged state supreme courts to interpret
their state constitutions to find a state constitutional right to a jury
trial. 146
The strongest and most fundamental challenges contend that
changes in juvenile justice administration require a re-examination
of McKeiver's factual premise that juvenile courts only treat, rather
than punish, delinquents. McKeiver never analyzed the differences
between treatment in juvenile court and punishment in criminal
court,"'47 and virtually every state has revised and greatly
"toughened" its juvenile codes in the decades since that decision.
48
Whether or not the Court properly decided McKeiver in 1971,
legislative amendments to states' juvenile codes have fostered a
punitive convergence with criminal courts and completely eroded
the rationale for less effective procedural safeguards in delinquency
trials.49 In short, the unproved factual premise on which the Court
Strikes'Legislation, 29 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 437 (1996).
145. See, e.g., In re T.M., 742 P.2d 905, 911-12 (Colo. 1987) (rejecting the
argument that state and federal equal protection clauses grant juveniles the
same right to a jury trial enjoyed by adult criminal defendants); In re D.J., 817
So. 2d 26, 40 (La. 2002) (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("Equal protection of the laws
requires that, upon his request, a juvenile is entitled to receive the same mode
of jury trial which is available to an adult charged with the same offense."); In
re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Minn. 1987) (stating that a juvenile does not
have an equal protection right to waive juvenile court jurisdiction in order to
obtain jury trial in criminal court); State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that equal protection does not prohibit use of juvenile
priors to enhance adult sentences because obtained without right to a jury
trial); State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 248-50 (Wash. 1987) (holding that age is
not a suspect category and does not require strict scrutiny of procedural
differences between juvenile and adults).
146. Prior to McKeiver, some state supreme courts had found a state
constitutional right to a jury trial. See R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 32 (Alaska
1971); Peyton v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716, 722-26 (N.M. 1968) (holding that juveniles
have constitutional right to jury trial for offenses that would be felonies if
committed by an adult); State v. Benjamin C., 781 P.2d 795, 797-99 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1989) (showing that New Mexico state constitutional right to a jury trial
does not extend to offenses that would be misdemeanors if committed by an
adult).
Most delinquents' attempts to obtain recognition of a state constitutional
right to a jury trial have failed. See, e.g., In re Myresheia W., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
65, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Klamath County v.
Reynolds, 857 P.2d 842, 850 (Or. 1993); State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 215 (Wash.
1992).
147. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., TORBET ET AL., supra note 139, at 4, 7, 25-27; Feld, supra note
140, at 189.
149. See, e.g., In re D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 30 (La. 2002) (stating the juveniles'
argument that "this policy-based analysis applied more than 20 years ago when
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based McKeiver simply does not exist today.
Despite the vast change in juvenile justice policy and sentencing
practices since McKeiver, appellate courts consistently reject these
constitutional arguments."' They sometimes use a "glass half-full"
McKeiver and Dino were decided is outdated and that recent changes in state
law, as well as an ongoing national critique of the juvenile justice system,
render the reasoning behind the two cases outdated and inapplicable to current
conditions").
In State v. Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660, 668-70 (Wis. 1998), juveniles argued
that substantial legislative amendments--changes in purpose clause to
emphasize accountability and community protection, statutory relocation of
juvenile code next to criminal code, provisions for long term secure confinement,
and the increased collateral consequences of delinquency convictions including
to increase adult sentences--effectively had converted the juvenile code into a
"criminal code." The majority upheld the legislative amendments, including the
repeal of a statutory right to a jury trial, as "consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver and ... with a majority of the states in
the union which have determined that juveniles do not have a state or federal
constitutional right to a trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a juvenile
delinquency proceeding." Id. at 678. The dissent argued that the court should
focus on the changes in the juvenile code in its entirety to decide whether its
"purpose and effect is [so] criminal in nature" as to require a jury trial. Id. at
687. It concluded that Wisconsin had shifted the focus of its juvenile justice
system and that "[we must either restore the juvenile court's primary
rehabilitative approach or restore the constitutional right of juveniles to trial by
jury." Id.
In In re J.F. and G.G., 714 A.2d 467, 469 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), the
Pennsylvania Superior Court confronted the question whether the legislative
amendment had "radically transformed the nature and function of
Pennsylvania's juvenile court from a benevolent institution concerned with the
welfare and rehabilitation of young offenders into a more punitive system,
much more akin to the adult criminal justice system." After analyzing the
various legislative changes, the court "cannot conclude that . . .adjudication
has.., become the equivalent of an adult criminal proceeding." Id. at 471.
After going through a "glass-half-full" analysis, the court opined that "[miuch of
the reasoning of the plurality in McKeiver, despite the changes in society and
the juvenile system in the intervening twenty-seven years, remains valid and
compelling in reference to the juvenile court system of today." Id. at 473; see
generally Ainsworth, supra note 72, at 1105 ("[S]entences in the new punitive
juvenile court are designed to hold the youth accountable for the offense
committed; any rehabilitative services or programs provided during
incarceration are incidental to the punishment meted out. The 'just deserts'
sentencing model bases the length of incarceration on how much punishment
the offense merits, not on how long it might take to reform the offender."); Feld,
supra note 92 at 246-62; Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 118; Feld,
Violent Youth, supra note 124, at 1099-108; Kropf, supra note 113, at 2150
("[A1lthough McKeiver may have been correctly decided in 1971, it should be
reexamined in light of the fundamental changes in the juvenile justice system.
Specifically, the Supreme Court should overrule McKeiver and guarantee the
jury trial right to juveniles charged with nonpetty offenses. In turn, courts
should not use juvenile convictions entered after nonjury trials to enhance adult
sentences under the Guidelines.").
150. State court decisions have denied juveniles the right to a jury trial.
See, e.g., Raines v. State, 317 So. 2d 559, 562-63 (Ala. 1975); Elkins v. State, 646
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rather than "glass half-empty" logic to distinguish delinquency trials
from criminal prosecutions."' In other instances, they uncritically
invoke McKeiver as continuing authority despite the complete
erosion of its three-decades-old jurisprudential foundation.15 And,
in a few states, legislators have added insult to injury and retracted
a previous statutory right to a jury trial even as they increased the
punitiveness of the juvenile justice system. 153 While appellate courts
S.W.2d 15, 17 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983); In re T.M., 742 P.2d 905, 909-11 (Colo. 1987)
(denying jury trial for misdemeanors when court does not order incarceration);
In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 597-98 (La. 1978); In re K.A.A., 397 N.W.2d 4, 5-6
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987); cf.
In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (showing an
appellate court urging California Supreme Court to reconsider earlier decision
denying juveniles the right to a jury trial); In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 400 (La.
1998) (stating that a juvenile has a right to a jury trial if the related judicial
proceeding is more "criminal" than "civil" in nature); In re J.F. & G.G., 714 A.2d
467, 475 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (analyzing the juvenile's right to a jury trial in
light of policy underlying the juvenile justice system); State v. Hezzie R., 580
N.W.2d 660, 678 (Wis. 1998) (holding that, under state law, juveniles have a
right to a jury trial in criminal but not civil proceedings); B. Finberg,
Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in Juvenile Court Delinquency Proceedings, 100
A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965 & Supp. 1997) (summarizing state cases analyzing
juveniles' right to a jury trial).
151. See, e.g., In re D.J., 817 So. 2d at 33 (La. 2002) ("[Nlotwithstanding the
changes in the juvenile justice system discussed above, there remains a great
disparity in the severity of penalties faced by a juvenile charged with
delinquency and an adult defendant charged with the same crime."); State v.
Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. 1987) ("The fact that juveniles are
accountable for criminal behavior does not erase the differences between adult
and juvenile accountability. The penalty, rather than the criminal act
committed, is the factor that distinguishes the juvenile code from the adult
criminal justice system .... [Tihe purpose of the juvenile system is to provide
an alternative to incarceration in adult correctional facilities."); State v. Rice,
655 P.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Wash. 1982) ("[Tjhe [Juvenile Justice Act] has not
utterly abandoned the rehabilitative ideal which impelled the juvenile justice
system for decades. It does not embrace a purely punitive or retributive
philosophy. Instead, it attempts to tread an equatorial line somewhere midway
between the poles of rehabilitation and retribution.").
152. In re D.J., 817 So. 2d at 34-35 (La. 2002) ("While we recognize that the
Louisiana juvenile justice system is far from perfect, we are 'not yet ready to
spell the doom of the juvenile court system by requiring jury trials in juvenile
adjudications."' (quoting In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 398 (La. 1998)); In re C.B.,
708 So. 2d 391, 398 (La. 1998); In re J.F. & G.G., 714 A.2d 467, 470 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1998); State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 892, 580 N.W.2d 660, 676 (1998).
153. See State v. Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Wis. 1998); see also Kara
E. Nelson, Comment, The Release of Juvenile Records Under Wisconsin's
Juvenile Justice Code: A New System of False Promises, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1101,
1105 (1998) (analyzing changes in Wisconsin's juvenile justice laws and noting
that the "Code favors societal protection and personal accountability over
rehabilitation and the juvenile's best interests"); Jaime L. Preciado, Comment,
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caution that at some point, a juvenile justice system may become so
punitive as to cross the line into criminalization and require a jury
trial, courts only find that states cross that line when a statute
authorizes juveniles convicted without a jury trial to be confined in
adult penal facilities. 
154
A danger exists in advocating jury trials for delinquents. A
relationship exists between procedural formality and sentencing
severity in juvenile courts.155 More formal, bureaucratized juvenile
courts hold more youths in pretrial detention and sentence more
severely similarly charged offenders than do more traditional,
informal juvenile courts.' Providing the right to a jury trial and
procedural parity with adults might encourage some legislators to
seek more penal "bang for the buck" and to impose even longer
sentences on delinquents. Procedural formality also creates
The Right to a Juvenile Jury Trial in Wisconsin: Rebalancing The Balanced
Approach, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 571, 605-06 (1999) (criticizing legislation repealing
statutory right to jury trial in light of increased punitiveness of juvenile code).
154. The statute in Louisiana authorized the department of correction to
transfer convicted juveniles to adult prisons when the youth turned seventeen,
even though they were denied a right to a jury trial at the time of their
delinquency adjudication. In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 400 (La. 1998) ("We
therefore hold that the statute through its corresponding regulation has
sufficiently tilted the scales away from a 'civil' proceeding, with its focus on
rehabilitation, to one purely criminal."); see also State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d
848, 887-88, 580 N.W.2d 660, 674 (1998) ("Juveniles transferred under these
provisions are subject to placement in the exact environment to which adults
with criminal convictions are subject. In addition, those juveniles are subject to
being housed with the general population of criminally convicted adults.
However, the juvenile subject to placement in adult prisons are not afforded the
right to a trial by jury, unlike the adult offenders.").
155. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 238 (1993) ("A relationship between procedural
formality and the severity of sanctions prevailed whether the higher rates of
representation were associated with urbanism... or the presence of lawyers
per se ... . The more formal courts, where lawyers appeared routinely,
sentenced juveniles more severely than did the informal courts where the
presence of lawyers was the exception.... .") [hereinafter FELD, JUSTICE FOR
CHILDREN]; Barry C. Feld, Justice By Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural
Variations in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
156, 157-58 (1991).
156. Id. at 208 ("This study provides even stronger support for the formality-
severity relationship. The urban courts sentenced youths charged with similar
offenses more severely than did the suburban or rural courts. The pattern of
urban severity remained even after controlling for the present offense and prior
record.").
157. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 124, at 1105-06 ("Some Task Force members
denied juveniles the right to a jury based on a political calculus about the
impact of such a recommendation on the legislature .... Task Force members
2003] 1159
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
perverse incentives to plea bargain which subverts any procedural
rights granted.' Ultimately, granting the right to a jury might
realize McKeiver's ultimate fear of providing impetus for the
abolition of the juvenile court.'59 While the future of the juvenile
court as a separate institution remains a controverted issue, 6 as
feared that equating juvenile and adult criminal procedures would strengthen
the position of 'get tough' legislators who wanted to exclude offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction and who could argue that procedural equality with
adults should produce correspondingly longer sentences.").
158. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,
100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 528 (2001) (stating one explanation for the expansion of
criminal liability is that "prosecutors keep courts at bay by using the charging
opportunities legislators give them to generate guilty pleas. Guilty pleas, of
course, avoid adjudication altogether; they leave courts very little role to play.").
Stuntz argues that a natural bureaucratic alliance exists between legislators
interested in re-election who advocate "get tough" and symbolic crimes, and
prosecutors and police who desire new crimes or over-lapping crimes that
facilitate their enforcement and plea bargain strategies in the most cost-
effective manner. Id. at 534. Elected prosecutors share some of the same
incentives as politicians, and both are more inclined to pursue strategies that
reduce the costs of enforcement. Id. at 535. The result is an increased premium
on plea bargains to avoid trials or appellate review and reversal. Id. at 536-37.
But there is more than one way to hold costs down: if the number
of cases cannot be reduced, the incentive is to reduce the time and
energy spent on each case. The best way to do that is to convert
potential trials into guilty pleas .... Guilty pleas are not simply
cheaper than trials; they are enormously cheaper. And prosecutors'
bargaining strategies tend to ensure that this remains so. The
literature on plea bargaining suggests that most prosecutors insist on
bargains very early in the process, and punish defendants who resist
settlement until shortly before trial.
So prosecutors have some incentive to keep costs down, which
they can do either by limiting the number of cases filed or by limiting
the amount of time and energy expended per case ... . Recall that
legislatures can push toward greater efficiency by expanding criminal
law, thereby making it easier for prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas. If
crimes are defined in ways that make guilt hard to prove, the threat of
trial will be less serious to many defendants, and the inducements to
plead will be accordingly less substantial. If, on the other hand, crimes
are defined so as to make conviction easy, the threat value of trial is
increased. And if prosecutors are able to threaten defendants who
take their cases to trial with a range of overlapping charges that
produce a severe sentence, the ability to induce a plea is magnified
still more.
Id. at 536-37 (citation omitted).
159. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 441, 551 (1971) ("If the formalities
of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile
court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that
ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are
disinclined to give impetus to it.").
160. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 72, at 1085 (arguing that "the supposed
benefits of juvenile jurisdiction do not depend on the existence of a separate
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currently administered, juvenile courts pose substantial questions
about the quality of delinquency adjudications and the
appropriateness of using those convictions for sentence
enhancements following Apprendi.
1. Accurate Fact-Finding and Judge versus Jury Reasonable
Doubt
Apprendi emphasized the importance of the jury to assure the
constitutional reliability of fact-finding and to uphold the standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court's conclusion
in McKeiver that states do not need to provide juries to assure
accurate fact-finding follows neither the logic nor the policies in
Winship,' and fails to take account of the real differences in fact-
finding processes between juries and judges. Winship reasoned that
the seriousness of the proceedings and the potential consequences
for a defendant, whether juvenile or adult, required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to avoid convicting innocent people. 162 Having the
juvenile court, and that juveniles would receive positive advantages from being
tried within a unified criminal justice system"); Ainsworth, supra note 114, at
930; Gary L. Crippen, The Juvenile Court's Next Century-Getting Past the Ill-
Founded Talk of Abolition, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 195, 198 (1999); Katherine
Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the
Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 25 (1990); Feld,
supra note 114, at 128, 133 (arguing for abolition of juvenile court, trial of all
offenders in a unified criminal court, and separate sentencing policy for younger
offenders); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to
the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 163, 182-84 (1993) (arguing
that legislatures would not give juveniles either greater procedural protections
or shorter sentences in a unified criminal court); Stephen Wizner and Mary F.
Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency
Jurisdiction Obsolete, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 1133 (1977) ("But if the goal -
and limit-of juvenile delinquency proceedings is to be prosecution and
sentencing of criminal offenders, if sentencing is to be proportional to the
seriousness of the criminal offense and prior record of the offender, and if
participation in rehabilitative programs by incarcerated offenders is to be
voluntary, then how do juvenile delinquency proceedings differ from criminal
proceedings?"); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn
From the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 577, 602 (1996);
Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2477, 2493-95 (2000) (arguing for separate juvenile court as a
means of insulating youth against criminal sanctions imposed on adults).
161. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see supra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text.
162. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64; cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-
29 (1979) (showing that the Court's adoption of "clear and convincing" standard
of proof in civil commitment proceedings is consistent with Winship because
commitment proceedings are not punitive and mentally ill person benefit from
treatment during commitment).
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same rigorous standard of proof for both adults and juveniles
assures the greatest possible factual accuracy, protection against
government oppression, public confidence in decisions, and the
likelihood of similar outcomes in juvenile and criminal proceedings.
McKeiver's rejection of jury trials for juveniles, however,
undermines factual accuracy and creates the strong probability that
outcomes will differ in delinquency and criminal trials.6 3 Because
there is no way to know the "correct" outcome or how an "ideal"
decision-maker should resolve a factually disputed case, most
research compares the decisions of jurors with those of judges, the
only other decision-maker practically available. These comparisons
indicate that juries serve special protective functions to assure the
accuracy of factual determinations. Although judges and juries
agree in their judgments of defendants' guilt or innocence in about
four-fifths of cases, when they differ, juries are far more likely to
acquit defendants than are judges given the same types of
evidence. 164
163. PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., YOUTH CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
CALIFORNIA: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 30-31 (1983) (comparing the attrition
rates of similar types of cases in juvenile and adult courts in California and
concluding that "it is easier to win a conviction in the juvenile court than in the
criminal court, with comparable types of cases"); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 183, 185-90, 209-13 (1966) (noting the differences
in interpretation of "reasonable doubt" between judge and jury and the role of
the youthfulness of defendant in eliciting sympathy).
164. See, e.g., JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS 4 (1979)
(discussing a judge's independent assessment of verdicts and his conclusion that
juries reached correct verdict in at least 85% of cases); KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra
note 163, at 58-59 (comparing juries' actual verdicts and judges' hypothetical
verdicts in civil and criminal cases and found agreement 78% of the time; juries
acquit 16% more often than judges); Ainsworth, supra note 72, at 1123 ("[Ilt is
one of the less well-kept secrets of our criminal justice system that juries acquit
more frequently than do judges .... [A] defendant ordinarily stands a far
better chance with a jury trial than with a bench trial."); Rebecca Bromley, Jury
Leniency in Drinking and Driving Cases Has it Changed? 1958 versus 1993, 20
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 27, 27 (1996) (showing juries more lenient than judges in
DUI cases); Valerie P. Hans, Jury Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 56, 65 (D.K. Kagehiro and W.S. Lavfor eds., 1992) ("When
they disagreed in criminal cases, juries were more likely than judges to find the
defendant not guilty."); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A
Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 29, 46
(1994) ("[I]n both criminal and civil trials, judges in our sample are somewhat
more likely to convict or find for the plaintiff."); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury
Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 44-45 (1997) (reviewing studies comparing judge and jury
decision-making); Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of
Proof A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
319, 329 (1971).
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Fact-finding by judges and juries is inherently different,
because the former may preside over hundreds of cases annually
while the latter may hear only one or two cases in a lifetime.65 As a
result of routinely hearing many cases, judges sometimes become
less meticulous in considering evidence, evaluate facts more
casually, and apply less stringently the concepts of "reasonable
doubt" and "presumption of innocence" than do jurors. 6 Although
the personal characteristics of judges differ from those of jurors,
defendants have greater difficulty learning how those individual
qualities might affect the decision in a case. 6' Through voir dire,
165. While decision-making by an exceptional judge will outperform most
juries, average juries generally will make better decisions than average judges.
Basic research and theory on group decision-making indicate that for
the sorts of decision tasks posed by trials, groups generally outperform
individuals. They bring more informational and cognitive resources to
the task. Larger groups, certainly up to size twelve, afford a greater
probability of someone having or seeing or remembering information
essential to reaching correct factual conclusions.
Saks, supra note 164, at 42-43 (citations omitted). Juries and judges react
differently to the same evidence because of the novelty of deciding cases.
A judge who has presided over numerous trials in which the accused
invoked such a defense falsely (or, more precisely, in which the judged
deemed the defense to be false) cannot help but be skeptical when yet
another defendant or juvenile respondent comes forward with the
same story. Accordingly, unlike a jury which would assess the
accused's credibility with an open mind, a judge may start from the
cynic's position that the story is false until proven otherwise.
Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 89, at 575 (citations omitted). See also Lisa
Forquer, Comment, California's Three Strikes Law-Should a Juvenile
Adjudication Be a Ball or a Strike?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1297, 1336 (1995)
("[H]eavy juvenile court caseloads . . . may result in the court becoming 'less
meticulous in considering the evidence' or the court applying 'less stringent
concepts of reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence."').
166. See, e.g., Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 89, at 564 (reviewing a
number of appellate reversals of bench trial verdicts that call into question the
fairness and quality of judicial decision-making). "The case law suggests that
judges often convict on evidence so scant that only the most closed-minded or
misguided juror could think the evidence satisfied the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id. Because appellate courts indulge a strong
presumption in favor of fact-findings by the trial judge, they only may reverse a
case for insufficient evidence when no rational fact finder could have found as
the trial court did. Id. at 566. Judges may rely on stereotypes based on
previous cases which can bias their decision-making in the present one. See,
e.g., Ronald A. Farrell & Malcolm D. Holmes, The Social and Cognitive
Structure of Legal Decision-Making, 32 Soc. Q. 529, 532-33 (1991) (showing that
court actors internalize crime stereotypes as cognitive schemata that provide a
shorthand for information-processing in a system characterized by time and
resource constraints).
167. Saks notes,
Judges are lawyers; lawyers are people who, disproportionately more
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litigants may examine jurors about their attitudes, beliefs, and
experiences to assess how they may affect the way they will decide
the case, but defendants have no comparable opportunity to explore
a judge's background to determine how her experiences might
influence her decisions.
Juries and judges evaluate testimony differently. Juvenile
court judges hear testimony from police and probation officers on a
recurring basis and develop a settled opinion about their
credibility.'68 Similarly, as a result of hearing earlier charges
against a juvenile or presiding over a detention hearing or pre-trial
motion to suppress evidence, a judge already may have a pre-
determined view about a youth's credibility and character or the
merits of the case. 9 Fact-finding by a judge differs from that by a
than most educated Americans, are uncomfortable with quantitative,
scientific, and technological information; avoided it as students, and
are incompetent with it as adults. By contrast, a well assembled jury
containing a high school science teacher, an accountant, or an
engineer, should have greater potential than the average judge to
understand complex technical or quantitative evidence.
Saks, supra note 164, at 43.
168. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 89, at 568, report a pattern of:
[T]rial judges unduly leaning in the prosecution's favor when
appraising the evidence. There are numerous instances in which the
appellate courts have reversed trial court rulings denying motions to
suppress evidence because the higher court concluded that the trial
judge had credited police testimony that was so obviously false that
the prosecution did not meet its minimal burden of producing a
credible witness.
One reason that judges may unduly credit questionable testimony is
their familiarity with the witnesses.
[Jludges who sit in a criminal or juvenile court for years come to know
the police officers of the jurisdiction. If the judge knows that a
particular officer is a "good cop" and particularly if the judge has
found that the officer testified truthfully in previous cases, the natural
tendency is to presume that the officer would not lie.
Id. at 574.
169. Numerous studies indicate that jurors exposed to inadmissible
evidence, such as a defendant's prior record, may use it impermissibly to infer
that the defendant committed the present offense. Saks, supra note 164, at 26.
However, studies of judicial decision-making indicate that judges are not
impervious to the affects of prejudicial exposure to inadmissible evidence. See,
e.g., Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 89, at 574-75 ("[A] judge's experience in
presiding over criminal and juvenile cases may make the judge unduly skeptical
of the testimony of the accused. Judges who sit for years in a criminal or
juvenile court tend to hear the same stories over and over .... A judge who has
presided over numerous trials in which the accused invoked such a defense
falsely (or, more precisely, in which the judge deemed the defense to be false)
cannot help but be skeptical when yet another defendant or juvenile respondent
comes forward with the same story."); Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos,
A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on
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jury because an individual fact-finder does not have to discuss either
the law or the evidence with a group before reaching a conclusion.
7 0
Indeed, Justice Blackmun, who wrote the McKeiver plurality
opinion, later recognized the superiority of group decision-making
over individual judgments in Ballew v. Georgia,7' which defined the
constitutional minimum number of jurors whom a state must
empanel. 7 1 Some group members remember facts that others may
forget, and the give-and-take of group deliberations promotes more
accurate outcomes by airing competing points of view. 73 Although a
Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 113, 119-25 (1994);
Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability
Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992).
170. Jurors from different walks of life bring "a variety of different
experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits" to bear when they assess the
credibility of witnesses and the facts. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 18 (1955). As a consequence, "By drawing upon a pool of twelve
people's experiences and perspectives, rather than a single judge's, the jury
model increases the likelihood that witnesses' credibility will be assessed
accurately and facts correctly found." Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 89, at
576. One consequence of reducing the number of decision-makers is to increase
the variability and unpredictability of outcomes. Saks, supra note 164, at 14
("The conclusion of nearly every statistician and social scientist who has
examined the question has been that reducing the size of the decision-making
group is a recipe for increasing the variance of the decisions rendered.").
171. 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978).
172. Id. at 233-34.
When individual and group decisionmaking were compared [in social
scientific studies], it was seen that groups performed better because
prejudices of individuals were frequently counterbalanced, and
objectivity resulted. Groups ... exhibited . . . self-criticism ....
Because juries frequently face complex problems laden with value
choices, the[se] benefits are important . . . . In particular, the
counterbalancing of various biases is critical to the accurate
application of the common sense of the community to the facts of any
given case.
Id. at 233-34.
173. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 89, at 578, observe that the process of
acting as a judge may detract from the accuracy of fact finding. Unlike jurors,
whom most states prohibit from taking notes, judges try to maintain an on-
going record.
[E]ven the most assiduous note-taking judge may neglect to jot
down an important response by a witness or argument of counsel
because the judge failed to appreciate its significance at the time.
Moreover, in her effort to take careful notes, the judge may fail to
notice some meaningful aspect of a witness's demeanor or some highly
salient gesture or meaningful glance by the witness while on the
stand. Indeed, judges suffer from a particular disadvantage in this
regard because, unlike jurors, their attention is constantly diverted by
the need to resolve pending evidentiary matters, to control the
courtroom, and to attend to a series of clerks and lawyers filing in and
out of the courtroom.
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judge instructs a jury about the law to apply to the case, in a bench
trial the judge does not explicitly state the law, and this makes it
more difficult to know whether the judge correctly understood and
applied it.
The youthfulness of a defendant is another factor that elicits
jury sympathy and accounts for some of the differences between jury
and judge trial outcomes.'74 Consequently, it is easier to convict a
youth in juvenile court without a jury than to convict a younger
person in a criminal proceeding. Indeed, juvenile court judges may
be more predisposed to find jurisdiction than criminal court judges
or juries in order to "help" an errant youth.175 A comparison of the
A final advantage of group decisionmaking, and perhaps the most
important one, is that the give-and-take of a discussion format
promotes accuracy and good judgement by ensuring that competing
viewpoints are aired and vetted. As social scientific studies of
decisionmaking by juries and other groups have shown, group
members common reconsider and change even the firmest of
prejudgements as they come to appreciate the complexities of a
subject and take heed of viewpoints which they initially did not
recognize or sufficiently value.
Id. at 578-79; see also Heuer & Penrod, supra note 164, at 30 ("[Nlot all judges
are bright and diligent and because they do not have the advantages of
collective recall, they may be incapable of rendering more rational decisions
than juries .... [Jiuries are less influenced by the political implications of their
decisions, partly because, unlike many judges, they were not chosen because of
their political biases.").
174. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 163, at 209-13. Although Kalven and
Zeisel conducted their research in adult criminal proceedings, they concluded
that the youthfulness of a defendant was the personal characteristic that
elicited the greatest sympathy from jurors. Id. at 210.
175. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 89, at 569-70, suggest a variety of
institutional and ideological reasons why individual judges' biases may incline
them to convict youths more readily.
Some judges may tip the balance in the prosecution's favor to guard
against acquiring a reputation for being "soft on crime," a reputation
which can jeopardize a judge's prospects for re-election or
reappointment to the bench. Judges who conduct bench trials in
criminal or delinquency cases also may over-convict in close cases out
of a misguided notion that the best way to protect the community from
potentially dangerous offenders is to err on the side of conviction ....
Finally, judges in the juvenile court setting may inappropriately lean
in favor of conviction in order to ensure that youths in need of
rehabilitative services will receive them as a condition of probation or
placement.
Id. at 569-70. See also People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 926 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (Johnson, J. dissenting) ("In the juvenile context, the real danger in fact
may come not as much from 'compliant, biased, or eccentric judges', as from the
'kindly, fatherly or motherly judge' who sees a youngster mired in a horrendous
environment and wants to rescue the juvenile before it is too late. The
temptation, often irresistible, is to remove the child from those terrible
circumstances even though that may require bending the reasonable doubt
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outcomes of cases in juvenile and adult courts with comparable
evidence suggests that it is easier to convict a delinquent in juvenile
court than a defendant in criminal court.'
7 6
The greater flexibility and informality of non-jury, closed
proceedings in juvenile court compounds the differences between
judge and jury "reasonable doubt" and places delinquents at a
further disadvantage. Juvenile court judges preside at detention
hearings and receive prejudicial information about a youth's offense,
criminal history, and social circumstances prior to trial. This
increases the likelihood that a juvenile court will convict and
subsequently institutionally confine her.'7 ' The lack of a jury allows
judges to conduct suppression hearings during the trial, exposes
them to prejudicial information about the youth, and further
increases the likelihood of erroneous conviction.
7 8
standard in order to find him or her guilty of the charged offense.").
176. See GREENWOOD ETAL., supra note 163, at 30-31.
177. See supra note 169, and accompanying text. See also Joseph B.
Sanborn, Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class Punishment: The Use of Juvenile
Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206, 212 (1998) ("Another
problematic aspect of juvenile court procedure is the abundance of
contaminants that diminish the prospect of impartial fact finding. In many
juvenile courts the same individual conducts both preliminary/detention
hearings as well as the adjudicatory hearing. This exposes the fact finder to
prejudicial information (like prior record) that is inadmissible at the trial stage.
Often, juvenile court judges also are familiar with defendants from previous
prosecutions . . ").
178. See Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 92, at 231-41.
Whenever a judge knows information that it not admissible at trial
but is prejudicial to a defendant, the impartiality of the tribunal is
open to question. The presumption that judges can successfully
compartmentalize admissibility and guilt is a frail reed on which to
build an adjudicative apparatus. The presumption against
evidentiary "seepage" is particularly troublesome in juvenile court
proceedings because the same judge typically handles the same case
at different stages. For example, at a detention hearing, a judge may
be exposed to a youth's "social history" file and the youth's prior record
of police contacts and delinquency adjudications, all of which bear on
the issue of the appropriate placement of the youth. When the same
judge is subsequently called on to determine the admissibility of
evidence in a suppression hearing and the guilt of the juvenile in the
same proceeding, the risks of prejudice become almost insuperable.
To whatever degree a judge is unable to compartmentalize, a juvenile
is denied the basic right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal with a
determination of guilt based on admissible evidence.
Id. at 239-40. Guggenheim and Hertz, supra note 89, at 571, identify other
sources of evidentiary contamination which may prejudice judicial fact-finding:
[Tirial judges are often exposed to inadmissible, extra-record evidence.
Such evidence often suggests, and sometimes virtually proves
incontrovertibly, that the accused committed the crime(s) charged.
For example, by presiding at a pretrial suppression hearing that
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Criminal guilt does not involve just "factual guilt," but entails a
complex assessment of moral culpability. 179  The power of
nullification provides the link between the legislature's original
decision to criminalize conduct and the community's sense of justice
when it applies the law to the facts of a particular case 8 Analysts
attribute the differences in decision-making outcomes between
juries and judges to various factors, including differences in jury-
judge evaluations of evidence, jury sentiments about the "law" (jury
equity), and jury sympathy for the defendant.' Kalven and Zeisel
results in the suppression of evidence (a statement of the accused,
tangible evidence, or identification testimony), the judge will be
apprised of highly incriminating evidence that is inadmissible at trial
and would be kept from a jury. By presiding over the trial or a guilty
plea of a co-respondent or adult co-perpetrator, the judge may hear
another individual implicate the accused. In the course of
encouraging the parties to settle the case with a guilty plea, the judge
may learn from defense counsel that the accused admits guilt. Even
in cases where the judge lacks such extra-record information about
the accused's involvement in the charged crime, the judge may learn
inadmissible information about the accused's prior record as a result
of presiding over prior hearings in the case or while resolving
evidentiary matters at trial.
Id.
179. See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 160-68
(1968) (analyzing distinction between "factual" and "legal guilt"); Peter
Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 214 (1983).
180. Id. at 215; see Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The
Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 51 (1980).
181. The Court in Duncan v. Louisiana emphasized that
juries do understand the evidence and come to sound conclusions in
most of the cases presented to them and that when juries differ with
the result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because
they are serving some of the very purposes for which they were
created and for which they are now employed.
391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968); see also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 163, at 182, 185-
90; Hans, Jury Decision Making, supra note 164, at 65 ("Disagreements [about
outcomes] are caused by the judge and jury's divergent reactions to factors in
the case, such as different standards of reasonable doubt, sympathy for the
defendant, and the jury's quarrel with the law itself... . In disagreeing with
the judge for specific reasons in particular cases, the jury reflected community
motions of equity and justice that were at odds with judicial views."); Timothy
E. Foley, Comment, Juveniles and their Right to a Jury Trial, 15 VILL. L. REv.
972, 992-95 (1970). BALDWIN & MCCONVILLE, supra note 164, at 48, analyzed
jury verdicts in England and made similar findings about patterns of acquittals
in which judges would have convicted.
The possibility that defendants may, in a strict legal sense, be
wrongfully acquitted by jury might not of itself give cause for concern.
Indeed, several writers have argued that it is at the heart of the jury's
function to mitigate the harshness of certain laws or in other ways to
introduce common sense and equity when the exercise of cold legal
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attribute the substantial differences between judge and jury verdicts
to the jury's use of a higher evidentiary threshold standard of "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 18' They conclude that "[i]f a society
wishes to be serious about convicting only when the state has been
put to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be well advised to
have a jury system."' The factual and legal issues in delinquency
hearings are exactly the same as those in criminal trials-has the
state proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed a crime? Given the importance of juries to answer this
question, McKeiver's decision to dispense with juries in juvenile
court makes it easier to convict a youth appearing before a judge in
juvenile court than it would be to convict an adult criminal
defendant, on the basis of the same evidence, before a jury of
detached citizens. Apprendi exempted "the fact of a prior
conviction" from its holding because of the Court's confidence in the
quality of the criminal justice system to produce reliable prior
convictions.84 The right to a jury trial was the fundamental
constitutional predicate. The differences between the quality,
validity, and reliability of delinquency adjudications compared with
criminal convictions call into question the legitimacy of including
them within Apprendi's exception.
2. Right to Counsel and the Quality of Delinquency
Adjudications
The lack of a right to a jury trial affects other aspects of juvenile
judgment would be inappropriate or unjust. There is no doubt that,
looking at acquittals as a whole, [judge] respondents often took the
view that extra-legal considerations did influence, and in some cases
determine, the jury's verdict. In most cases, respondents identified
several factors which in their view explained the acquittal, and these
frequently included matters which are usually considered to be part of
'jury equity'--sympathy with the defendant, disapproval of the
behaviour of the victim, and the like.
Id. at 48.
182. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 163, at 182, 185-90.
183. Id. at 189-90.
184. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000) (noting that a
defendant's criminal history is the result of judicial proceedings that met due
process standards and is therefore supported by "substantial procedural
safeguards of [its] own"). See also Huigens, supra note 4, at 404 (Apprendi "put
in place the second of its two limitations on the broad principle that the facts
that are used to justify punishment must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
to a jury."); Richard E. Redding, Using Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence
Enhancement Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is It Sound Policy?, 10
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 231, 233 (2002) ("[Blecause of the significant differences
between the juvenile and criminal courts, juvenile adjudications often lack the
same level of reliability as criminal convictions.").
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justice administration in important ways. The informality of
delinquency proceedings enables juvenile courts in many
jurisdictions to adjudicate juveniles without the presence or
assistance of an attorney which further prejudices the accuracy and
reliability of the fact-finding process. 86 Studies in many states
consistently report that juvenile courts adjudicate youths delinquent
without the appointment of counsel."' Many other studies strongly
185. See supra notes 169, 177 and accompanying text; BARBARA FLICKER,
PROVIDING COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED JUVENILES 2 (1983) ("[Iun some defender
offices, assignment to 'kiddie court' is the bottom rung of the ladder, to be
passed as quickly as possible on the way up to more visible and prestigious
criminal court assignments."); Ainsworth, supra note 72, at 1128 ("[L]awyers in
juvenile courts are all too frequently both inexperienced and overworked.
Particularly in jurisdictions where juveniles have no right to jury trial, public
defender offices often assign their greenest attorneys to juvenile court to season
them.").
186. See generally FELD, supra note 155; N. Lee Cooper et al., Fulfilling the
Promise of In re Gault: Advancing the Role of Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 651, 654-60 (1998).
187. See e.g. Cooper et al., supra note 186, at 655-56, who note that
prior to In re Gault, attorneys appeared on behalf of children in 5% of
juvenile delinquency cases. Through an analysis of data from six
states .... Professor Feld found that many jurisdictions still failed to
appoint counsel in a majority of juvenile court cases. Large urban
states were more successful at assuring juveniles the assistance of
counsel, with rates of 85% to 95% representation, as opposed to 37.5%
and 52.7% in Midwestern states ....
In Professor Feld's analysis of other studies on access to counsel,
he reported wildly varying representation rates in different parts of
individual states. For example, lawyer appointment rates ranged
from 19.3% to 94.5% in different counties of Minnesota. Professor
Feld attributed the disparities, in part, to different appointment of
counsel practices in urban, suburban and rural areas .... Studies
from other jurisdictions confirm Professor Feld's findings that access
to counsel remains a serious problem in many states.
See also FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 155; AM. BAR ASS'N, A CALL
FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 44-45 (1995) [hereinafter A CALL
FOR JUSTICE] (noting that a large number of juveniles appear without counsel,
often induced to waive representation by court's suggestion that "lawyers are
not needed because no serious dispositional consequences are anticipated"); AM.
BAR ASS'N, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION
60 (1993) ("Many children go through the juvenile justice system without the
benefit of legal counsel. Among those who do have counsel, some are
represented by counsel who are untrained in the complexities of representing
juveniles, and fail to provide 'competent' representation ... . Under pressure
from parents or judges, they often sign documents waiving their right to
counsel, without understanding the implications of their decision."); GEORGE
BURRUS & KIMBERLY KEMPF-LEONARD, ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION & IMPACT IN
SERIOUS DELINQUENCY CASES: AN EVALUATION OF THREE MISSOURI CIRCUITS 60
(2000) ("[Rlepresentation by legal counsel was relatively uncommon among
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question the quality of representation that appointed attorneys
provide for those delinquents who do receive the assistance of
counsel.'
juveniles who were accused of felony offenses in 1998.. ."); GABRIELLA CELESE &
PATRICIA PURITZ, THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN
LOUISIANA 59-62 (2001) (observers in several parishes estimate 80% to 90% of
delinquents waive right to counsel); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: REPRESENTATION RATES VARIED As DID COUNSEL'S IMPACT ON COURT
OUTCOMES 13 (1995) (wide range of variation in rates of representation among
states and within states); PATRICIA PURITZ & KIM BROOKS, KENTUCKY:
ADVANCING JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 29 (2002) (despite efforts to
improve delivery of legal services, "it is clear that large numbers of youth are
still waiving counsel ... ."); PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 24-25 (2002) (estimating that 50% of juveniles waived their right
to counsel, regardless of the seriousness of the charges).
188. See, e.g., A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 187, at 52-56 (heavy caseloads
detract from quality of representation); JANE KNITZER & MERRIL SOBIE, LAW
GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
CHILDREN 84-85 (1984) (more than two-thirds of law guardians had no special
training or interest in juvenile law, half appeared unprepared for trial, and half
of transcripts reviewed included errors that lawyers failed to challenge or
appeal).
Attorneys may not represent their juvenile clients effectively even when
counsel are appointed for delinquents. The juvenile court as an institution
actually works against the adversarial process. Stevens H. Clarke & Gary
Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control, and do Lawyers Make a
Difference?, 14 L. & Soc. REV. 263, 305 (1980) (noting juvenile courts' treatment
of lawyers as an "impediment"); Feld, supra note 92, at 187 ("Organizational
pressures to cooperate, judicial hostility toward adversarial litigants, role
ambiguity created by the dual goals of rehabilitation and punishment,
reluctance to help juveniles 'beat a case,' or an internalization of a court's
treatment philosophy may compromise the role of counsel in juvenile court.");
see generally M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF
INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 136-39 (1982) (illustrating the role of counsel in
juvenile court). Indeed, organizational pressures to maintain stable,
cooperative working relations with other adult personnel in the system may
impede effective adversarial advocacy on behalf of the child. See, e.g., id. at
136-37 (examining the influence of court personnel on lawyer's perceived role in
juvenile court); W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF
YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 102-06
(1972) (discussing the juvenile court as a "quasi-cooperative system"); Abraham
S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15, 18-24 (1967) (arguing the
impact of institutional pressures upon the ability of attorneys to maintain
advocacy posture).
Several scholars question whether lawyers can perform as advocates in a
parens patriae rehabilitative juvenile justice system. See, e.g., STAPLETON &
TEITELBAUM, supra note 188, at 156-64 (finding juvenile court philosophy limits
the ability of lawyers to adequately perform as advocates); Sanford J. Fox,
Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1236
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While the Supreme Court recognized the seriousness of a
delinquency prosecution, Gault granted juveniles the right to
counsel based on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
rather than the explicit provision for counsel in the Sixth
(1970) (characterizing the role of attorneys as accommodating to the
institutional needs of the juvenile justice philosophy). Some studies indicate
that when lawyers represent juveniles in more traditional juvenile courts, they
actually may place their clients at a disadvantage at trial or sentencing. See,
e.g., BORTNER, supra note 188, at 139-40 (characterizing the disadvantages of
attorney representation for juvenile defendants); FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN,
supra note 155, at 98 (presence of an attorney appears to be aggravating factor
in the sentencing of juveniles). For example, courts appear more likely to
incarcerate juveniles who appear with counsel than they do those without
counsel. BORTNER, supra note 188, at 139-40 ("[Regardless of the types of
offenses with which they were charged, juveniles represented by attorneys
receive more severe dispositions."); STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 188,
at 63-96; Clarke & Koch, supra note 188, at 306; David Duffee & Larry Siegel,
The Organization Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIM. L. BULL.
544, 552 (1971). An evaluation of the impact of counsel in delinquency
proceedings in six states reported that
it appears that in virtually every jurisdiction, representation by
counsel is an aggravating factor in a juvenile's disposition .... In
short, while the legal variables [of seriousness of present offense, prior
record, and pretrial detention status] enhance the probabilities of
representation, the fact of representation appears to exert an
independent effect on the severity of dispositions.
Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 418-19 (1988). After
controlling for the influence of other legal variables, such as the seriousness of
the offense, prior record, and pre-trial detention status, it appears that
"representation by counsel is an additional aggravating factor in a juvenile's
disposition." Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An
Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1330 (1989).
Several observers of the quality of litigation in juvenile courts decry the
quality of representation and report that trials often are
"only marginally contested," marked by "lackadaisical defense efforts."
Defense counsel generally make few objections, and seldom move to
exclude evidence on constitutional grounds. Defense witnesses rarely
are called, and the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses is
"frequently perfunctory and reveals no design or rationale on the part
of the defense attorney." Closing arguments are sketchy when they
are made at all. Watching these trials, one gets the overall
impression that defense counsel prepare minimally or not at all.
Ainsworth, supra note 72, at 1127-28.
Analysts attribute the poor quality of attorneys' performance to lack of
preparation, crushing caseloads, and inadequate compensation. CELESE &
PURITZ, supra note 187, at 62-65 (grueling caseloads preclude any meaningful
contact with clients); PURITZ AND BROOKS, supra note 187, at 31-35 (high
caseloads and limited resources adversely affected quality of representation);
PURITZ ET AL., supra note 187, at 24-26 ("[M]ost juvenile defenders do not
adequately prepare delinquency cases .... There was no written submission to
the court, no legal pad, and it was clear that [the attorney] was still thinking
about what to say moments before the hearing.").
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Amendment. 189 By relying only on "fundamental fairness," Gault did
not mandate automatic appointment of counsel for delinquents but
only required that "the child and his parents must be notified of the
child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if
they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child."'9 ° However, the Court also held that a juvenile
could waive her right to counsel.' Courts typically use the adult
waiver standard-"knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the
totality of the circumstances"-to assess the validity of juveniles'
waivers of constitutional rights including the right to counsel.9
Many juveniles commonly appear without lawyers because
juvenile court judges find that they waived their right to counsel.9 3
189. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1967). Like in Gault, the Supreme Court
initially relied on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause when it
granted adult criminal defendants a constitutional right to counsel. See, e.g.,
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that a court must appoint
counsel for indigents in capital cases); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472-73
(1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that
due process does not require automatic appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants, unless case presents special circumstances of complexity).
However, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruled Betts, and
based the appointment of counsel for adult felony defendants on the Sixth
Amendment. "[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him." Id. at 344.
190. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. By contrast, the Court's decision based on the
Sixth Amendment "embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein
the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); see also note 130 supra and accompanying
text.
191. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42.
192. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (stating
requirements for adequate waiver of a juvenile's right to an attorney).
193. See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel:
Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 54 U. FLA. L. REV. 577, 649-50 (2002) ("The broad
discretion granted to juvenile court judges by the court's founders and later by
state statutes, coupled with the informality of juvenile court proceedings, have
impeded the full recognition of juveniles' constitutional rights .... Juveniles do
not have the capacity for sound decision making or an understanding of the
significance of right to counsel and the consequences of waiving the right.")
There are several explanations for why so many youths still appear
without counsel. Affluent parents may be reluctant to retain an attorney.
Public-defender legal services may be inadequate or non-existent in non-urban
areas. Juvenile court judges may encourage and readily find waivers of the
right of counsel in order to ease administrative burdens on the courts. For
example, courts may give cursory advisories of rights that imply that waiver isjust a formal technicality. Moreover, traditional, treatment-oriented judges
may resent legal advocacy that attempts to limit their discretion. See, e.g., In re
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In most states, courts determine the validity of a juvenile's waiver of
a constitutional right by assessing whether it was "knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary" under the "totality of the
circumstances. '" 194 The Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v.
Zerbst"9 ' and Faretta v. California96 recognized adult criminal
defendants' right to waive counsel and appear pro se. Faretta held
that adult defendants in state criminal trials have a constitutional
right to proceed without counsel if they voluntarily and intelligently
choose to do so.' 9  Although the Supreme Court has not decided
explicitly whether juveniles validly can waive their right to counsel
in delinquency proceedings, it has upheld youths' waiver of their
Miranda right to counsel during pretrial "custodial interrogation"
under the "totality of the circumstances. State courts routinely
M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing a trial court that
had summarily dismissed a juvenile's court appointed attorney for appealing its
decision, noting that "[t]his kind of arbitrary action can have no other but a
chilling effect on conscientious advocacy"). Judges also may decide what a
juvenile's likely disposition will be, and decline to appoint counsel when they
anticipate a probationary sentence. See FELD, supra note 155, at 190; M.A.
BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT 140 (New York University Press 1982)
(noting that court officials are likely to recommend counsel only in cases with
the potential for serious dispositions). Whatever the reasons, many juveniles
waive their right to counsel without consulting with an attorney or appreciating
the consequences of foregoing their right to counsel, and confront the coercive
power of the state without legal assistance.
194. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (articulating
requirements for adequate waiver of a juvenile's right to an attorney); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (finding that a defendant may waive her
right to counsel); In re M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 732 (Minn. 1984) (placing
burden on state to show a valid waiver of rights); In re L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334,
337 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the totality test must consider all the
surrounding circumstances); State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 1980)
(upholding juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights). See generally Barry C. Feld,
Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the Right to
Counsel, in THOMAS GRIsSO & ROBERT G. SCHWARTZ, YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105 (The University of
Chicago 2000) (detailing waiver of right to counsel jurisprudence in the juvenile
court setting).
195. 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
196. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
197. Id. at 836. The Faretta Court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees defendants the "assistance of counsel." Id. at 832. The Faretta
Court noted, however, that in order to represent himself, the waiver of counsel
must be "knowing and intelligent." Id. at 835. Accord Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-
65.
198. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979); see generally Feld,
Criminalizing, supra note 92, at 171-72 (discussing application of the "totality
of the circumstances" test to juvenile proceedings); Frederic Paul Gallun, The
Sixth Amendment Paradox: Recent Developments on the Right to Waiver
Counsel Under Faretta, 23 J. CRIM. & CIVIL CONFINEMENT 559, 585-93 (1997)
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uphold juveniles' waivers of the right to counsel at trial.
The crucial question, of course, is whether juveniles possess the
competence to waive counsel "voluntarily and intelligently,"
particularly without consulting counsel. When the judges who give
youths advisories seek predetermined results-waivers of counsel-
they compound the problem, as this affects both what and how they
inform juveniles and how they interpret their responses.99 Every
scholar has criticized the "totality" approach to juveniles' waiver of
rights for failing adequately to compensate for youths' immaturity
and lack of adjudicative competence. 00  Not surprisingly, the
(analyzing difficulty of administering Faretta in the context of juveniles'
waivers of right to counsel).
199. CELESTE & PURITZ, supra note 187, at 59-60, describe the problems
posed by judges who "coerce" waivers of counsel by juveniles:
The overall impression I had of the treatment of these cases was
one of coercion. The judge's chambers were very tight; often there
were not enough chairs for the child's parents to sit. The hearings
were held in chambers around a rectangular table; at the table were
the judge, ADA [assistant district attorney], children with their
parent/guardian, clerk, court reporter, probation officer and a court
officer. Prior to the hearing the ADA would speak with the parent
about their child agreeing to waive counsel. In chambers the judge
would review the waiver form with the parent and ask the parent if
the child wished to waive. The child and his or her parent were
confronted in this room with six strangers. It was clear that the ADA
and the judge wanted the children to waive counsel and admit the
offenses. Children were never allowed to review police reports or to
speak to a defense attorney .... The process of waiver often took less
than five minutes ....
Probably the most notable aspect of [this parish] ... was the
astoundingly high percentage of children who never had a chance to
consult with an attorney on their cases." Here, judges and defenders
report that "most children" waive counsel. As one judge puts it, "if
children ask to have an attorney, we're going to give them one;
however, most of the time children do not choose to have one." And
judges prefer it that way. This judge explains that he is quite content
with this system because cases are handled more efficiently by
probation "without the interference of a lawyer" and though he would
like to see lawyers on felony cases, he rarely appoints them.
By contrast, appellate courts envision a very different role for the trial judge in
assessing the validity of waivers. See, e.g., In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1178
(R.I. 1984) ("[E]xceptional efforts must be made in order to be certain that an
uncounseled juvenile fully understands the nature and consequences of his
admission of delinquency.").
200. See generally Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 92, at 173-76; Thomas
Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1139-40 (1980); Comment, Juvenile Confessions: Whether
State Procedures Ensure Constitutionally Permissible Confessions, 67 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 195 (1976); Berkheiser, supra note 193, at 631-48 (criticizing
cases approving juveniles' waivers of counsel); Ellen Marrus, Best Interests
Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation For
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empirical research indicates that juveniles are not as competent as
adults to waive their rights in a "knowing and intelligent" manner. 1
Particularly for younger juveniles, their capacity to understand and
waive rights is especially problematic:
As a class, juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to
meet both the absolute and relative (adult norm) standards for
comprehension .... The vast majority of these juveniles
misunderstood at least one of the four standard Miranda
statements, and compared with adults, demonstrated
significantly poorer comprehension of the nature and
significance of the Miranda rights.0 2
Although "juveniles younger than fifteen manifest significantly
poorer comprehension than adults of comparable intelligence," the
research also questioned whether youths sixteen and older possess
adjudicative competence or adequately understand the implications
of waiver.2 °3 A few states recognize the developmental differences
Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 316-20 (2003) (describing
circumstances under which juveniles waive counsel and judicial pressures to do
so).
201. See, e.g., THOMAS GRIsso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 106-07 (Plenum Press 1981); Grisso, supra note
200, at 1160; Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions,
Miranda, and the Right to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105, 113-15 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G.
Schwartz, eds. 2000); Berkheiser, supra note 193, at 625-30 (analyzing social
science research on juveniles' capacity and competence to waive the right to
counsel).
202. Grisso, supra note 200, at 1160.
203. Id. at 1157. Juveniles' diminished understanding of rights, confusion
about trial processes, limited language skills, and inadequately developed
decision-making abilities undermine their ability effectively to participate or to
assist counsel. Most youths younger than thirteen or fourteen years of age lack
the basic competence to understand or meaningfully to participate in their
defense. See, e.g., Richard E. Redding and Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative
Competence in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 353 (2001).
Many youths younger than sixteen years of age lack adjudicative competence
either to stand trial as adults or to make legal decisions in juvenile court
without the assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth
Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in
Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 249 (1996); Laurence
Steinberg and Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A
Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 389 (1999). Juveniles' lesser competence does not derive from
mental illness, as is the case for adult defendants, but rather from generic
developmental limitations-immaturity, lack of knowledge, attitude toward
risk, emphasis on short-term rather than long-term consequences, susceptibility
to peer and parental influences-which affect their ability to communicate, to
reason and understand, and to exercise judgment and make sound decisions.
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between juveniles and adults and prohibit waivers of the right to
counsel or incarceration of unrepresented delinquents. °4 In most
states, however, juveniles may waive their right to counsel in
delinquency proceedings without even consulting with an
205
attorney.
Because of the high rates of delinquency convictions without the
assistance of counsel, the dubious competence of most juveniles to
waive their rights, and the inability of appellate courts subsequently
to assess the validity of their waivers of counsel, it may be improper
to consider prior delinquency convictions to enhance subsequent
sentences. In Gideon v. Wainwright the Court incorporated and
applied the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel to state felony
proceedings.207  The Supreme Court in Gault cited Gideon and
emphasized that "[a] proceeding where the issue is whether a child
will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution. The child 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceeding against him'."20 8 Based on Gideon, the
Court in Burgett v. Texas2 °9  held that because it was
unconstitutional to convict a person of a felony without benefit of a
lawyer or a valid waiver of that right, it was also impermissible to
See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youth's Capacities as Trial
Defendants, in THOMAS GRISSO & ROBERT G. SCHWARTZ, YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra
note 202; Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 799 (2003).
204. See Feld, supra note 201, at 119-120; see also INST. OF JUDICAL ADMIN.,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 89 (1980) (advocating
that the juvenile should have the mandatory and nonwaivable right to effective
assistance of counsel at all stages of the proceedings); AM. BAR AsS'N, A CALL
FOR JUSTICE (1995); Tory J. Caeti et al., Juvenile Right to Counsel: A National
Comparison of State Legal Codes, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 611, 630-31 (1996) (noting
that only seven states require mandatory appointment of counsel for juveniles
in delinquency proceedings). "The majority of states, twenty-seven, are less
protective of a juvenile's right to counsel in that they make appointment of
counsel discretionary or do not provide strict waiver requirements. Thus,
although the right to counsel exists, provision of an attorney to juveniles is
conditional in many states." Id. at 624.
205. See, e.g., In re L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(upholding Miranda waiver by fourteen-year-old who had a below normal I.Q.).
But see Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Minn. 1977) (requiring extensive
inquiry into defendant's capacity to waive right).
206. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
207. Id. at 344. "[In our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him." Id.
208. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
209. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
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use that conviction to enhance subsequent sentences. In United
States v. Tucker,21' the Court remanded for re-sentencing when the
judge enhanced an adult criminal defendant's sentence using an
uncounseled prior felony conviction.2 " And, in Custis v. United
States,1 3 the Court held that a defendant has a constitutional right
collaterally to challenge a prior conviction used to enhance a
sentence which he alleges the state obtained in violation of the
Gideon Sixth Amendment right to counsel.2 4  Courts apply the
principle of Tucker and Burgett when states use uncounseled
juvenile convictions to enhance criminal sentences.15
210. Id. at 115. The Court stated:
To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright
to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance
punishment for another offense is to erode the principle of that case.
Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the
right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew form the
deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.
Id. at 115. The defendant must be notified and validly waive the right to
counsel on the record when entering a guilty plea for the conviction to be used
to enhance the term of incarceration for a subsequent offense. See, e.g., Reeves
v. Mabry, 615 F.2d 489, 491 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Where... a jury in imposing an
enhanced term of imprisonment.., considered or may have considered a
constitutionally invalid prior conviction, the ... sentence that was imposed
must generally be set aside. . . ."); United States ex rel. Lasky v. LaVallee, 472
F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1973) ("If [the defendant] was not represented by counsel
[the court] cannot use the conviction for the purpose of enhancing [the
defendant's] sentence.").
211. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
212. Id. at 449 ("The Gideon case established an unequivocal rule 'making it
unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he had a
lawyer or had validly waived one."'); Kropf, supra note 149, at 2153-54 (In
Burgett and Tucker "the Court disallowed the use of prior convictions that were
entered without advice of counsel. These earlier cases were concerned that
later sentencing courts would erode constitutional protections by applying
enhancement statutes. The Court reasoned that if prior convictions obtained in
violations of established constitutional protections-such as in violation of
Gideon v. Wainwright-were used to enhance later sentences then those
constitutional protections had been essentially destroyed, and the defendant's
constitutional rights had been violated.").
213. 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
214. Id.
If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not
competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the
Sixth Amednment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction
and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty . . . . The
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is
void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas
corpus.
Id. at 494.
215. See, e.g., Rizzo v. United States, 821 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1987)
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In Argersinger v. Hamlin,216 the Court considered whether the
state must appoint counsel for an indigent defendant whom it
charged with and imprisoned for a misdemeanor. Argersinger held
that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor or felony unless he was represented by counsel."21 v
Because the State actually imprisoned Argersinger, it was unclear
whether the Court drew the line for the right to appointed counsel
on the type of charge-felony or misdemeanor-and the statutorily
authorized penalty, or on the actual sentence of imprisonment that
the judge imposed. Subsequently, in Scott v. Illinois,"8 the Court
clarified this ambiguity and held that whether or not the trial judge
actually sentenced a defendant to a term of confinement determined
whether the court must appoint counsel as a pre-requisite.1 s
Shortly after Scott prohibited "incarceration without
representation," Baldasar v. Illinois220 prohibited enhancement of a
("[Tihe judge may have impermissibly relied on the uncounseled [juvenilel
adjudication in imposing sentence."); People v. Carpentier, 521 N.W.2d 195
(Mich. 1994) ("[A] defendant who collaterally challenges an antecedent
[juvenile] conviction allegedly procured in violation of Gideon bears the initial
burden of establishing that the conviction was obtained without counsel or
without a proper waiver of counsel .... [T]o prevail upon a request for Tucker
relief, a defendant must present prima facie proof that a prior conviction
violated Gideon or present evidence that the sentencing court either 'failed to
reply' to a request or 'refused to furnish' requested copies of records and
documents."); Majchszak v. Ralston, 454 F. Supp. 1137, 1142 (W.D. Wis. 1978)
(remanding for resentencing a denial of parole release because the presentence
report included prior uncounseled delinquency adjudications); Stockwell v.
State, 207 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Wis. 1973) (holding juvenile adjudications obtained
without counsel could not be considered in subsequent sentencing proceedings);.
216. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
217. Id. at 37 (court may not incarcerate defendant unless represented by
counsel). The Court observed that
every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it,
unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure
of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when
to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts.
Id. at 40.
218. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
219. Id. at 373-74 (right to court appointed counsel restricted to cases in
which court actually imprisons defendant). Basing the initial decision to
appoint counsel on the subsequent sentence the court may impose presents
significant administrative difficulties. Without prejudicing the defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial, how could a judge decide initially what
sentence she eventually will want to impose? See, e.g., Feld, Right to Counsel,
supra note 188, at 1198.
220. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam).
2003] 1179
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
defendant's sentence based on a prior, uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction that had not resulted in incarceration. 2 ' Baldasar
reasoned that a conviction that could not initially sustain
incarceration could not be used to extend subsequent confinement.
However, Nichols v. United States 2 overruled Baldasar and held
that states could use uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to
enhance later sentences as long as they were constitutionally valid
when the state obtained them because the trial court did not order a
sentence of imprisonment.22 3 The dissent in Nichols objected to the
221. Id. at 224. Because Baldasar's initial misdemeanor conviction resulted
only in a fine and probation, but not actual incarceration, the right to counsel,
as announced in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), did not apply. Baldasar,
446 U.S. at 222-24. When Baldasar was convicted a second time for a similar
offense, under the enhanced penalty statute, the court used the prior conviction
to convert the second conviction into a felony for which the defendant was
imprisoned. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed Baldasar's
felony conviction. Id. at 224. Justice Potter Stewart's concurrence condemned
the increased penalty noting that the defendant "was sentenced to an increased
term of imprisonment only because he had been convicted in a previous
prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of appointed counsel in his
defense." Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Thurgood Marshall's
concurrence stated that a defendant's "prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction could not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of
imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction." Id. at 226 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
222. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
223. Id. at 746. "[An uncounseled conviction valid under Scott may be
relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even though that
sentence entails imprisonment. Enhancement statutes.., do not change the
penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." Id. at 746-47. See Lily Fu, Note,
High Crimes from Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use of Prior, Uncounseled
Misdemeanors Under the Sixth Amendment, Baldasar and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 77 MINN. L. REV. 165, 194 (1992) (urging Court to adopt
rationale of Baldasar dissent and rule that all constitutionally procured
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions be used for sentence enhancements);
Ralph Ruebner et al., Shaking the Foundations of Gideon: A Critique of Nichols
in Overruling Baldasar v. Illinois, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 507, 546 (1996) ("[Tjhe
holding in Nichols reflects an abrupt departure from previous Sixth
Amendment decisions and endangers the reliability of convictions and fairness
of sentencing proceedings. The Court was mistaken in allowing judges to rely
on inherently unreliable uncounseled convictions to enhance an offender's
sentence because judges traditionally may only use reliable evidence to
determine a sentence.").
In United States v. Early, 77 F.3d 242, 244-45 (8th Cir. 1996), the court
applied Nichols and approved sentence enhancement based on uncounseled
juvenile delinquency convictions. Although Early asserted that he was
unrepresented, the court held that
we will only exclude the use of uncounseled juvenile convictions if
there is some particularized defect in the juvenile proceedings. For
sentencing purposes, however, once the government has carried its
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use of a conviction collaterally to extend a period of imprisonment
when it could not validly support incarceration initially.224 As a
result of Scott and Nichols, trial court judges may deny counsel to
misdemeanor defendants, even if they request a lawyer, as long as
they do not incarcerate them at that time, and then may use those
convictions to increase substantially a defendant's subsequent
sentence.25  Some courts use the rationale of Nichols that
convictions valid at the time obtained may be used for subsequent
enhancements to support their conclusion that delinquency
adjudications obtained without the right to a jury also may be used
to extend later sentences.226
C. Juvenile Records of Prior Delinquency Adjudications
Criminal courts' access to records of delinquency convictions
poses a policy conflict between the traditional rehabilitative goals of
juvenile justice and public safety interests in identifying,
incapacitating, and punishing career offenders more severely. 27
initial burden of proving the fact of conviction, it is the defendant's
burden to show a prior conviction was not constitutionally valid.
Id. at 245.
224. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 754-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending
that the rationale of Nichols is inconsistent with Scott). "It is more logical, and
more consistent with the reasoning in Scott, to hold that a conviction that is
invalid for imposing a sentence for the offense itself remains invalid for
increasing the term of imprisonment imposed for a subsequent conviction." Id.
at 757.
225. See, e.g., Ruebner, Berner, & Herbert, supra note 223, at 508 ("The
immediate impact of Nichols is that a sentencing judge is no longer prohibited
from enhancing a sentence on the basis of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction .... [A] prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may not be used
to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony and result in
imprisonment.").
226. See supra notes 311-318 and accompanying text.
227. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 75, at 233-25
(describing policy conflict between rehabilitative goals of juvenile courts and
crime control interests in identifying career criminals); Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr.,
Second-Class Justice, First-Class Punishment: The Use of Juvenile Records in
Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206 (1998) ("On the one hand is the
argument that crimes by youths are neither committed with adequate
culpability nor adjudicated with sufficient justice to trail these offenders into
adulthood. On the other side is the contention that adult criminals with
juvenile records should not be forgiven a history of criminal behavior simply
because it occurred while they were juveniles."); Kara E. Nelson, The Release of
Juvenile Records Under Wisconsin's Juvenile Code: A New System of False
Promises, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1101, 1101-02 (1998) ("[T]o prevent a juvenile from
being scarred by his delinquent acts, preventing the release of juvenile records
was one of the juvenile justice system's central goals. Today, the juvenile
justice system's emphasis has changed, and the confidential status juvenile
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Although juvenile courts historically restricted criminal courts'
access to avoid stigmatizing youths, the bifurcation does not seem
reasonable for juveniles whose delinquency careers are serious and
who persist into serious adult offending. Thus, while juvenile
records should continue to be protected from general public access,
the adult criminal justice system should have access to juvenile
records of at least those offenders arrested as adults on a felony
charge.2
Research on the development of criminal careers provides ample
justification to use delinquency convictions to enhance young adult
offenders' sentences. A strong relationship exists between age and
criminal activity and rates of criminality peak in mid-to-late
adolescence. 29 Although most delinquent youths desist after one or
two contacts with the justice system, once a youth becomes a chronic
offender with five or more criminal contacts, then a substantial
likelihood exists that the youth will continue to engage in criminal
activity. 3° Career offenders become involved in crime in their early-
to-mid teens, persist into their twenties, and then gradually "mature
out" of criminal behavior. 3' Moreover, chronic offenders, a relatively
small subset of all delinquents, account for a disproportionately
232large amount of serious, violent, and repetitive property crime. A
records traditionally enjoyed has started to erode.").
228. See generally 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" 197 (Alfred
Blumstein et al., eds., 1986) [hereinafter CRIMINAL CAREERS]. Sanborn, supra
note 227, at 208, summarizes the reasons courts give for including delinquency
priors in their sentencing decisions:
[Slentencing judges required access to juvenile court records in order
to learn offenders' character and threat to society, and to determine
their appropriate punishment or rehabilitative potential and needs.
Other courts explained that failure to consider juvenile court records
would penalize adult defendants with no criminal history, that these
records were supposed to be forgiven but not forgotten, and that the
commission of new crimes indicated both the failure of juvenile court
rehabilitation and the lack of any further need to prevent disclosure of
youthful indiscretions.
229. 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note 228, at 22-23. Studies of the
development of delinquent careers suggest that serious offenders are best
identified by their persistence rather than by the nature of their initial offense.
The criminal career research indicates that young offenders do not "specialize"
in particular types of crime, that serious crime occurs within an essentially
random pattern of delinquent behavior, and that a small number of chronic
delinquents are responsible for many offenses and most of the violent offenses
committed by juveniles. Id.
230. Id. at 75-76.
231. See, e.g., David P. Farrington, Age & Crime, 7 CRIME & JUST. 189
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986) (analyzing age-specific crime rates
and noting that crime rates peak in mid-to-late adolescence and then decline).
232. PAUL E. TRACY ET AL., DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN Two BIRTH COHORTS
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rational sentencing policy should identify criminally active young
offenders for selective incapacitation or greater punishment, and a
prior record of persistent offending, whether acquired as a juvenile
or as an adult, provides the best evidence of career criminality.233
The confidentiality of juvenile proceedings and the practice of
expunging records to avoid stigmatizing delinquents often hindered
criminal courts' access to juvenile conviction records.234  For
administrative and policy reasons, criminal courts sometimes could
not gain access to an offender's juvenile history at sentencing. 35
279-80 (1990) (small group of chronic offenders account for the majority of all
delinquent acts and an even larger proportion of the most serious and violent
crime); MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, ROBERT M. FIGLIO, & THORSTEN SELLIN,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 88-105 (1972) (small group of chronic offenders
committed over half of all delinquent acts and most of the more serious ones);
Sanborn, supra note 227, at 208 ("disproportionate amount of crime is
committed by relatively few offenders and that career adult criminals tend to
have roots in juvenile delinquency.").
233. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 21, at 327, who analyzes the appropriate
role of juvenile records in various justifications for punishment:
There seems little justification from the perspectives of deterrence or
incapacitation for expunging a juvenile record when the offender
reaches the age of majority. Indeed, utilitarian sentencing theorists
would consider the juvenile offense record to be a critical indicator of
the likelihood of further offending . . . . Desert theorists should also
have difficulty with a system that completely erased records at the
age of majority. Sentencing adults who have a significant juvenile
record as first offenders is tantamount to offering a double discount:
the offender received a discount at the juvenile level (first juvenile
offense) and should not now be accorded a second completely fresh
start.
234. Policies on access to juvenile records pose a conflict between the
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court and the public safety interests of
identifying career criminals. 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note 228, at 197
("[While juvenile records should continue to be protected from general public
access, the adult criminal justice system should have access to juvenile records
of at least those offenders arrested as adults on a felony charge.").
235. Juvenile courts' practices of sealing or expunging records to avoid
stigmatizing offenders impedes the use of juvenile court records to identify
young career offenders and to enhance their subsequent sentences. See, e.g., T.
Markus Funk, The Dangers of Hiding Criminal Pasts, 66 TENN. L. REV. 287, 289
(1998) (policy of expungement interfere "with the just and appropriate
sentencing of youthful adult offenders by judges, impedes law enforcement
investigations ... [and] perversely penalize persons who have conformed their
behavior to the dictates of the law, while providing unjustified gains to those
who have not"); T. Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamining
the Policy of Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
885, 890-91 (1996) ("The primary reason for expungement statutes is an
understandable concern that the juvenile offender will be forced to endure the
stigma of being labeled a 'juvenile delinquent' for the rest of his life as a result
of mere 'youthful misconduct.'... Expungement statutes, therefore, are at
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Despite the tradition of confidentiality and restricted access to
juvenile records, the use of prior delinquency convictions to enhance
adult sentences has a long lineage.236 Even prior to the adoption of
minimum attempts to lessen the additional penalty that public opinion places
upon former offenders ... "); T. Markus Funk & Daniel D. Polsby,
Distributional Consequences of Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records: The
Problem of Lemons, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 161, 161-62 (1997)
(purpose of expungement policy is "to allow young men who have been guilty of
youthful indiscretion to enter adulthood without the heavy stigmatic freight of a
criminal record.").
Criminal courts often lack access to the juvenile component of offenders'
criminal histories because of the confidentiality of juvenile court records, the
functional and physical separation of juvenile and criminal court staff who must
collate and combine these records, bureaucratic record-keeping ineptitude, and
the difficulty of maintaining integrated systems to track offenders and compile
complete criminal histories across both justice systems. See Peter W.
Greenwood, Differences in Criminal Behavior and Court Responses Among
Juvenile and Young Adult Defendants, 7 CRIME & JUSTICE 151, 173 (1986); Joan
Petersilia, Juvenile Record Use in Adult Court Proceedings: A Survey of
Prosecutors, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1746, 1747-49 (1981); Roberts, supra
note 21, at 328 ("There has also been recognition by several guidelines
commissions and scholars that the poor state of juvenile record information
systems (relative to comparable systems at the adult level) would result in
inequities of application if all juvenile adjudications were included.").
Courts have rejected defendants' equal protection claims that the uneven
availability of state juvenile records may produce sentencing disparities. See,
e.g., United States v. Inglesi, 988 F.2d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[Any
distinction in sentencing potential resulting from the availability of some but
not all state juvenile records for use in federal sentencing under the provisions
of Guidelines § 4A1.2(d) is not an arbitrary one but is based on a rational
sentencing scheme .... [Defendant's] challenge is based solely on the inherent
potential for disparities arising from the uneven availability of state court
juvenile records.").
The National Academy of Science's study of career criminals concluded
that:
[tihe prohibitions against merged juvenile and adult records, the
failure to routinely include juvenile court data in policy record
systems, and the sealing and purging of juvenile records create a
situation in most jurisdictions in which criminal justice authorities
frequently make their decisions with no information about police
contacts with juveniles .... For those who advocate the use of
juvenile records, the challenge is to respond to these concerns by
designing systems and procedures that inform adult just system
decision makers more fully about juvenile delinquent careers without
undermining the rehabilitative goal of juvenile courts.
1 CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note 228, at 193.
236. E.g., United States v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 1391 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1751 (1989); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 492 A.2d 55 (Pa.
1985); Harris v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 165, 172 (Va. App. 1998) ("mere
fact that a juvenile adjudication is not a criminal conviction does not bar its
admission into evidence at a sentencing hearing."); see generally Daniel E. Feld,
Annotation, Consideration of Accused's Juvenile Court Record in Sentencing for
Offenses Committed as an Adult," 64 A.L.R.3D 1291 (1975) (discussing cases
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state and federal sentencing guidelines, courts regularly approved
the use of delinquency records to enhance the sentences of adult
offenders."' However, some states limit the impact of delinquency
convictions on criminal sentences because of concerns about the
quality of procedural justice in juvenile courts.238 In addition, the
factual ambiguity of delinquency adjudications sometimes makes it
difficult for criminal courts to determine for what offense the
where adult courts have considered whether to include juvenile records for
sentencing purposes); Neal Miller, State Laws on Prosecutors' and Judges Use
of Juvenile Records, NAT'L INST. OF JUST RES. IN BRIEF 1, 1 (1995).
237. State v. Johnson, 216 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Minn. 1974) ("[W]e see
nothing improper in the court's taking into consideration the past conduct of a
juvenile in determining what sentence could be proper. How else could he
evaluate the past performance of a juvenile who had been in trouble before he
came before the court?"); see also MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.B.4 (2003)
(analyzing inclusion of juvenile convictions in Minnesota's Sentencing
Guidelines); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b) (1982) (juvenile adjudications may be
counted when there was an express finding that the offense constituted a felony
or one of the weapons misdemeanors); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4A1.2(d) (1994) (sentence enhancements based on "offenses committed prior to
age eighteen").
238. See, e.g., MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.B.4 cmt. II.B.406
(expressing serious reservations about "the disparities in the procedures used in
the various juvenile courts"). The denial to juveniles of a constitutional or
statutory right to a jury trial and the practical unavailability of counsel in many
of Minnesota's juvenile courts raised concerns for the Commission about the
validity and reliability of delinquency convictions. See Feld, Violent Youth,
supra note 124, at 1060-61. See also Roberts, supra note 21, at 328, who
observes that "the administration of juvenile justice fails to accord the young
offender the same degree of protection that is offered to offenders at the adult
level. The full due process protections that are accorded adult offenders are not
generally extended to juveniles."
Some states include the juvenile record as a discretionary "factor" to
consider when available while others formally include some component of a
juvenile record in calculating a youth's criminal history score. MILLER, supra
note 236; Roberts, supra note 21, at 330. Some states' sentencing guidelines
weigh juvenile prior offenses less heavily than comparable adult convictions, or
only include juvenile felonies committed after age sixteen. See Feld, Violent
Youth, supra note 124, at 1059-61. Roberts, supra note 21, at 329, describes
these policies:
Almost all the sentencing guidelines systems count some juvenile
adjudications. However, relative to previous adult convictions, the
juvenile priors play a limited role in subsequent sentencing hearings.
The American guidelines systems typically employ prior juvenile
convictions in complex ways that reflect the defendant's current age,
the time since the previous (juvenile) infractions, as well as the
seriousness of the juvenile offending.
Other states do not distinguish qualitatively between juvenile and adult prior
convictions, and count both equally in an offender's criminal history score. See,
e.g., Kan. Stat.Ann. § 21-4170(a) (1995); Roberts, supra note 21, at 330. See
also infra note 304 and accompanying text.
20031 1185
1186 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
juvenile court actually convicted a youth when it uses those
convictions for sentence enhancements or other collateral
239purposes.
239. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), did not address the use of
juvenile prior convictions as such. Rather, Taylor involved the issue of what
definition of "burglary" courts would use when they decided whether to use
those prior "violent felony" convictions for enhancement under the Armed
Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The statutory elements of burglary
vary widely among the states and the ACCA provides no definition of "generic"
burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580. The Court declined to adopt each state's
definition of burglary, because that would introduce inappropriate variation in
sentences for similar prior conduct. Id. at 590-93. The Court also rejected a
"factual approach" in which the trial court would review the prior factual record
to determine whether the defendant had committed a "violent" burglary
intended under the ACCA for enhancement. Id. at 600-02. Rather, Taylor
employed a "categorical approach," and held that regardless of a state's
statutory definition or label, a burglary conviction appropriate to use for
enhancements has "the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or
remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime." Id. at
599. The sentencing judge only need examine the charging documents, statute,
burglary instruction and conviction itself to determine whether the definition of
the offense established the elements of the "generic" burglary used in the
ACCA. Id. at 602.
Despite the seeming clarity of Taylor's "categorical approach," courts find it
difficult to apply to delinquency "violent felony" convictions because the
charging documents, which allege the elements of the offense, may not exist and
the ACCA requires a specific factual determination that the juvenile's "Violent"
prior conviction involved the use of a weapon.
While the categorical approach prescribed by Taylor is simply stated
and relatively easily applied when considering a defendant's prior
adult convictions, it can become more difficult when a court must
determine whether a juvenile adjudication comes within the ACCA.
For one thing, although the categorical approach prohibits factual
determinations concerning a defendant's prior convictions, an "act of
juvenile delinquency" introduces an additional wrinkle, for it will only
count as a violent felony if the offense involved "the use or carrying of
a firearm, knife, or destructive device," 18 U.S.C. 942(e)(2)(B), a
seemingly paradigmatic factual determination. For another, the
documents that the Supreme Court and the various Courts of Appeals
have held that a district court may consider in the context of an adult
conviction-the indictment or information, the jury charge, and/or plea
agreements-may be nonexistent where there has been an adjudication
of juvenile delinquency given that, for starters, there is no right to
trial by jury for juvenile offenses. That having been said, we can
perceive no basis for saying that the reasons the Taylor Court found
as warranting the categorical as opposed to the factual approach when
considering an adult conviction are not equally persuasive when
considering a juvenile adjudication. We note, however, that we are in
uncharted waters because, in the context of juvenile adjudications and
the ACCA, virtually nothing has been written by any court.
United States v. Richardson, 313 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000) (use of "categorical
approach" to assess "violent" quality of prior delinquency burglary to determine
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A number of states' sentencing guidelines and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines include some juvenile prior convictions in an
adult defendant's criminal history score.24° Under California's
"three-strikes" sentencing law, some juvenile felony convictions
constitute "strikes" for purposes of sentence enhancements. 4'
Sentencing judges often assert the importance of access to
whether youth fits statutory criteria for mandatory transfer to criminal court);
United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003) (use of categorical approach
requires court to look only at statutory definition of prior offense and fact of
conviction).
240. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4A1.2(D)(2)(A) (1995) ("each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least
sixty days"); Cassandra S. Shaffer, Inequality Within the United States
Sentencing Guidelines: The Use of Sentences Given to Juveniles by Adult
Criminal Court as Predicate Offenses for the Career Offender Provision, 8 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 171-75 (2002) (analyzing use of juvenile sentences as
predicate offenses for imposition of career offender provisions of federal
sentencing guidelines).
A survey of state statutes reports that about half of states systematically
consider juvenile records in setting adult sentences. MILLER, supra note 236, at
3 ("Twenty-four States' laws provide for structured consideration of defendants'
juvenile records in the setting of sentences. The most common structuring
method is through inclusion of the juvenile record among the factors used in
State sentencing guidelines (14 States). Typically, the juvenile record is
included in calculating a criminal history score."); Kropf, supra note 149, at
2175 (more than twenty states use delinquency convictions to enhance adult
criminal sentences); Kay Redeker, Solidifying the Use of Juvenile Proceedings
as Sentence Enhancement and Clarifying Second-Degree Murder, 37 WASHBURN
L.J. 483, 488 (1998) (delinquency convictions regularly used to enhance
subsequent adult sentences); Roberts, supra note 21, at 326-31.
241. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (Deering 1994). See, e.g., People v. Davis,
938 P.2d 938, 949-50 (Cal. 1997) (upholding validity of using juvenile
adjudications as strikes under three strikes law); People v. Garcia, 980 P.2d
829, 830-38 (Cal. 1999) (statutory interpretation limiting types of juvenile
felony adjudications that could count as "strikes" under three strikes law); see
also Tonya K. Cole, Counting Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes Under
California's "Three Strikes" Law: An Undermining of the Separateness of the
Adult and Juvenile Systems, 19 J. Juv. L. 335, 343 (1998) ("Using prior juvenile
adjudications as strikes is in direct conflict with the rehabilitation goal of the
juvenile court."); Lise Forquer, California's Three Strikes Law-Should a
Juvenile Adjudication Be a Ball or a Strike?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1297, 1315-
26 (1995) (analyzing qualifying criteria for use of juvenile adjudications as
"strikes"); David C. Owen, Striking Out Juveniles: A Reexamination of the Right
to a Jury Trial in Light of California's "Three Strikes" Legislation, 29 DAVIS L.
REV. 437, 440 (1996) (juveniles should have a right to a jury trial if state uses
prior convictions as "strikes" or for sentence enhancements); Amanda K. Packel,
Juvenile Justice and the Punishment of Recidivists Under California's Three
Strikes Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1157, 1165 (2002) (analyzing contradiction
between "rehabilitative and diversionary spirit of juvenile justice system,"
punitive intent behind three strikes legislation, and unfairness of using
delinquency convictions as strikes).
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defendants' prior records of juvenile convictions to distinguish
errant offenders from recidivists. In United States v. Davis,"' the
court observed that "These pubescent transgressions, when
considered along with adult offenses, help the sentencing judge to
determine whether the defendant has simply taken one wrong turn
from the straight and narrow or is a criminal recidivist."43 In
United States v. McDonald,244 the court noted the policy conflict
between confidentiality and punishing repeat offenders:
Setting aside a conviction may allow a youth who has slipped
to regain his footing by relieving him of the social and
economic disabilities associated with a criminal record. But if
a juvenile offender turns into a recidivist, the case for
conferring the benefit dissipates. Society's stronger interest is
in punishing appropriately an unrepentant criminal.245
Although states often use delinquency adjudications for
sentence enhancements, it is wrong to equate delinquency
convictions with adult criminal convictions and to count them as
one-for-one equivalents. Even though juvenile offenders may cause
the same physical harm or property loss as older actors, their
choices to engage in that conduct are not as culpable or
blameworthy as that of older offenders and should not be weightedthe ame s dlt pior .. 246
the same as adult prior convictions. Youths' ability to exercise
self-control and the qualities of their judgment and decision-making
are not developmentally comparable to those of adults.247 Youths
242. 48 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 1995).
243. Id. at 280. The Court further noted:
[Ilt is imperative that the defendant's sentence account for his
criminal history "from the date of birth up to and including the
moment of sentencing. [T]he consideration of the defendant's juvenile
record is essential, because it is clear that the 'magic age' of eighteen,
seventeen, or sixteen, whatever it may be in a specific state, cannot
wipe out all previous contacts with the law.
(citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1314,
1315 (7th Cir. 1982)).
244. 991 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
245. Id. at 872 (citations omitted).
246. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 98-115
(1997) (developing rationale for reduced culpability as rationale for
youthfulness as a mitigating factor at sentencing). Feld argues that
[i]n a framework of deserved punishment, it would be fundamentally
unjust to impose the same penalty upon offenders who do not share
equal culpability. If young people are neither fully responsible nor the
moral equals of adults, then they do not deserve the same legal
consequences even for their blameworthy misconduct.
Id. at 102. See also Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81
TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003).
247. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1610 (1992); Laurence Steinberg &
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and adults "differ in their breadth of experience, short-term versus
long-term temporal perspective, attitude toward risk, impulsivity,
and the importance they attach to peer influences., 24  These
differences affect their maturity of judgment, their self-control, and
their culpability.249 State laws treat juveniles differently from adults
in a host of areas-e.g. serving on a jury, voting, marrying, driving,
and drinking-because of their lack of experience, propensity to
engage in risky behavior, and immature judgement.25°  I have
argued that youths deserve less severe punishment than do adults
when they commit the same crimes-a "youth discount" -because of
their diminished responsibility.25 ' Some states' sentencing laws
formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor.252 The same
Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors
in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 251 (1996) ("[Tlhe
intuition behind paternalistic policies is that developmentally linked traits and
responses systematically affect the decisionmaking of adolescents in a way that
may incline them to make choices that threaten harm to their own and others'
health, life, or welfare, to a greater extent than do adults."); see also Elizabeth
Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000).
248. Feld, supra note 246, at 106; Scott and Steinberg, supra note 245, at
811-18 (adolescents' psycho-social development contributes to their immature
judgment and tendency to make risky and harmful decisions).
249. Feld, supra note 246, at 106-07 ("Three developmentally unique
attributes of youth-temporal perspective, attitudes toward and acceptance of
risk, and susceptibility to peer influences-may affect young peoples' qualities
of judgement in ways that distinguish them from adults and bear on their
criminal responsibility."). The Supreme Court has recognized that youths are
less mature and responsible than adults.
[Diuring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of
adults .... The Court has already endorsed the proposition that less
culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a
comparable crime committed by an adult.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, at 834-35 (emphasis added). See also
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 246, at 813 ("The psycho-social factors most
relevant to differences in judgment include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes
toward and perception of risk, (c) temporal perspective, and (d) capacity for self-
management."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J.
CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997).
250. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835. The Court noted:
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager
less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at
the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere
emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles
are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also
explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.
Id.
251. Feld, supra note 246, at 98-121; Feld, BAD KIDS, supra note 75, at 303-
19.
252. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(k) (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-38-1-7.1(a)(4)(1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1)(g)(2001); Tenn. Code
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principle of lesser consequences for the reduced culpability of youths
applies to the weight given to their prior convictions as well as to
their current sentences.
States' expanded uses of juveniles' prior records to enhance the
sentences of young adult offenders raise troubling issues in light of
the quality of procedural justice by which juvenile courts originally
obtained those convictions. As noted above, juvenile courts in many
states adjudicate as many as half of all youths delinquent without
the assistance of counsel, including many convicted of felonies, and
the vast majority of states deny juveniles access to a jury trial. As a
result, a substantial number of delinquency adjudications occur that
would not result in criminal convictions or pleas if defendants
received all procedural safeguards." 3
The Supreme Court in McKeiver denied juveniles a
constitutional right to a jury trial because delinquents supposedly
received treatment rather than punishment. The question is not
whether delinquency convictions are sufficiently reliable to allow for
therapeutic juvenile dispositions, but rather whether they were
obtained in a sufficiently reliable manner to justify the much
harsher consequences of their use as criminal sentence
enhancements. States use delinquency convictions obtained with
less stringent procedures to treat youths as juveniles, but then
subsequently punish them more severely as adults. In United
States v. Williams,254 the court upheld the use of a delinquency
conviction obtained without a jury trial in order to enhance the
defendant's subsequent criminal sentence.255 Williams reasoned
Ann. § 40-35-113(6)(1997). Scott and Steinberg, supra note 246, at 830-31,
argue that "the developmental factors that drive adolescent decisionmaking
predictably contribute to choices based on immature judgment" and provide the
legislative rationale for recognizing the reduced culpability of youths.
253. See David Dormont, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult
Sentences, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1798-99 (1991). Dormont argues that
substantive outcomes in juvenile and criminal cases are not the equivalent:
Because the procedural safeguards employed in therapeutic
proceedings are less rigorous than those employed in criminal
procedures, a sentence of incarceration is more likely to result from
juvenile procedures. Therefore, juvenile adjudications which result in
incarceration should be more constitutionally suspect when used for
enhancement purposes.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Sanborn, supra note 227, at 212 ("Juvenile
courts are notorious for relaxing, if not ignoring, due process standards. This is
understandable due to juvenile court's traditional commitment of pursuing the
best interests of the child .... [T]he rehabilitation mission encourages some
judges to bend results and adjudicate borderline cases so as to ensure offenders
receive help . . ").
254. 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989).
255. Id. at 215 ("If it does not violate due process for a juvenile to be
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that the later use for enhancement of a conviction that was valid at
the time it was obtained does not violate Due Process.256 The court
also rejected the defendant's claim that the purpose of his earlier
juvenile disposition was for rehabilitation, rather than punishment,
and noted that the court need only determine the fact of
confinement itself and not the reasons behind the sentence.5 7 Even
though treatment of delinquents provided the rationale for
employing less stringent procedural safeguards, Williams saw no
anomaly in using those convictions, valid for one purpose, to
accomplish their antithesis of extending punishment. Moreover,
courts presume the validity of predicate prior convictions, place the
deprived of his or her liberty without a jury trial, we fail to find a violation of
due process when a later deprivation of liberty is enhanced due to this juvenile
adjudication."); see also United States v. Mackbee, 894 F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that informality of delinquency proceedings
made juvenile convictions less reliable to use for sentence enhancement).
256. 891 F.2d at 215 ("If a judge could have enhanced a sentence because of
factors which have not been fully adjudicated with due process guarantees, a
judge can enhance a sentence due to a prior adjudication when.., the
defendant has had such due process safeguards as the right to counsel and the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses."); see also Forquer, supra note 241, at
1333:
If it is constitutionally permissible to increase a sentence based upon
conduct underlying an offense that did not result in a convection and
that was proved by a preponderance of evidence, then certainly it is
permissible to use a finding of delinquency that was obtained in a
procedure that provided a right to notice, counsel, confrontation, and
cross-examination, in addition to requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
257. 891 F.2d at 216 ("Although the purpose of juvenile sentencing is
rehabilitative rather than strictly punitive, the effect is nonetheless to deprive
the juvenile of liberty. The sentencing guidelines do not direct the sentencing
court to examine the purpose behind the specific form of a prior confinement,
they merely direct the judge to consider the fact of confinement."). However, for
other sentencing purposes, courts recognize that important differences exist
between juvenile and adult sentences. Contrary to Williams, the use of juvenile
sentences as predicate offenses for sentencing under the career offender
provisions require courts to examine the nature of juvenile imprisonment. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d) (2002). The issue arises when
juveniles are transferred to and convicted in adult criminal court, but then
receive sentences to juvenile facilities. See Shaffer, supra note 240, at 171-75;
compare, e.g., United States v. Carillo, 991 F.2d 590, 592-94 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding that courts may consider any sentence imposed on a youth after an
adult conviction that satisfies other requirements of career offender provisions),
with United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555, 559 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that
commitment to a delinquency facility following adult conviction does not
constitute career offender predicate because "only those [offenses] that resulted
in adult sentences . . . are counted") (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 cmt. 7 (1998).
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burden on the defendant to demonstrate that a challenged
delinquency conviction was constitutionally invalid, and assess the
trial judge's ruling on its validity under a highly deferential "clearly
erroneous" standard of review. These presumptions and burdens
place on youths, at the peril of extended punishment as an adult, all
of the risks of error created by the procedural laxity of juvenile
courts.
In United States v. Johnson,"' the defendant challenged the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' policy of equating juvenile sentences of
confinement with adult sentences of imprisonment when judges
calculate the criminal history score.160 The court did not find the
policy unreasonable:
It is a method, rough to be sure, of measuring relative
culpability among offenders and the likelihood of their
engaging in future criminal behavior. Those who have
committed crimes after serving sixty days or more in a prison
like facility, whether they were then a juvenile or an adult,
prove that they have not been deterred.
258. See, e.g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 23, 24 (1992) (Court will not
presume denial of counsel from the absence of record of knowing and intelligent
waiver and presumption of administrative regularity places burden on
defendant to demonstrate conviction resulted from unconstitutional denial of
counsel); United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759, 762 (1st Cir. 1990) (even if
delinquency conviction is obtained without counsel, defendant has burden to
prove prior adjudication invalid); United States v. Early, 77 F.3d 242, 245 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding that placing burden on defendant to prove prior delinquency
conviction is unconstitutional). The Early court noted, "Neither the Sentencing
Guidelines nor our precedents provide any basis for distinguishing between
counseled and uncounseled juvenile convictions on a per se basis. Thus, we will
only exclude the use of uncounseled juvenile convictions if there is some
particularized defect in the juvenile proceedings." See also United States v.
Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 697 (3rd Cir. 2003) (defendant has burden of establishing
that his prior conviction resulted from constitutional infirmity by denial of right
to counsel); supra notes 215, 256.
259. 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
260. Id. at 155. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, "a juvenile sixty-day
sentence of confinement warrants the same number of points as an adult
sentence of imprisonment for the same time." Id. See also Deborah L. Mills,
United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System
from Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 905 (1996)
("[Clourt's decision was soundly rooted in history and precedent.").
261. 28 F.3d at 155. The court asserted that no inconsistency existed
between equating juvenile and criminal sentences of confinement: "When
yesterday's juvenile delinquent becomes today's adult criminal the reasons
behind society's earlier forbearance disappear. The question before the
sentencing court is what punishment to mete out to an adult criminal, not how
to treat and rehabilitate a youthful offender." Id.; see also United States v.
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While Johnson recognized that the nature and purpose of
delinquency confinement differs from criminal imprisonment and
does not relate directly to a youth's culpability, the court noted that
a sentencing judge has discretion to make downward departures
when appropriate.262
Judge Patricia Wald dissented in Johnson, characterized the
policy of equating juvenile and adult confinement as "manifestly
irrational, 6 3 and objected that it unfairly treats different things as
similar because of the differences in purposes between the two
systems:
Unlike criminal punishment, which might be imposed in
pursuit of retributive as well as rehabilitative objectives, the
focus of juvenile confinement traditionally has been primarily,
or even exclusively, on reforming and treating the offender
.... [W]hile the purposes of confinement in the juvenile and
adult spheres may occasionally converge, they have never been
congruent. Two-thirds of the states continue to employ the
offender-specific rehabilitation model, and in all states the
initially distinct emphases of the juvenile and adult criminal
systems have led to the development of a very different set of
264procedures and standards for confinement and incarceration.
McKeiver denied delinquents the right to a jury trial because
juvenile proceedings were not criminal prosecutions and because
judges based dispositions on the needs of the offender rather than
Hanley, 906 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir. 1990) (guidelines' "prior incarceration
provisions cover both adult and juvenile offenses").
262. 28 F.3d at 156 ("Distinctions between juvenile dispositions and adult
convictions and sentences of imprisonment may warrant a sentencing court's
departing from the Guidelines' sentencing range... on the basis that the
defendant's criminal history category 'does not adequately reflect the
seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the
defendant will commit other crimes.'") (quoting Davis, 929 F.2d at 933).
263. Id. at 157 (Wald, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 159 (citations omitted); see also Dormont, supra note 253, at
1793-94, who argues that
[tihe Supreme Court approves of lower standards for incarceration
procedures only in treatment-oriented proceedings where the
government has disavowed any interest in criminal prosecution or
punishment. Only when treatment is the objective of the juvenile's
sentence does McKeiver allow for different sentencing standards and a
correspondingly lower level of due process in juvenile proceedings.
Accordingly, courts should not interpret McKeiver to justify using
juvenile convictions with reduced procedural protections for punitive
purposes at the adult level. Interpreted in this manner, McKeiver
would not allow courts to enhance an adult's sentence based on
juvenile sentences obtained during proceedings governed by the lower
"fundamental fairness" standard.
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the gravity of the offense.265  It seems contradictory and
fundamentally unfair to provide youths with fewer procedural
safeguards in the name of rehabilitation and then to use convictions
and sentences obtained for treatment purposes to punish them more
severely as adults.266
Although rational sentencing policy supports systematic use of
juvenile records of convictions, justice and fairness require adult
criminal procedural safeguards to assure the quality and legitimacy
of their use. Despite the importance of including juveniles' prior
records in the adult criminal history score, the denial of a right to a
jury trial and the questionable waivers of and delivery of effective
legal services call into question the quality of delinquency
convictions. Although courts routinely approve sentence
enhancements with prior delinquency convictions, Apprendi's
emphasis on the vital role of the jury to assure the validity and
reliability of prior convictions requires reconsideration of those
265. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 160 ("Juvenile confinement, unlike adult
incarceration, is still largely imposed on the basis of characteristics of the
offender, rather than characteristics of the offense. The imposition and
duration of juvenile confinement may be set irrespective of proportionality;
irrespective of the sentence ranges for adult offenders .... [If a juvenile spent
sixty days or more in confinement, it] may simply mean that the juvenile lacked
an adequate home or that the community lacked adequate services."); see also
Neal Miller, National Assessment of Criminal Court Use of Defendants' Juvenile
Adjudication Records, in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS: APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL
AND NONCRIMINAL JUSTICE USES 51 (April, 1997), at
http://blackstone.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/ncjjr.txt ("[S]entencing laws that
mandate juvenile record use assume that there is some substantive meaning to
a juvenile adjudication for a particular offense .... Because the juvenile justice
system is still often treatment-oriented, there is no necessary relationship
between the adjudicated offense and the 'sentence' imposed by the court.").
266. See, e.g., Dormont, supra note 253, at 1791 (analyzing use of juvenile
adjudications under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). Dormont argues that
[ilf a sentence was imposed under the guise of therapy, it should
remain a therapeutic sentence; it should not be allowed to
metamorphosize into a criminal conviction at the prosecution's
convenience. In the same vein, enhancing a sentence because of an
earlier period of incarceration imposed under a mental illness statute
would be inherently unfair. Because the procedural protections found
sufficient in juvenile proceedings are not sufficient in adult
proceedings, McKeiver cannot support the collateral use of such
juvenile proceedings against juveniles when they reach adulthood.
Id. at 1794-95 (footnotes omitted); see also Forquer, supra note 241, at 1330-31
("When a juvenile adjudication is used to increase an adult sentence under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines or Three Strikes, the adjudication is used for a
punishment purpose. Thus, the treatment-only justification that permits the
lower due process standard in the juvenile system is not served by this
subsequent punitive use of the juvenile adjudication.").
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policies.26
III. APPRENDI, DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATIONS, AND THE "FACT OF A
PRIOR CONVICTION"
In Apprendi and Jones, the Court created an exception for
recidivism to avoid over-ruling its earlier decisions in Almendarez-Torrs an "  2611
Torres and Monge. In Apprendi, Justice Thomas confessed that he
erred in voting in Almendarez-Torres to treat recidivism as a
"sentencing factor" rather than an "element" to be proven to a
jury. 69 He switched his position, cast the swing-vote in Apprendi,
267. Huigens, supra note 4, at 432, argues that the core of Apprendi's
holding hinges on the responsibility of the jury to determine the defendant's
fault:
If we have a meaningful jury right at all, then the jury's function
includes at least the determination of whether wrongdoing has been
committed. Because fault is an aspect of wrongdoing, fault can be
determined only by the body conducting the deliberations in which
wrongdoing is determined, in those same deliberations. These are, of
course, highly fact-specific determinations. The determination of
wrongdoing and fault, therefore, is the jury's province, as is the
determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the facts on which
wrongdoing and fault are predicated .... [Ciriminal fault is not
confined to those [mens real mental states. The manner and
circumstances of the offender's wrongdoing also serve as indicators of
fault, and the jury's determination of fault is inextricable from its
determination of wrongdoing. The jury right that unquestionably
extends to both the determination of wrongdoing and mens rea
extends to all objective indicators of fault as well.
Because McKeiver denies juveniles the opportunity ever to have a jury
determine fault, it undermines the central validity of using delinquency
convictions for sentence enhancements.
268. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. Both cases may be ripe
for overruling. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489 (stating that "it is arguable
that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application
of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested")
(footnote omitted); id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the
Constitution requires a broad rule "that all the facts which must exist in order
to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by
the jury"); id. at 520-22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Court
incorrectly decided Almendarez-Torres).
269. 530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Olne of the chief errors of
Almendarez-Torres-an error to which I succumbed-was to attempt to discern
whether a particular fact is traditionally (or typically) a basis for a sentencing
court to increase an offender's sentence.). On the basis of Justice Thomas'
change of heart, analysts suggest that Almendarez-Torres and Monge may be
ripe for overruling:
Nevertheless, it is clear the Justices forming the 5-4 majority in
Apprendi view those two 5-4 cases as wrongly decided: the four
previously dissenting Justices are now joined by Justice Thomas, who
had cast the swing vote against applying the Apprendi principle in
those cases but who wrote separately in Apprendi to explain his
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and argued for a broader rule that "every fact that was by law a
basis for imposing or increasing punishment (including the fact of a
prior conviction) was an element."27° Even without overruling
Almendarez-Torres and Monge, appellate courts have struggled to
apply the Apprendi principle to delinquency convictions.
A. United States v. Tighe
In United States v. Tighe,271 the defendant pled guilty to a three-
count indictment charging him with bank robbery and being a felon
in possession of a firearm. 272  The indictment did not allege that
Tighe could be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA") and subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen
years, if he had three prior convictions for violent felonies.273 At his
sentencing, the trial judge found three predicate violent offenses,
274one of which was a juvenile delinquency adjudication, and
sentenced Tighe to the fifteen year mandatory minimum, rather
than the ten year maximum sentence for which a non-ACCA felon-
in-possession of a firearm otherwise could be sentenced. 27  Because
switch. Thus, although presently still good law, it seems likely
Almendarez-Torres and Monge soon will be overruled.
Priester, supra note 4, at 291 n.64 (citations omitted); see also Huigens, supra
note 4, at 412 ("Justice Thomas's concurrence explicitly endorses the overruling
of Almendarez-Torres and McMillan, and implicitly acknowledges that this may
entail declaring unconstitutional the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.") (footnote
omitted).
270. 530 U.S. at 512. "[A] 'crime' includes every fact that is by law a basis
for imposing or increasing punishment." Id. at 518.
271. 256 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
272. The indictment charged Tighe with bank robbery, being a felon in
possession of a firearm, and interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. Id. at
1190.
273. Id. at 1190. The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2002),
imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence for any person convicted
as a felon-in-possession of a firearm, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and who
has three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Id.
at 1189.
274. Id. at 1189. One of the three predicate felonies the trial court used to
enhance Tighe's sentence was a delinquency adjudication for reckless
endangerment, robbery, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. At the time of
his adjudication, Tighe did not have a state or federal right to a jury trial. Id.
275. Id. at 1192. The trial judge sentenced Tighe for 235 months for bank
robbery, and 180 months for being a felon-in-possession of a firearm. Id. at
1190. Without the previous convictions for three violent felonies, a defendant
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm could only receive a
maximum sentence of ten years. 18 U.S.C § 924(a)(2) (2002). Tighe challenged
the applicability of the ACCA because it "allows for a substantial increase in
[the] statutory maximum [sentence] based on prior convictions, the existence of
which need only be proved to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence."
Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1191.
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Apprendi held that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction,
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, Tighe argued that his delinquency adjudication should have
been charged in the indictment and found by a jury in order to
increase his felon-in-possession sentence under the ACCA beyond
the statutory maximum of ten years. Although courts and Congress
routinely approve use of non-jury delinquency adjudications to
enhance criminal sentences, 76 the 2-1 majority in Tighe found that
the Apprendi principle applied because his delinquency conviction
increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum penalty to
which the offense otherwise exposed him.277  Although Apprendi
created an exception for "prior convictions," Tighe reasoned that
those prior convictions assumed the right to a jury trial at the time
they were obtained to assure their validity.
The issue in Tighe was whether "prior juvenile adjudications,
which do not afford the right to a jury trial, fall within the 'prior
conviction' exception to Apprendi's general rule that a fact used to
increase a defendant's maximum penalty must be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt?"2 79  Earlier,
Almendarez-Torres and Jones treated prior convictions as
"sentencing factors" rather than as "elements of the offense" that the
state must prove to a jury, even though they could increase the
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum. In
distinguishing prior convictions from other sentence-enhancing
"facts," Jones emphasized that "unlike virtually any other
276. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Congress provided under
the ACCA, that juvenile delinquency adjudications could provide predicate
violent felony "convictions." 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(C) (2000) ("[T]he term
'conviction' includes a finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile
delinquency involving a violent felony."); see also United States v. Williams, 891
F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989) (use of non-jury juvenile delinquency adjudication to
enhance sentence under the sentencing guidelines within statutory maximum
range); supra notes 254-258 and accompanying text.
277. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1192. According to the court, "under the ACCA the
fact of Tighe's prior juvenile adjudication was used to increase his statutorily
mandated maximum punishment from not more than 10 years, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2), to at least fifteen years. A fact that is used to increase the
maximum statutory penalty to which a defendant is exposed raises an entirely
different set of constitutional concerns than a fact that merely affects where a
sentence is fixed within an undisputed statutorily mandated range." Id.
278. Id. at 1193. "Neither Apprendi, nor Almendarez-Torres-the case upon
which Apprendi relied to create the 'prior conviction' exception to its general
rule-specifically addressed the unique issues that distinguish juvenile
adjudications from adult convictions, such as the lack of a right to a jury trial in
most juvenile adjudications." Id.
279. Id.
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consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense ...
a prior conviction must itself have been established through
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt and jury trial
guarantees."'28 Similarly, Apprendi recognized the unique validity of
"prior convictions" because defendants enjoyed the right to a jury
trial at the time they were obtained. 281' Because juveniles do not
have a right to a jury trial, Tighe reasoned that delinquency
adjudication does not fall within the "prior conviction" exception.
[T]he 'prior conviction' exception to Apprendi's general rule
must be limited to prior convictions that were themselves
obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Juvenile
adjudications that do not afford the right to a jury trial and a
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof, therefore, do not
fall within Apprendi's 'prior conviction' exception.282
Tighe declined to extend Apprendi's "prior conviction" exception
to delinquency adjudications because of the Supreme Court's
reservation about the continuing validity of that exception, at least
where the defendant contests the validity of those prior
convictions.2 2 The Oregon state law under which Tighe acquired the
delinquency conviction that provided the ACCA felony-predicate
denied him the right to a jury trial. Therefore, the court concluded
that the trial court erred when it used that conviction to impose to
280. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (emphasis added). The
court in Tighe reasoned that Jones' and Apprendi's exception for prior
convictions "was rooted in the concept that prior convictions have been, by their
very nature, subject to the fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections
intended to guarantee the reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice,
reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial." Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193.
281. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000).
[T]here is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a priorjudgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant
had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find
the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.
Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. The Apprendi majority questioned the continuing vitality of
Almendarez-Torres, at least where the defendant contests the validity of the
prior convictions. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90 ("[It is arguable that
Alemndarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our
reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested. . ." (footnote
omitted)). Justice Thomas' concurrence was even more forthright in its
repudiation of the validity of Almendarez-Torres. Id. at 520-21 ("[Tjhe fact of a
prior conviction is an element under a recidivism statute."). See also supra
notes 268-270 and accompanying text.
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an ACCA-enhanced sentence.2u
The dissent in Tighe objected to the majority's rejection of
Apprendi's "prior conviction" exception to increase his sentence. The
dissent invoked Williams,285 where the court approved the use of
prior delinquency adjudications to enhance criminal sentences
under the federal sentencing guidelines.286 Even though McKeiver
denied juveniles the constitutional right to a jury trial, Williams
reasoned that delinquency trials provided sufficient procedural
protections to confine the juvenile at the time of adjudication and to
justify their use for later sentencing purposes as well.
[W]here a juvenile received all the process constitutionally due
at the delinquency proceeding stage, we found the later use of
the juvenile adjudication for an adult enhancement to be
constitutionally sound because 'the conviction was
constitutionally valid for purposes of imposing a sentence of
imprisonment for the [juvenile] offense itself."
Williams asserted the illogic of requiring greater procedural
safeguards to use a delinquency conviction for subsequent
enhancement than to impose a disposition at the time of
adjudication.28 However, Williams did not examine the illogic of
allowing convictions obtained with fewer procedural safeguards in
order to provide treatment subsequently to be used to extend
punishment. According to the Tighe dissent, no reasons exist to
treat delinquency convictions used to enhance sentences differently
from those used to exceed the maximum penalty.
284. Id. at 1194-95.
[W] e conclude Apprendi's narrow 'prior conviction' exception is limited
to prior convictions resulting from proceedings that afforded the
procedural necessities of a jury trial and .proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, the 'prior conviction' exception does not include nonjuryjuvenile adjudications. Therefore, the district court violated Apprendi
when, at sentencing it increased Tighe's penalty beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum based on an adjudication which denied
Tighe the right to a jury trial.
Id. (footnote omitted).
285. United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989); see also United
States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (approving consideration of
juvenile records in sentencing decision); supra notes 254-264 and accompanying
text.
286. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1198 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (juvenile convictions
allowed to enhance criminal sentence). See supra notes 254-258 and
accompanying text.
287. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1198-99 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams,
891 F.2d at 215).
288. Williams, 891 F.2d at 215 ("[W]e would in essence have to hold that the
enhancement of an adult criminal sentence requires a higher level of due
process protection than the imposition of a juvenile sentence.").
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Congress has the constitutional power to treat prior
convictions as sentencing factors subject to a lesser standard of
proof because the defendant presumably received all the
process that was due when he was convicted of the predicate
crime. For adults, this would indeed include the right to a jury
trial. For juveniles, it does not. Extending Jones' logic to
juvenile adjudications when a juvenile receives all the process
constitutionally due at the juvenile stage, there is no
constitutional problem (on which Apprendi focused) in using
that adjudication to support a later sentencing
enhancement." 9
Moreover, if the prosecution has to allege and prove the fact of a
prior juvenile conviction to the jury as an element of the offense,
then the introduction of evidence of prior crimes could unduly
prejudice the defendant.29 °
B. United States v. Smalley
United States v. Smalley29' presented facts and issues virtually
identical to those in Tighe. Smalley pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, the prosecution sought enhancement under
the Armed Career Criminal Act, and the trial court increased his
sentence from the ten years statutory maximum to the fifteen year
mandatory minimum based in part on his prior delinquency
292
adjudications. Smalley objected to use of his delinquency
adjudication as a "prior conviction" within the Apprendi exception.'2 9
The Smalley court rejected the Tighe court's reasoning that because
juveniles did not enjoy the right to a jury trial, their delinquency
289. Id. at 1200.
290. Id. at 1200-01.
If a juvenile adjudication (without the right to a jury trial) does not
fall within the Almendarez-Torres exception, then, to comply with
Apprendi, prosecutors will be required to prove the fact of the prior
convictions to the jury in order to support the sentencing
enhancement .... [Tihe Supreme Court has long recognized 'that the
introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant
prejudice.' Thus, a defendant with a prior juvenile adjudication will
be put to the Hobson's choice of stipulating to the priors or parading
them before a jury. But, as Almendarez-Torres recognized, "[e]ven if a
defendant's stipulation were to keep the name and details of the
previous offense from the jury .... jurors would still learn, from the
indictment, the judge, or the prosecutor that the defendant had
committed [three violent felonies]."
Id. (citations omitted).
291. 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002).
292. Id.
293. Id. ("The question before us is whether juvenile adjudications can be
characterized as prior convictions as that term is used in Apprendi. If so, it
follows that they can be used to increase the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum without being submitted and proved to a jury.").
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convictions did not provide the fundamental procedural safeguards
necessary to assure their reliability and to fall within the "prior
conviction" exception.294
Smalley reasoned that Apprendi excepted "prior convictions"
from its general rule because the procedural safeguards of trial by
jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt assured their reliability.295
While Apprendi identified those procedural safeguards that clearly
established the reliability of prior convictions-notice, right to a jury
trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt-it did not hold that they
were essential prerequisites to a valid conviction.
We think that while the Court established what constitutes
sufficient procedural safeguards (a right to jury trial and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made
findings under a lesser [preponderance] standard of proof), the
Court did not take a position on possibilities that lie in
between these two poles. In other words, we think that it is
incorrect to assume that it is not only sufficient but necessary
that the "fundamental triumvirate of procedural
protections"... underly [sic] an adjudication before it can
qualify for the Apprendi exemption."'
Rather than focusing on the specific procedural safeguards of a
criminal prosecution, Smalley focused on "whether juvenile
adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process
of law is not offended by such an exemption."297 The court reviewed
the procedural safeguards available to juveniles as a result of Gault
and Winship and concluded that "these safeguards are more than
294. Id. at 1032.
295. Id.
[T]here is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior
judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant
had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find
the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.
296. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 496.
297. Id. at 1033 see also United States v. Bevard, 44 Fed. Appx. 748, 749
(8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1262 (2003) (claiming that juvenile
adjudications are not "prior convictions" under Apprendi foreclosed by Smalley).
But see People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 924-25 (2003) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting), where Judge Johnson stated that Apprendi, Jones, and Tighe held
that the right to a jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and notice
form an essential "triumvirate," all three of which must be present
before it can be said a prior adjudication by a court qualifies as a
"prior conviction". . . justifying an enhanced sentence for the current
crime. That a defendant enjoyed one of those rights or even two of
them-is simply irrelevant to the question whether a trial court can
utilize the prior adjudication as a reason to elevate the defendant's
sentence ....
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sufficient to ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires."298 The
court reiterated McKeiver's assertion that the absence of a jury
would not detract from the accuracy of fact-finding in delinquency
adjudications.299 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in treating
delinquency adjudications as "prior convictions" for purposes of
enhancement under Apprendi. Again, however, Smalley did not
examine McKeiver's "treatment" rationale for less stringent
procedural safeguards or the inconsistency of using convictions
obtained for a benign purpose subsequently to be used for a more
punitive one.
Both Tighe and Smalley focused on the procedural safeguards
necessary to assure the reliability of a "prior conviction" under
Apprendi.00 For Tighe, the right to a jury trial was part of the
"procedural triumvirate" that distinguishes criminal trials from
other proceedings and non-jury delinquency adjudications simply
failed to ensure such reliability. Tighe's understanding of the
importance of the jury appears more consistent with the Court's
jury-jurisprudence in Jones and Apprendi than does Smalley's
reasoning which had recourse only to McKeiver.0 1  Smalley's
298. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033 ("[Jluvenile defendants have the right to
notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
and the privilege against self-incrimination. A judge in a juvenile proceeding,
moreover, must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before he or she can
conflict."). Id. (citations omitted); see also, United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688,
696 (3rd Cir. 2003):
[We find nothing in Apprendi or Jones, two cases relied upon by the
Tighe court.., that requires us to hold that prior nonjury juvenile
adjudications that afforded all required due process safeguards cannot
be used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA .... A prior nonjury
juvenile adjudication that was afforded all constitutionally-required
procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior
conviction for Apprendi purposes.
299. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
[W]hile we recognize that a jury does not have a role in trials for
juvenile offenses, we do not think that this fact undermines the
reliability of such adjudication in any significant way because we
think that the use of a jury in the juvenile context would "not
strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding function" and is not
constitutionally required.
300. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law-Right to Jury Trial-Eighth
Circuit Holds an Adjudication of Juvenile Delinquency To Be a "Prior
Conviction" for the Purpose of Sentence Enhancement at a Subsequent Criminal
Proceeding.-United States v. Smalley, 294 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002), 116
HARv. L. REV. 705, 706 (2002).
301. Tighe questioned the reliability of non-jury criminal adjudications
based on the language of Jones and Apprendi. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193-94. See,
e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 ("[Tlhere is a vast difference between accepting
the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which
the defendant had the right to a jury trial... and allowing the judge to find the
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doctrinal reliance on McKeiver seems even more tenuous in light of
the questionable reliability of delinquency adjudications in
comparison with criminal convictions. °2 The United States Solicitor
General recognized that the conflict among the circuits, the
important and recurring nature of the question, and the
implications for state as well as federal sentencing practices
required a prompt resolution of the issue.0 3
C. Other Apprendi Challenges To Juvenile Sentencing and Waiver
Hearings
Juveniles have raised Apprendi issues in state proceedings to
challenge criminal sentence enhancements and to oppose judicial
waiver from juvenile to criminal courts. The state enhancement
cases raise issues similar to Tighe and Smalley, albeit with
somewhat different analyses. Because transfer to criminal court
greatly increases the sentence that a youth may receive if tried as
an adult, a waiver proceeding involves a form of sentencing
enhancement beyond the delinquency maximum and presents an
Appendi issue unique to juvenile courts.
1. Sentence Enhancements
In State v. Hitt,"4 the defendant raised the Apprendi issue
whether a delinquency conviction constituted a "prior conviction"
under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act ("KSGA"). '°0 Because
the trial court used the prior delinquency conviction to sentence Hitt
within the presumptive sentencing range, the Kansas supreme court
required fact.. ."); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at 249 ("[A] prior conviction must
itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice,
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.") (emphasis added).
302. See supra notes 136 and 253 and accompanying text.
303. See State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732 (Kan. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 962
(2003). The Solicitor General was invited to file a brief in this case. 537 U.S.
1104 (2002) (mem.). The Solicitor General's brief concluded that
[iun light of the square circuit conflict, which involves a question of
recurring importance, review by this Court is warranted to determine
whether a criminal defendant's sentence may be enhanced beyond the
otherwise-applicable statutory maximum, based on the sentencingjudge's finding that the defendant had sustained a prior juvenile
adjudication in which the juvenile defendant was not afforded a right
to jury trial.
Hitt v. Kansas, No. 01-10864 (Dec. 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osgbriefs/ 202/2pet/6invit/2001-10864.pet.amni.inv.html.
However, the Solicitor General concluded that Tighe and Smalley presented
more suitable pending cases in which to resolve the issue. Id.
304. State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732 (Kan. 2002), cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 962
(2003).
305. Hitt, 42 P.3d at 735.
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concluded that the Apprendi principle did not directly apply. 0 6
However, Hitt also argued that because Kansas denied juveniles the
right to a jury trial, his delinquency adjudications should not
constitute a "prior conviction" within the Apprendi exception for
recidivism.0 7  Hitt reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions in
Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and Apprendi and concluded that the
predicate for treating recidivism as a "sentencing factor," rather
than as an "element" of the offense, hinged on its being "cloaked in
substantial procedural safeguards.""8
Apprendi created an exception allowing the use of a prior
conviction to increase a defendant's sentence, based on the
historical role of recidivism in the sentencing decision and on
the procedural safeguards attached to a prior conviction.
Juvenile adjudications are included within the historical cloak
of recidivism and enjoy ample procedural safeguards;
therefore, the Apprendi exception for prior convictions
encompasses juvenile adjudications. Juvenile adjudications
need not be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be used in
309
calculating a defendant's criminal history score ....
Kansas, like most states, denies delinquents the right to a jury
trial.310 Hitt reasoned that because juveniles received all the
306. In State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001), Kansas adopted the
Apprendi principle where the defendant "received a sentence beyond the
statutory maximum based upon a court finding of certain aggravating factors
found by a preponderance of the evidence." The trial court in Hitt, by contrast,
sentenced him within the presumptive sentencing range.
307. Hitt, 42 P.3d at 734.
He reasons that under Apprendi, juvenile adjudications must be
charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . . [Jiuvenile adjudications are not prior convictions, and,
more importantly, unlike adult convictions, juvenile adjudications do
not result from proceedings in which the defendant has a right to a
jury trial. Thus, Hitt asserts that juvenile adjudications do not come
within the 'prior conviction' exception to Apprendi's general rule.
Id. at 734-35.
308. Id. at 736 ("The question becomes whether the absence of the jury trial
safeguard in juvenile adjudications is enough to remove it from the narrow
exception for prior convictions built into the Apprendi rule.").
309. Id. at 740 (emphasis added). Accord State v. Kemp, 46 P.3d 31, 36
(Kan. App. 2002) (holding the defendant's "juvenile adjudications were properly
included in his criminal history determination"); see also, State v. Cameron, 56
P.3d 309, 314 (Kan. App. 2002) ("[P]rior juvenile adjudications fall under the
Apprendi prior conviction exception." The trial court properly used prior
juvenile adjudications to enhance sentence.).
310. A juvenile court judge has unreviewable discretion whether or not to
empanel a jury in a felony delinquency matter. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1656
(2000) ("[T]he judge may order that the juvenile be afforded a trial by jury.").
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procedural safeguards to which the constitution entitled them, their
adjudications were valid "prior convictions" which courts could use
to enhance subsequent sentences. 311 "The Apprendi Court spoke in
general terms of the procedural safeguards attached to a prior
conviction. It did not specify all procedural safeguards nor did it
require certain crucial procedural safeguards."312 The procedures
that juveniles did receive were constitutionally adequate to support
their delinquency adjudication. Apart from its constitutional
analysis, the Hitt court feared that disallowing the use of non-jury
delinquency adjudications would have a substantial negative impact
on the sentences already imposed on many criminal defendants.313
As the court noted in Hitt, however,
We have held that there is no federal or state constitutional right to
jury trial in juvenile proceedings. Further K.S.A. 38-1656 does not
grant a juvenile the right to request or demand a jury trial. The
decisions to grant a trial is entirely up to the court. The court is not
required to state a reason for its decision, and the decision is not
appealable.
Hitt, 42 P.3d at 738 (citations omitted).
311. Id. at 740 ("If juvenile adjudications are constitutionally sound
according to the more limited set of rights afforded in juvenile proceedings, they
may be used to increase a defendant's sentence for a later crime."). Id. at 739.
In Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224, 229 (1980) (per curiam),
overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), a plurality of the
Supreme Court prohibited enhancement of the defendant's sentence based on a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that had not resulted in
incarceration. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text (discussing
Baldasar and Nichols). In Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746-48
(1994), the Court overruled Baldasar, and held that the government could use
an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a subsequent sentence,
because his initial conviction resulted only in a fine and probation. Nichols
reasoned that uncounseled convictions that are constitutionally valid under
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), because the sentencing court did not order
imprisonment, also could be used to enhance subsequent sentences. Nichols,
511 U.S. at 748-49. "[An uncounseled conviction valid under Scott may be
relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even though that
sentence entails imprisonment. Enhancement statutes ... do not change the
penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." Id. at 746-47. Hitt relied, by
analogy, on Nichols to uphold the use of non-jury delinquency adjudications for
sentence enhancements:
[We likened a nonjury juvenile adjudication to an uncounseled adult
misdemeanor conviction-both obtained absent rights that did not
attach to the particular type of offense .... Here, the defendant's
juvenile adjudications were constitutional even if he had no right to a
jury trial in those proceedings. Because the juvenile adjudications
were not constitutionally infirm, they may be used in calculating the
defendant's criminal history score under the KSGA.
Hitt, 42 P.3d at 739 (citations omitted).
312. Hitt, 42 P.3d at 740.
313. Id. at 740.
A decision to exclude nonjury juvenile adjudications from the criminal
history score, even limited to a prospective application, would have an
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To further bolster its position, Hitt invoked the rationale of
Nichols which held that courts could use uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions to enhance subsequent sentences, because the conviction
was constitutionally valid at the time it was obtained.3 4 In State v.
LaMunyon,15  the defendant challenged the use of a prior
delinquency conviction to enhance his adult sentence because he
was denied the right to a jury trial as a juvenile. However, the
Kansas supreme court drew on McKeiver and Nichols to hold that
courts could use a jury-less delinquency conviction, valid at the time
obtained, to increase a subsequent penalty. 16 "[T]he defendant's
juvenile adjudications were constitutional even if he had no right to
unprecedented effect on the sentences of an untold number of criminal
defendants .... [I]t would appear that far more defendants have a
criminal history score bolstered by juvenile adjudications. To remove
juvenile adjudications from the KSGA calculation would require the
resentencing of many and result in lighter sentences for them and
future defendants.
Id.
314. Id. at 739.
We recognized that Nichols v. United States held that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction could be used to enhance the sentence of a
subsequent offense .... [We used Nichols to justify our conclusion
that the use of an uncounseled but constitutionally sound
misdemeanor conviction could be used in determining a criminal
history score under the KSGA.
Id. See supra notes 222-225, 311 and accompanying text (analyzing Nichols'
interpretation of Scott v. Illinois which approved denial of counsel where the
state did not order defendant confined). Reubner, Berner, and Herbert, supra
note 223 at 551-52, strongly criticized the Court's reasoning in Nichols and its
implications for sentence enhancements:
The Supreme Court wanted to ensure that proceedings resulting in
the loss of an individual's liberty would be reliable and fair. In
keeping with this goal, it has long been an accepted notion that
sentencing judges may use only reliable evidence when determining a
sentence. Since Nichols allows judges to consider uncounseled, and
therefore unreliable, convictions in fashioning a prison sentence...
the Court's previous emphasis on fairness of proceedings and
reliability of convictions is defeated.
315. 911 P.2d 151 (Kan. 1996).
316. But see Kropf, supra note 149, at 2157-58, who notes that Court's
concern about compounding the impact of denials of constitutional rights.
[A]lthough the previous cases had dealt with uncounseled prior
convictions, the basic prohibition against the use of unconstitutional prior
convictions might extend to "other defects." The denial of a jury would
likely fall into this category of constitutional defects. The Court has
stated that sentence enhancements cannot be triggered by either a prior
conviction that violates a "specific federal right' or 'upon misinformation
of constitutional magnitude." Clearly, the right to a jury is a "specific
federal right" as it is explicitly described by the Constitution .... [Tihe
Court would erode the constitutional principle of trial by jury if it were to
allow sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction obtained by
denying the defendant a right to jury.
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a jury trial in those proceedings. Because the juvenile adjudications
were not constitutionally infirm, they may be used in calculating the
defendant's criminal history score . ... 3 However, the right to
counsel and the right to a jury trial serve different protective
functions, and criminal defendants enjoy a right to a jury trial even
in cases in which the state might convict them without a right to
appointed counsel.3 18 Because Apprendi emphasized the jury's role
317. LaMunyon, 911 P.2d at 158. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
432-33 (1979) (upholding lower standard of proof in involuntary civil
commitment proceedings); see also State v. Hatt, 38 P.2d 738, 741 (Kan. App.
2002) ("[Jluvenile adjudications are constitutional even though no right to jury
trial attaches to the proceedings and, therefore, they may be used to calculate
the defendant's criminal history score under the sentencing guidelines.");
Forquer, supra note 241, at 1331 (arguing that enhancement provisions using
juvenile adjudications "violate due process because the use of juvenile
adjudications to enlarge sentences permits an adjudication to be used for a non-
treatment purpose and allows the adjudication to have a significant and
onerous impact on an adult," but would likely pass constitutional muster under
Nichols). Following these courts' logic would suggest that courts could enhance
criminal sentences on the basis of mental health involuntary civil commitments
for "dangerousness" cum criminality because those commitments were
constitutionally valid at the time obtained.
318. Although all constitutional safeguards serve to assure accurate fact-
finding, to prevent governmental oppression, and to secure respect for
individual dignity and autonomy, the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and to
a jury secure these interests in somewhat different ways. See e.g., LAFAVE, ET
AL., supra note 127. Compare, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963) (counsel necessary to preserve proper functioning of adversary process),
with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-156 (1968) (jury of peers as check
on judiciary and executive branches).
Significantly, defendants enjoy a constitutional right to a jury trial even
under circumstances in which the state may deny them the right to counsel. In
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970), the Court held that "no offense
can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury where
imprisonment for more than six months is authorized." For Baldwin, the
legislature determined the "seriousness" of the offense by the maximum penalty
which it authorized, rather than by the sentence the judge actually imposed.
Id. By contrast, Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979), declined to extend
the right to counsel in all "non-petty" misdemeanor cases, but only required it
for those in which the court ordered actual imprisonment. In Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 746-47 (1994), the Court held that the state could use an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that was valid under Scott, because no
term of imprisonment had been imposed, to enhance the sentence for a later
subsequent offense even though the offense would be deemed "non-petty" under
Baldwin.
On the other hand, the Court may view the reliability of an uncounseled
conviction as more problematic than a delinquency conviction obtained without
the right to a jury. The Supreme Court gave retroactive effect to its ruling in
Gideon which recognized the right to counsel in state criminal trials, but
declined to give retroactive effect to the right to a jury trial recognized in
Duncan. Compare, e.g., Pickelsmimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963)
(vacating judgment and remanding for further consideration in light of Gideon
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to establish the validity and reliability of prior convictions, Hitt's
reliance on Nichols to include jury-less delinquency convictions for
purposes of enhancements is questionable authority at best.
The defendant in People v. Bowden, 19 raised the Apprendi issue
when the state used a prior delinquency adjudication as a "strike"
under California's "Three Strikes" law to increase his maximum
adult sentence. Although the state pleaded and proved the
existence of the qualifying delinquency conviction in the present
case as required under the "Three Strikes" law, the defendant
challenged the validity of that prior conviction under Apprendi
because the state obtained it without a right to jury trial in juvenile
court.320
Prior to Apprendi, the California court of appeals in People v.
Fowler321 approved the inclusion of prior delinquency convictions as
"strikes" even without the right to a jury trial.322
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)), with DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631,
633 (1968) (refusing to give retroactive effect to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1967)).
319. 102 Cal. App. 4th 387 (2002).
320. Id. Defendant, relying on Apprendi and Tighe, "makes the broader
contention that because a person previously tried as a juvenile had no right to a
jury trial in juvenile court, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot
constitutionally be treated as a prior conviction for purpose of the Three Strikes
law." Id. The California Supreme Court in In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 331
(Cal. 1924), held that juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial in juvenile
court under the state constitution. The court of appeals in In re Javier A, 206
Cal. Rptr. 386, 417-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), urged the California Supreme Court
to reconsider Daedler in light of the ensuing changes in juvenile justice
administration:
Those same 60 years have brought dramatic changes in the
procedures followed in juvenile courts causing them to become trials
in the full sense of the word - formal, adversarial and public. Finally,
the consequences of a finding the accused juvenile committed the
charged crime now closely resemble what would follow conviction in
adult criminal court .... [A] juvenile delinquency proceeding in 1984
asks a court to decide whether a child has violated a specified criminal
law and whether this violation is a felony or misdemeanor. If the
court decides beyond a reasonable doubt the child did commit the
crime, it can, in order to 'protect the public from criminal conduct,'
deprive the child of his liberty for the same period of time an adult
would lose his liberty for violating the same criminal law.
321. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
322. Id. at 876-77 ("[J]uveniles enjoy no state or federal due process or equal
protection right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings. It is well established
that the trial court may consider a defendant's juvenile adjudication as evidence
of past criminal conduct for the purpose of increasing an adult defendant's
sentence."). Prior to the passage of the Three Strikes law, California courts did
not use delinquency adjudications to enhance criminal sentences because they
were not properly "felony convictions." People v. West, 201 Cal. Rptr. 63, 65-71
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); see also Lise Forquer, California's Three Strikes Law-
Should a Juvenile Adjudication Be a Ball or a Strike?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1208 [Vol. 38
FACT OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
By enacting the three strikes law, the Legislature has not
transformed juvenile adjudications into criminal convictions; it
simply has said that under specified circumstances, a prior
juvenile adjudication may be used as evidence of past criminal
conduct for the purpose of increasing an adult defendant's
sentence. The three strikes law's use of juvenile adjudications
affects only the length of the sentence imposed on an adult
offender, not the finding of guilt in the adult court nor the
adjudication process in the juvenile court. Since a juvenile
constitutionally - and reliably (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania) -
can be adjudicated a delinquent without being afforded a jury
trial, there is no constitutional impediment to using that
juvenile adjudication to increase a defendant's sentence
following a later adult conviction."'
Even though juveniles have no right to a jury trial, the court in
Bowden held that Apprendi did not change the result because,
"when a juvenile receives all the process constitutionally due at the
juvenile stage, there is no constitutional problem (on which
Apprendi focused) in using that adjudication to support a later
sentencing enhancement."2 4 Thus, courts' rejection of Apprendi
claims hinge crucially on McKeiver and the ability of juvenile court
judges to make reliable determinations of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In a second, post-Apprendi California case, the defendant in
People v. Smith.. acquired both of his two prior "strikes" from a
single, jury-less delinquency adjudication for multiple counts arising
out of the same transaction.2 6 As a result, upon his first adult
conviction for burglary at age 19, the trial court sentenced him as
three-strike offender to a term of 30 years to life in prison.327 The
majority in Smith relied on Bowden and Fowler and approved the
use of prior delinquency adjudications to increase the adult
defendant's sentence well above the statutory maximum for the
burglary alone . 2 8 Despite the substantial convergence between the
1297, 1310-15 (1995) (reviewing appellate cases holding that delinquency
adjudications are not criminal convictions for purposes of sentence
enhancements).
323. Fowler, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876-877.
324. Bowden, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
325. 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
326. Id. at 908 (noting that both prior strikes "resulted from a single juvenile
court proceeding where the juvenile judge found the defendant, then age 16,
committed two offenses on a single occasion").
327. Id. at 902.
328. Id. at 905 ("Since a juvenile constitutionally-and reliably-can be
adjudicated a delinquent without being afforded a jury trial, there is no
constitutional impediment to using that juvenile adjudication to increase a
defendant's sentence following a later adult conviction.").
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juvenile and adult justice systems, it insisted that sufficient
differences remained between a finding of criminal guilt and a
delinquency adjudication to justify the procedural differences
notwithstanding the subsequent collateral consequences."'
Ultimately, the court concluded that it was bound by Daedler and
McKeiver to deny juveniles a jury trial and that unless the
California or United States supreme courts overruled those
decisions, the legislature was the proper body to address any
unfairness from the use of prior delinquency adjudications."'
A strong dissent in Smith characterized the use of delinquency
convictions obtained without the right to a jury trial for sentence
enhancements and as "strikes" as an "injustice [that] rises to the
level of a constitutional violation and, as such, can and must be
remedied by the courts.""' Judge Johnson argued that the
California Supreme Court probably erred in 1924 when it originally
denied delinquents a state constitutional right to a jury trial in
juvenile court332 and that, in any event, "the legal and social
environment have changed so much that the rationale undergirding
In re Daedler's holding has eroded completely away."333 In the
329. Id. at 906 (noting "significant differences between a finding of criminal
guilt in an adult criminal court and a declaration of wardship by a juvenile
court"). The differences in consequences of criminal convictions and
delinquency adjudications include: the possibility of imprisonment for life or
capital punishment versus a term of confinement that cannot extend beyond the
age of twenty-five; public criminal records versus sealed juvenile records that
may affect future employability; and collateral consequences including the right
to serve on a jury, to vote, to possess firearms, and to engage in certain
professions. Id.
330. The Courts in McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528, 528-29 (1971), and In re Daedler,
194 Cal. 320, 332 (Cal. 1924), denied juveniles a federal and state constitutional
right to a jury trial, and the Smith majority regarded those decisions as
controlling. In the absence of judicial action, "[a]ny meaningful response...
must come from the political branches of our state government." Id. at 907.
331. Id. at 908. Judge Johnson objected that when a trial judge "counts a
juvenile court 'true finding' as a prior 'strike,' despite the absence of a right to
jury trial in delinquency proceedings where he was found to have committed
that offense ... the statute authorizing this practice violates both the California
and United States Constitutions ...." Id. at 909.
332. Judge Johnson referred to the court of appeal's earlier decision in In re
Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), which concluded that Daedler
erroneously misread the law at the time when it found that it was permissible
to deny delinquents a right to a jury trial. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 911. "[W]e
concluded our Supreme Court had erred some 60 years earlier when it held
juvenile courts could try alleged juvenile offenders without juries." Id.
333. Id. at 910. California courts regularly asserted that juvenile
proceedings differed from criminal prosecutions, that the purpose of
delinquency intervention was "not to punish the child but to redirect him to the
right path," and that juvenile court judges give "more consideration for their
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alternative, if delinquency proceedings truly are non-criminal equity
proceedings, then they cannot be reclassified as "criminal
convictions" for later use to enhance a "three strike" sentence.33 4 In
addition, changes in California's waiver law grant prosecutors the
discretionary authority to decide whether to charge a youth in
criminal court as an adult, where he has the right to a jury, or as a
juvenile, where he has no right to a jury, and to use either conviction
as a "strike" regardless of the forum in which it is obtained.3 5 This
future development than for their past shortcomings." Id. at 913. However, the
court in In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), and Judge
Johnson emphasized that those differences in proceedings and purposes had not
survived the Twentieth Century. "[Tihe goals are too punitive, the process too
adversarial, and the consequences too much like punishment to qualify as
anything other than criminal." Id. at 915. Indeed, to claim that a delinquency
prosecution is anything other than a criminal proceeding is "pure fiction." Id. at
914.
334. Id. at 918-19.
[Tihe constitutionality of denying juveniles a right to jury trial is
predicated on classifying juvenile delinquency proceedings as
something other than 'criminal proceedings.'. . . [Olnly because there
was no right to trial by jury in English courts of equity as of 1850, and
only because our juvenile courts are courts of equity rather than
criminal courts, do juveniles lack a constitutional right to jury trial in
these courts in 21st century California .... [Ihf we instead admit
what is happening in juvenile court is now the equivalent of criminal
proceedings and the resulting outcomes the equivalent of criminal
convictions, we can no longer constitutionally deny juveniles a right to
jury trial in delinquency proceedings before the juvenile court.
335. As a result of California's adoption of Proposition 21, the prosecutor has
discretion to charge directly in criminal court youths sixteen years of age or
older and accused of committing certain violent offenses enumerated in Cal.
Welf. & Inst. §707(b), and juveniles fourteen years of age or older charged with
committing certain serious offenses under specified circumstances, id. at 707(d).
In Manduley v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168 (Cal.
2002), the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law.
The court characterized the decision to charge a youth in criminal court or in
juvenile court as an exercise of traditional prosecutorial charging discretion
which was not subject to judicial review. Id. at 175.
Inasmuch as petitioners concede that the Legislature possesses the
authority to eliminate entirely the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
and preclude juvenile court dispositions with regard to all minors who
come within the scope of section 707(d), a statute conferring upon the
prosecutor the discretion, before a judicial proceeding has been
commended, to charge some of these minors in criminal court does not
usurp an exclusively judicial authority.
Id. at 180. The court summarily rejected Manduley's claim that the lack of
standards or criteria to guide the prosecutor's exercise of discretion violated due
process "because minors who commit crimes under the circumstances set forth
in section 707(d) do not possess any statutory right to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court." Id. at 188. Unlike a judicial waiver hearing
which requires procedural due process, Manduley concluded that
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enables the prosecutor to control and to deny juveniles access to a
jury trial in those cases in which it would be most essential. 3 6
Finally, Judge Johnson argued that Apprendi and Jones barred the
use of delinquency adjudications as "prior convictions" because the
state obtained them without a right to a jury trial.337  The
constitutional impediment occurs because it is a judge, rather than a
jury, who initially decided whether the juvenile committed the
underlying offense subsequently to be used for sentence
enhancement. 38
[T]he Apprendi line of cases interpreting the Constitution,
forecloses the use of prior juvenile adjudications as 'felony
convictions' in California's three strikes sentencing scheme
.... [T]o tolerate such a punishment with two of the three
qualifying offenses decided in proceedings where appellant
lacked the right to jury trial offends both the United States
and California Constitutions and several hundred years of
Anglo-American legal tradition as well.33 9
[a] statute that authorizes discretionary direct filing in criminal court
by the prosecution ... does not require similar procedural protections,
because it does not involve a judicial determination but rather
constitutes an executive charging function, which does not implicate
the right to procedural due process and a hearing.
Id. at 191. Similarly, prosecutorial selection of some youths for adult
prosecution and others for delinquency adjudication does not violate Equal
Protection unless the youth can show that "she has been singled out
deliberately for prosecution on the basis of some invidious criterion, and that
the prosecution would not have been pursued except for the discriminatory
purpose of the prosecuting authorities." Id. at 193. Regardless of the forum in
which the state obtains a conviction, a "strike" is a "strike." People v. Smith, 1
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 920 ("whichever route the prosecutor elects, if successful the
conviction or juvenile adjudication inflicts a 'strike' on the accused ordinarily by
far the most significant consequence attaching to a finding of guilt.").
336. Id. at 920. The prosecutor could deny a juvenile access to a jury trial
where
the prosecution's case is weak, or this particular juvenile would be
especially sympathetic to a jury, or for some other reason the jury
would be more likely to acquit than a judge. Or, it is even possible to
imagine a prosecutor choosing a juvenile court trial without jury in
order to gain the advantage of trial before a judicial officer ... known
to render decisions favorable to the prosecution-in other words, the
very sort ofjudge the right to jury trial is designed to allow an accused
to avoid.
Id.
337. Id. at 922.
338. Id. at 924 ("[Iun the instant case as in Tighe, the underlying facts-
whether the defendant actually committed the offense charged in the juvenile
court proceeding are being decided by a judge rather than a jury because the
defendant was denied the option ofjury trial.").
339. Id. at 929.
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In contrast with Hitt, Bowden, and the majority in Smith, the
Louisiana court of appeals in State v. Brown 340 recognized the
validity of the defendant's Apprendi objection to the use of his prior
delinquency conviction to enhance his criminal sentence.341
Although Louisiana continues to deny juveniles a statutory or state
constitutional right to a jury trial, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
In re D.J. recognized that the differences between delinquency and
criminal trial procedures might require exclusion of delinquency
adjudications for sentence enhancements.342 The court in Brown
reviewed the reasoning of Tighe and Smalley and the minimal
guidance provided by In re D.J. and held that "prior juvenile
adjudications that resulted absent a jury trial are constitutionally
inadequate under the Apprendi exception for purposes of subsequent
sentence enhancement."
343
Significantly, the court in Brown reviewed the facts of the prior
delinquency conviction obtained in a delinquency bench trial as
illustrative of the Apprendi problem. The juvenile court judge had
convicted Brown despite the absence of any evidence that he
participated in the crime and a jury had acquitted his alleged adult
co-defendant charged with the same offense.3 44  "To use such a
defective juvenile adjudication to constitute a 'prior conviction' for
purposes of the Apprendi exception, and allow such prior conviction
to be used to enhance the statutory penalty ... is constitutionally
improper. 3 45  Thus, Brown vividly demonstrates the procedural
deficiencies of juvenile courts and the reasons to exclude
340. No. 2002-KA-1217, 2003 WL 21299836 (La. Ct. App. May 28, 2003).
341. Id. at *7.
342. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied juveniles a constitutional right to
a jury trial in State in Interests of Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 598 (La. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Fernandez, 712
So. 2d 485 (La. 1998). The court reaffirmed its holding denying a right to jury
trial in delinquency proceedings in In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391 (La. 1998). In In
re DJ, 817 So. 2d 26 (La. 2002), the court again reaffirmed its holding denying
juveniles a constitutional right to a jury. "[W]e find that fundamental fairness
does not require us to overrule Dino's holding that due process does not afford a
juvenile the right to a jury trial during the adjudication of a charge of
delinquency in juvenile court." Id. at 32. However, the court suggested that the
differences in trial procedures might affect the ability of the state to use
juvenile convictions for sentence enhancements.
In United States v. Tucker and Burgett v. Texas, the Supreme Court
prohibited the use of prior convictions that were entered without the
advice of counsel to enhance later sentences. In a related vein, some
commentators suggest that the practice of using juvenile convictions
obtained without the option to be tried by a jury to enhance adult
sentences renders the juvenile system unconstitutional."
Id. at 31 n.6.
343. Brown, 2003 WL 21299836, at *12.
344. Id. at *13.
345. Id.
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delinquency convictions from the Apprendi exception.
2. Waiver to Criminal Court: Judicial Fact-Finding that
Increases the Maximum Sentence
Waiver of juveniles to criminal court for adult prosecution
represents the single most important sentencing decision that
juvenile court judges make. 46 In Kent v. United States,3 7 the
Supreme Court held that due process requires some procedural
protections in judicial waiver hearings.48 Subsequently, in Breed v.
Jones3 9 the Court applied the Constitution's Double Jeopardy
provisions to delinquency adjudications and required states to
decide whether to prosecute a youth as a juvenile or adult before
holding a trial on the merits of the charge.35°
346. See generally Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 83
(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (analyzing legislation shifting
waiver discretion from judges to prosecutors) [hereinafter, Feld, Legislative
Exclusion]; HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 102-108 (1999) (summarizing types of waiver
legislation); PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT
JUVENILE CRIME 3-9 (1996) (analyzing changes in waiver legislation in mid-
1990s in response to upsurge in youth violence); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile
Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver
Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987) (analyzing types of waiver
legislation-judicial waiver, prosecutorial direct file, legislative offense
exclusion-and recent statutory changes) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Waiver];
Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth
Violence, 24 CRIME & JUSTICE 189 (1998) (analyzing statutory changes designed
to increase number of youths tried as adults in criminal court).
347. 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
348. Id. at 554. The Court concluded that the loss of the special protections
of the juvenile court-private proceedings, confidential records, and protection
from the stigma of a criminal conviction-was a "critically important" decision
that required a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations
and other records, and written findings and conclusions capable of review by a
higher court. Id. at 556-57.
349. 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
350. Id. Breed posed the issue of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment prohibited adult criminal re-prosecution of a youth after a
prior conviction in juvenile court. Id. at 541. The Court resolved the question
by establishing a functional equivalence between an adult criminal trial and a
delinquency proceeding. Id. at 531. The Court described the virtually identical
interests implicated in a delinquency hearing and a traditional criminal
prosecution, "anxiety and insecurity," a "heavy personal strain," and the
increased burdens as the juvenile system became more procedurally formalized.
Id. at 530-31 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1955) and
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1979)).
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Although Kent and Breed provide the procedural framework for
judicial waiver-sentencing decisions, the substantive bases of waiver
pose the principal difficulty. Traditionally, most states allowed
judges to waive jurisdiction based on a discretionary assessment of a
youth's "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness." Judges
decided whether to order transfer based on the juvenile's age,
treatment prognosis and clinical evaluations, and threat to others as
indicated by the seriousness of the present offense and prior
record."6 ' Legislatures specify waiver factors with varying degrees of
precision, and often incorporate the substantive criteria the Court
appended to Kent. 52
Because judicial waiver is a form of sentencing decision that
represents a choice between the punitive sentences in criminal
courts and the shorter, nominally rehabilitative dispositions
available to juvenile courts, it increases the maximum penalties
juveniles face. Moreover, changes in waiver laws in recent decades
reflect the same changes in sentencing jurisprudence that have
occurred in the criminal justice system, from an emphasis on
characteristics of the offender to the seriousness of the offense, and
from a highly discretionary indeterminate process to a more
determinate framework using explicit offense criteria.353
351. See generally SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 346, at 103 (continuing
importance of determination of "amenability to treatment"); Barry C. Feld,
Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative
Alternative To Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 529-537
(1978) (analyzing judicial construction of "amenability to treatment");; Marcy
Podkopacz and Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1996) (analyzing age,
offense, and clinical factors affecting judicial waiver decisions).
352. Although the Supreme Court decided Kent on procedural grounds, in an
Appendix to the opinion, it listed substantive factors that a juvenile court might
consider in waiving jurisdiction:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense ... ;
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner;
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property... ;
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint...;
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the juvenile's associates ... are adults ... ;
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional
attitude and pattern of living;
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile ... ; and
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile ....
Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67.
353. See Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 346, at 91-98; see generally
Feld, Juvenile Waiver, supra note 346.
2003] 1215
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Legislatures use the seriousness of the present offense and the prior
record to guide judicial discretion, to create a rebuttable or
mandatory presumption for waiver to criminal court, or to create
more severe "blended sentencing" options for delinquents retained in
juvenile court such as an "Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile
Prosecution" or a "Youthful Offender" status.35' Because judges base
their waiver-sentencing decisions, inter alia, on a juvenile's prior
record of delinquency convictions, youths have raised Apprendi
challenges to proceedings that remove their juvenile status.
A juvenile successfully asserted an Apprendi claim in
Commonwealth v. Quincy Q. 55 In Quincy Q., the prosecutor either
could file a complaint alleging the juvenile was a delinquent or could
file an indictment seeking a "youthful offender" designation for
which, if convicted, the court could punish the youth as an adult."6
In an indictment seeking "youthful offender" status, the prosecutor
must allege and present evidence to the grand jury that the juvenile
threatened or inflicted "serious bodily harm."357  Because the
prosecutor failed to present evidence to the grand jury that the
youth threatened or inflicted serious bodily harm, the
354. See, e.g., TORBET ET AL, supra note 346, at 11-13 (analyzing "blended
sentencing" provisions); Feld, Juvenile Waiver, supra note 346, at 504-11; Feld,
Legislative Exclusion, supra note 346, at 87 (analyzing legislation mandating
adult prosecution based on present offense and prior record); Feld, Violent
Youth, supra note 124, at 1024-37 (analysis of presumptive certification using
offense criteria to shift burden of proof to juvenile to demonstrate why juvenile
court should retain jurisdiction); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz and Barry C.
Feld, The Back-Door To Prison: Waiver Reform, Blended Sentencing, and the
Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997, 1061-71
(2001) (analyzing "net-widening" effect of blended sentencing that places more
youths in prison).
355. 753, N.E.2d 781 (Mass. 2001).
356. Chapter 119 of the General Laws of Massachusetts permits the
prosecutor to indict a juvenile as a "youthful offender" if: the youth was between
fourteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the offense; the offense is a
felony; and the youth previously was committed to the department of youth
services, or the alleged offense involved a firearm, or it involved "the infliction
or threat of serious bodily harm." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 § 58 (2003)
(emphasis added). The court may punish a youth adjudicated as a "youthful
offender" as an adult, whereas the court only may commit a juvenile
adjudicated delinquent to the Department of Youth Services for rehabilitation.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 58 (2003).
357. Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d at 787 ("The label '[y]outhful offender' refers not
to a status necessary before an indictment may be brought by a prosecutor, but
to a status that is an outcome of indictment and adjudication .... [Wihere a
prosecutor seeks a youthful offender indictment relying on 'the infliction or
threat of serious bodily harm' component of the statute, the conduct
constituting the offense must involve the infliction or threat of serious bodily
harm.").
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Massachusetts supreme court held that the trial court should have
dismissed Quincy Q.'s "youthful offender" indictment which required
such a factual showing. Quincy Q. relied on Apprendi because "the
youthful offender statute authorizes judges to increase the
punishment for juvenile convicted of certain offenses beyond the
statutory maximum otherwise permitted for juveniles" if the
statutory requirements are satisfied.358 As a matter of legislative
grace, youths normally enjoy the shorter sentences and benefits of a
juvenile court system.
However, once the Legislature enacted a law providing that
the maximum punishment for delinquent juveniles is
commitment to the Department of Youth Services
(department) for a defined time period, any facts, including the
requirements for youthful offender status, that would increase
the penalty for such juveniles must be proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, if the Commonwealth
determines to proceed against a juvenile by indictment, it
must present at the grand jury stage sufficient evidence of the
underlying offense to warrant a finding of probable cause that
the underlying crime has been committed, as well as sufficient
evidence that the [statutory] requirements.., have been
met.
359
Thus, where the law presumptively classifies a youth as delinquent
and the more severe "youthful offender" hinges on the presence of
certain aggravating facts, such as "serious bodily harm," those
elements become part of the prosecution's burden to allege in the
indictment and to prove to a jury.
New Mexico's waiver law also created a "youthful offender"
status for juveniles charged with serious crimes. Following
conviction of one of twelve enumerated felonies, the court conducts a
waiver-sentencing hearing to determine a youth's "amenability to
treatment" and to decide whether to sentence the youth as an adult
or as a "youthful offender" over whom jurisdiction terminates at age36 361
twenty-one. In State v. Gonzales, the youth argued that
358. Id. at 864-65; see also Commonwealth v. Dale D., 431 Mass. 757, 759,
("A juvenile indicted as a youthful offender faces substantially greater penalties
than a juvenile proceeded against by complaint as a delinquent.").
359. Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d at 789.
360. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-2-3-(I), 32A-2-20 (Michie 2000). For youths
fourteen years of age or older and convicted of any of twelve enumerated
felonies or convicted of any felony who have three prior felony adjudications, the
court conducts a waiver-sentencing hearing to determine "amenability to
treatment or rehabilitation" and the trial judge has discretion whether to
sentence the juvenile as a "youthful offender" or as an adult. The statutory
criteria mirror those used in Kent, 383 U.S. at 547. New Mexico also gives
delinquents a statutory right to a jury trial, to enable the court to sentence the
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Apprendi's requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt
applied to the "amenability" determination because of the
seriousness of the consequences.6 2 The court distinguished a
jurisdictional or "amenability" determination from a finding of
criminal liability and rejected the defendant's Apprendi argument
for three reasons.
First, while findings of guilt are measures of the degree of an
individual's criminal culpability, the finding that a child is or
is not amenable to treatment is a measure of a child's
prospects for rehabilitation. Second, while findings of guilt are
based on historical facts susceptible of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, a finding that a child is not amenable to
rehabilitation requires a prediction of future conduct based on
complex considerations of the child, the child's crime, and the
child's history and environment. Third, a determination of
amenability or eligibility for commitment requires some
foreknowledge of available facilities and the programs in them
that trial judges who make sentencing decisions ever day have,
while juries do not.363
The court concluded that determining a youth's "amenability to
treatment" focused on the youth's prospects for rehabilitation rather
than her degree of criminal culpability and thus was properly a
"sentencing factor" to be decided by a judge, rather than an "element
of the offense" to be found by a jury.364 One judge concurred on the
grounds that because youths have no constitutional right to be
youth as an adult, if it determines he is not "amenable to treatment." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16 (Michie 2000).
361. 24 P.3d 776, 783 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
362. Id. at 783. ("Defendant argues that the consequences of sentencing as
an adult in terms of both the length of incarceration and removal of the
protections of the juvenile system render the amenability determinations more
like elements of a crime than sentencing factors.").
363. Id. at 783-84. The court also emphasized the special expertise of judges
in making sentencing decisions.
[A] court, which has regular exposure to both the criminal and
juvenile systems, is in a much better position to determine an
individual child's amenability to treatment within existing programs.
In their day-to-day interactions with sentencing decisions,
presentence reports, probation violations, and the whole range of
criminal and juvenile justice issues, trial courts become
knowledgeable about the basic considerations governing appropriate
dispositions for offenders.
Id. at 785.
364. Id. at 785. Unlike Apprendi, the court also emphasized that the
sentence for which the court convicted the "youthful offender" set the maximum
sentence and a finding of "non-amenability" did not increase the sentence
beyond the statutory range. "[Alt the time the child pleads or is adjudicated
guilty of an offense, the range of possible sentences is fixed." Id.
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sentenced in the juvenile system, the "youthful offender" statute did
not increase the maximum sentence to which they otherwise would
be exposed. 65
A number of states use age and offense criteria to create a
presumption for waiver.366 In Illinois, for example, the filing of a
delinquency petition exposes a convicted youth to the maximum
sanction of commitment to the Department of Correction's juvenile
division until age twenty-one.6 7 However, if a prosecutor files a
transfer motion with the petition, alleges that the juvenile is fifteen
years of age or older and committed a Class X felony, and the judge
finds probable cause, then the statute creates a rebuttable
presumption for criminal prosecution and shifts to the juvenile the
burden to demonstrate by "clear and convincing" evidence that the
minor would be "amenable to . . . treatment" through the juvenile
court.368 In People v. Beltran,369 the juvenile raised an Apprendi
objection to the presumptive transfer provision which exposed him
to criminal prosecution and a much longer sentence as an adult.37 °
365. See id. at 792 (Bustmante, J., concurring).
[J]uveniles have no constitutional right to be treated as a child within
the juvenile system. Given that limitation, the legislature can set
sentencing essentially as it pleases for juveniles. New Mexico's
unique system has given the trial judge two sentencing options [as an
adult or "youthful offender"]. The amenability determination helps
guide which option a judge may employ, but it does not increase the
maximum sentence allowed by the legislature.
Id.
366. See generally 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805 (West 1998); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 (West 2002); Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 124, at
1027-33.
367. 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-750 (West 1998).
368. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(2)(a) (West 1998) (providing for
presumptive transfer if the prosecutor alleges the minor committed a Class X
felony (other than armed violence or aggravated use of a firearm) and that the
minor is fifteen years of age or older). If the juvenile judge finds "probable
cause to believe that the allegations in the petition... are true," the statute
creates "a rebuttable presumption that the minor is not a fit and proper subject
to be dealt with" in the juvenile justice system and should be transferred to the
criminal court. Id. at 405/5-805(2)(a). The court shall order transfer for
criminal prosecution unless the judge makes a finding based on "clear and
convincing evidence that the minor would be amenable to the care, treatment,
and training programs available through the facilities of the juvenile court
based on an evaluation" of enumerated statutory criteria. Id. at 405/5-805(2)(b).
369. 765 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
370. See Beltran, 765 N.E.2d at 1075. The juvenile argued that when the
state filed a delinquency petition, he faced a maximum sanction of commitment
until age twenty-one. Id.
However, after the juvenile court found (1) probable cause to believe the
State's allegations and (2) a lack of clear and convincing evidence of defendant's
amenability to the juvenile court's facilities, defendant faced (and ultimately
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The court distinguished Apprendi on two grounds. First, unlike
Apprendi, which involved a criminal prosecution, presumptive
transfer is a juvenile proceeding in which juveniles do not enjoy a
constitutional right to a jury under McKeiver3  Second, the court
characterized the transfer hearing as dispositional, rather than
adjudicatory, and thus concluded that Apprendi did not apply.7 2
However, describing the proceeding as a sentencing hearing
assumes the very question presented in Apprendi, whether a "fact"
is properly viewed as a "sentencing factor" or as an "element" to be
proven to a jury.3
The Kansas transfer statute also creates a rebuttable
presumption for waiver for older youths charged with a serious
offense and places the burden on the juvenile to demonstrate her
"amenability to treatment" within the juvenile system.3 4 In State v.
Jones,7 5 the juvenile argued that the presumptive waiver statute
"runs afoul of Apprendi because the fact that he should be tried as
an adult is made by a judge resulting in a penalty beyond the
statutory maximum., 376  The Jones court relied on its analysis of
received) a much greater sanction. Thus, in violation of Apprendi, the
maximum penalty was increased upon facts that were not submitted to a jury
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
371. See id. at 1075-76. In distinguishing Apprendi, the court noted that
the defendant had the right to have a jury determine, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the facts that established the maximum penalty. A
hearing under Section 5-805(2), however, is a juvenile proceeding.
Thus, whether the defendant was denied due process depends on the
standards applicable to those proceedings, rather than those
applicable to criminal prosecution. It is well established that, in a
juvenile proceeding, due process does not require a jury.
Id. (citations omitted).
372. Id. at 1076.
A hearing under section 5-805(2) is dispositional, not adjudicatory.
That is, the hearing determines not the minor's guilt but the forum in
which his guilt may be adjudicated. Thus, although the juvenile court
made findings that exposed him to a greater sanction, defendant had
no due process right to have a jury make those findings beyond a
reasonable doubt. Because Apprendi bears only on the process due in
criminal proceedings, the case is simply inapplicable here.
Id. (citations omitted).
373. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 ("[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect.").
374. KAN. STAT. ANN. §38-1636(a)(2) (West 2000) (creating the statutory
presumption for waiver based on age and allegation of a serious offense).
Section 38-1636(e) enumerates the specific, Kent-like criteria the court must
consider in making its amenability determination.
375. 47 P.3d 783 (Kan. 2002).
376. Id. at 793. "Implicit in Jones' argument is that the statutory maximum
is the one under the juvenile system, not the Kansas criminal code. Sentencing
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Apprendi in Hitt, in which it concluded that the Constitution does
not require treatment as a juvenile and "certain rights afforded a
defendant under the adult system are not constitutionally required
for a respondent under the juvenile system."3 77 Just as Hitt found
the procedural safeguards of the juvenile system adequate to
establish the validity of delinquency convictions to fit within the
Apprendi exception, so too, Jones found the procedures for
determining jurisdiction adequate without the disruptive impact
that requiring a jury would entail.378 Ultimately, a judicial transfer
proceeding involves a decision whether a youth should be prosecuted
as a juvenile or an adult, rather than a finding of guilt, and a youth
tried "as an adult will be subjected to the statutory maximum
sentence under the applicable criminal statute only after a jury has
determined his or her [legal] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."379
As a matter of juvenile justice policy, the courts' decisions in
Gonzales, Beltran, and Jones to reject Apprendi in waiver hearings
reach the correct result. However, the facile assertions in Gonzalez
and Jones that juveniles do not enjoy a constitutional right to be
tried in juvenile court does not adequately analyze or dispose of the
Apprendi issues. The defendant's sentence in Apprendi was fixed by
statute, but judicially raising his penalty beyond the statutory
maximum violated his constitutional right to a jury trial. Similarly,
once a legislature grants a juvenile a statutory right to be tried in
juvenile court, a judicial proceeding that abrogates that statutory
entitlement and exposes her to a greater criminal penalty produces
the same consequences that Apprendi condemned. Rather than
distinguishing Apprendi based on juveniles' lack of a constitutional
right to be treated as delinquents, courts should analyze waiver-
sentencing as a jurisdictional determination-juvenile or criminal
justice system-to which no penalty consequences attach until the
judge makes the threshold determination whether a youth should be
tried as a juvenile or adult. This interpretation is consistent with
the Supreme Court's Double Jeopardy analysis in Breed v. Jones
which required juvenile courts to make the jurisdictional
determination prior to any adjudication on the merits. Waiver is a
quintessential sentencing decision that considers myriad
individualized facts bearing on "amenability" which a jury would be
under the Kansas criminal code does not exceed the prescribed statutory
maximum." Id. at 794.
377. Id. at 795. See supra notes 303-308 and accompanying text.
378. Id. ("The procedural safeguards are deemed adequate to withstand the
demands for jury determinations within the juvenile system, as well as to
support other differences afforded in the adult system but not in the juvenile
system.").
379. Id. at 798.
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even less likely than a judge to apply consistently from one case to
the next. The courts' fears about the disruptive impact of a jury in
this sentencing context are especially well-founded. Kent imposed
only modest procedural formality on waiver hearings and yet those
minimal requirements provided a strong political impetus for more
"stream-lined" waiver provisions such as offense exclusion and
prosecutorial "direct file."38° To procedurally encumber waiver
hearings with a jury would provide a strong incentive to exclude
more categories of offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction with all
311of the defects of mandatory sentencing statutes .
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Apprendi held that states must submit to
a jury and prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increased
the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum. To assure
congruence between culpability and consequence, the Court
reasoned that a jury must find the facts upon which a court based
an enhanced sentence as an "element" of the offense to be proved at
trial rather than as a judicial "sentencing factor."
[Tihere is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a
prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which
380. See Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 346, at 113.
States made relatively limited use of offense-based strategies until
Kent provided the impetus for offense exclusion and prosecutorial
direct-file laws . . . . But reflecting the influences of just deserts
jurisprudence, criminal career research, and get-tough politics, two
distinct legislative trends have emerged during the past quarter-
century. First, more states have excluded at least some offenses from
their juvenile courts' jurisdiction, lowered the ages of juveniles'
eligibility for criminal prosecution, and then increased the numbers of
offenses for which states may prosecute youths as adults. Second, the
number of states that allow prosecutors, rather than judges, to make
forum selection decisions via concurrent jurisdiction also has
increased, as has the range of offenses for which they may transfer
youths.
Id. (citations omitted).
381. Id. at 124.
Excluded-offense and direct-file laws suffer from the rigidity,
inflexibility, political vulnerability, and overinclusiveness
characteristic of mandatory sentencing statutes. In practice,
excluded-offense laws transfer discretion from juvenile court judges in
a waiver hearing to prosecutors who determine a youth's delinquent
or criminal status by manipulating their charging decisions . ...
[S]uch laws prescribe a simplistic, politically attractive sound bite
solution for a complex problem, curtail judicial discretion and juvenile
courts' clientele, and obscure the bases and processes of "adulthood"
decisions.
Id. at 124-25 (citations omitted).
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the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a
lesser standard of proof. 8'
Apprendi exempted the "fact of a prior conviction" from its
holding because defendants had the right to a jury trial and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt at the time the state obtained the
original conviction which assured its validity, accuracy, and
reliability.
In delinquency proceedings, by contrast, McKeiver used a lower,
"fundamental fairness" standard of procedural justice, rather than
the Sixth Amendment rights it incorporated for adults, to deny a
constitutional right to a jury trial. McKeiver used an outmoded
analysis and uncritically accepted the rhetoric of juvenile justice in
order to justify the result it reached. It did so because the Court
envisioned delinquency proceedings as something more benevolent
and therapeutic than criminal prosecutions. Although Winship
requires States to prove delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt, the
availability of a jury provides the prime checking mechanism to
assure congruence of outcomes between trials and pleas. While
McKeiver found non-jury delinquency procedures constitutionally
adequate for rehabilitative dispositions, those standards clearly
would not be adequate for an explicitly punitive disposition in the
first instance.
Regardless of the unproven therapeutic character of
delinquency dispositions three decades ago, juvenile courts today
clearly punish young delinquents for crimes. Importantly, all of the
courts that rely upon McKeiver to justify the use of delinquency
convictions for sentence enhancements-e.g., Williams, Johnson,
Smalley, Hitt-fail to acknowledge or discuss McKeiver's reasons for
using less stringent procedural safeguards or the anomaly of using
treatment dispositions for the purpose of extending subsequent
punishment. Unfortunately, none of the cases that uphold the use
of prior delinquency convictions for sentence enhancements
382. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.
383. As Judge Johnson of the California Court of Appeals noted in People v.
Smith,
Now nearly a third of a century later it is not altogether clear the
rationale of that opinion, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, remains sound
given the inexorable convergence of the criminal and juvenile systems
since it was issued. Furthermore, even if juvenile courts can deny
jury trial rights to alleged delinquents, this does not mean the
Constitution allows adult criminal courts to use adjudications thesejuvenile courts produce as "strikes" to enhance later adult sentences.
People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 921-22 (2003) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
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adequately examine the differences in purposes for which the state
initially obtained those convictions but mechanically rely on the idea
that a conviction that is valid for one purpose therefore must be
valid for all purposes. Moreover, none of them sufficiently evaluate
the reliability and quality of those prior convictions compared with
those of adult defendants.
As every commentator and many courts have noted, McKeiver's
uncritical and out-dated plurality decision is ripe for overruling.
Judicial, legislative, and administrative changes have transformed
the juvenile court into a very different institution than the one that
McKeiver considered more than three decades ago.384 At best, the
contemporary juvenile court functions as little more than a scaled-
down, second-class criminal justice system for youths that provides
neither therapy nor justice.385 Notwithstanding McKeiver's fond
hopes, juvenile courts' adjudicative functions simply replicate those
of criminal courts, albeit with fewer, less adequate procedural
protections. Providing delinquents with a constitutional or
statutory right to a jury trial would mitigate the unfairness of using
procedurally deficient, factually unreliable convictions to enhance
subsequent sentences. States which deny delinquents jury trials in
the contemporary punitive juvenile justice system compound that
inequity when they use those nominally rehabilitative sentences to
extend terms of adult imprisonment. In addition to the procedural
protections afforded by the right to a jury, the possibility of a jury
trial would improve the quality of juvenile justice administration
and the performance of counsel as well. Thus, Apprendi's exception
of "the fact of a prior conviction" carries the possibility of even more
far reaching reforms in juvenile justice administration.
384. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 227; Feld, Race, Politics, supra note 89.
385. Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997)
(stating that punitive reforms have transformed "the historical ideal of the
juvenile court as a social welfare institution into a penal system that provides
young offenders with neither therapy nor justice").
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